In 1968 India established this special branch of its intelligence service specifically targeted on Pakistan. The formation of RAW was based on the belief that Pakistan was supplying weapons to Sikh terrorists, and providing shelter and training to the guerrillas in Pakistan. Pakistan has accused the Research and Analysis Wing of sponsoring sabotage in Punjab, where RAW is alleged to have supported the Seraiki movement, providing financial support to promote its activities in Pakistan and organizing an International Seraiki Conference in Delhi in November-December 1993. RAW has an extensive network of agents and anti-government elements within Pakistan, including dissident elements from various sectarian and ethnic groups of Sindh and Punjab. Published reports allege that as many as 35,000 RAW agents entered Pakistan between 1983-93, with 12,000 working in Sindh, 10,000 in Punjab, 8,000 in North West Frontier Province and 5000 in Balochistan. The Government of Pakistan frequently assigns responsibility for terrorist activity to the Indian Government, even when no supporting evidence can be verified. It is evidently in the interest of the Pakistani government to blame terrorist actions on external rather than internal sources, just as it would be in the interest of Indian services to obscure their hand in such actions.

RAW has a long history of activity in Bangladesh, supporting both secular forces and the area's Hindu minority. The involvement of RAW in East Pakistan is said to date from the 1960s, when RAW promoted dissatisfaction against Pakistan in East Pakistan, including funding Mujibur Rahmanh's general election in 1970 and providing training and arming the Mukti Bahini. During the course of its investigation the Jain Commission received testimony on the official Indian support to the various Sri Lankan Tamil armed groups in Tamil Nadu. From 1981, RAW and the Intelligence Bureau established a network of as many as 30 training bases for these groups in India. Centres were also established at the high-security military installation of Chakrata, near Dehra Dun, and in the Ramakrishna Puram area of New Delhi. This clandestine support to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), some of whom were on the payroll of RAW, was later suspended. Starting in late 1986 the Research and Analysis Wing focused surveillance on the LTTE which was expanding ties with Tamil Nadu separatist groups. Rajiv Gandhi sought to establish good relations with the LTTE, even after the Indian Peace Keeping Force [IPKF] experience in Sri Lanka. But the Indian intelligence community failed to accurately assess the character of the LTTE and its orientation India and its political leaders. The LTTE assassination of Rajiv Gandhi was apparently motivated by fears of a possible re-induction of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka and a crackdown on the LTTE network in Tamil Nadu.

The rapid growth of the internal intelligence bureaus and the increased use of paramilitary forces against separatist insurgencies and communal unrest have given the Home Ministry increasing day-to-day control over law and order operations. Centrally controlled paramilitary forces are deployed throughout India and have been responsible for significant human rights abuses in Jammu and Kashmir and the northeast. These abuses ultimately raised questions about the effectiveness of civilian oversight and the extent of the Government's willingness and ability to prosecute offenders vigorously. Army units are also deployed for internal security duty in Kashmir and the northeast, and generally show greater respect for human rights than the paramilitary forces, although they have also been responsible for some abuses. The 25 state governments have primary responsibility for maintaining law and order. However, the central Government provides guidance and support through use of national paramilitary forces and in law has ultimate responsibility for protecting the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. The bulk of the Indian Police is comprised of forces in the States. Each State has its own force headed by a Director-General of Police (DGP) who is equivalent in rank to his counterpart in the Union Government forces. A number of Additional Directors-General or Inspectors-General of Police (IGP) who look after various portfolios, such as Personnel, Law & Order, Intelligence, Crime, Armed Police, Training, and Technical Services are located at the State Police Headquarters and report directly to the DGP. Major cities in a State are headed by a Commissioner of Police (CP) who, again, reports to the DGP. Areas outside these cities in a State are divided into Districts of varying size. Each district is headed by a Superintendent of Police (SP) and supervised by a Deputy Inspector-General (DIG) whose jurisdiction is called a Range, composed of a group of three or four districts.

OPERATIONS - This category looks after the actual protection duties. In the Operations Branch, there are components like Communications Wing, Technical Wing and Transport Wing.

TRAINING - This category deals with the training of personnel on a continuous basis; The SPG imparts training in physical efficiency, firing, anti-sabotage checks, communication and other operative aspects connected with close protection drills and having a bearing on VVIP security with a view to maintaining a high level of physical fitness and to fine-tune the operational skills of SPG officers. The Syllabi of the training program is constantly reviewed and updated to effectively thwart threats from newer areas and in keeping with existing threat perception.

INTELLIGENCE and TOURS - This category looks after the threat assessment, internal intelligence pertaining to personnel, verification of character and antecedents, tours and other allied jobs.

ADMINISTRATION - This category deals with personnel, procurement and other related matters.

Before 1981 the security of the Prime Minister at his residence and offices used to be looked after by Special Security District of Delhi Police under the charge of DCP. In October 1981 a Special Task Force was raised by I.B. to provide ring-round and escort to the Prime Minister during his movements both in Delhi and outside. Then after the assassination of Indira Gandhi in October, 1984, a review was undertaken by a Committee of Secretaries and it was decided to entrust security of the Prime Minister to a Special Group under unitary and direct control of designated officer and S.T.F. to provide immediate security cover both in Delhi and outside. These decisions were taken as short term measures. Then subsequently in February 18, 1985, MHA set up Birbal Nath committee to go into the issue in its entirety and submit its recommendation. In March, 1985, the Birbal Nath Committee submitted its recommendations of raising a Special Protection Unit. 

On March 30 1985 the President of India created 819 posts for the unit under Cabinet Secretariat. The SPU was then rechristened Special Protection Group and the post of IGP was redesignated as Director. The SPG came into being on 8th April, 1985 when Dr.S.Subramaniam, then Joint Director (VIP Security) in the IB assumed Office. Creation of SPG required an elaborate exercise in order to clearly delineate responsibility of various agencies concerned with the security of the Prime Minister. The provisions contained in the 'Blue Book' which lays down security guidelines for the protection of the Prime Minister had to be harmoniously blended with this new concept of proximate security. Intelligence Bureau and the State/UT Police concerned were responsible for coordination, collection and dissemination of intelligence affecting VIP security. State/UT Police concerned and the SPG were responsible for providing physical security arrangements for the Prime Minister; the Intelligence Bureau was to provide the required intelligence inputs to these operational agencies. The Special Protection Group functioned as a security group purely on the strength of an Executive Order for three years without a legislation, from April 1985 through 02 June 1988. The Special Protection Group was constituted and trained specially to provide protection to Rajiv Gandhi as Prime Minister, in view of very high threat to him from several sources. But the organisation created for the proximate security of Shri Rajiv Gandhi as Prime Minister did not contemplate provision of protection to him when he ceased to be the Prime Minister, and faced magnified threats.

By the beginning of 1995, over 400,000 troops were reportedly deployed in Kashmir, including eight army divisions and other independent brigades across the state. At least fifty-six of 148 battalions of Border Security Forces - each including one thousand men - are engaged in Kashmir. Thirty-nine in the valley and seven in Doda District are involved in counter-insurgency operations, and ten along the line of control are involved in border security operations. Security forces committed an estimated 100-200 extrajudicial killings of suspected militants in Jammu and Kashmir during 1997. Although well-documented evidence to corroborate cases and quantify trends is lacking, most observers believe that the number of killings attributed to regular Indian forces declined slightly from the previous year. According to press reports and anecdotal accounts, those killed typically had been detained by security forces, and their bodies, bearing multiple bullet wounds and often marks of torture, were returned to relatives or were otherwise discovered the same day or a few days later.

Impunity has been and remains a serious problem in Jammu and Kashmir. Security forces have committed thousands of serious human rights violations over the course of the conflict, including extrajudicial killings, disappearances, and torture. Yet, during the period January 1, 1990 to June 30, 1997, only ten members of the security forces were tried and sentenced to 10 or more years imprisonment for violations of human rights in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab. Civilian deaths caused by security forces in 1997 diminished for the fourth consecutive year in Jammu and Kashmir. This decrease apparently is due to press scrutiny and public criticism of abuses in previous years, increased training of military and paramilitary forces in humanitarian law, and greater sensitivity of commanders to rule of law issues. The security forces have not abandoned the abduction and extrajudicial execution of suspected militants, nor accepted accountability for these abuses. However, the inclination of many commanders to distance their units from such practices has led to reduced participation in them and a transfer of some of such actions to countermilitants. Killings and abductions of suspected militants and other persons by progovernment countermilitants, believed to operate under the direction of the Border Security Forces, continue as a significant pattern in Jammu and Kashmir. Countermilitants are former separatist militants who have surrendered to government forces but have retained their arms and paramilitary organization. Although precise numbers are unavailable, progovernment countermilitants may have committed 100 to 200 extrajudicial killings in Jammu and Kashmir during 1997. Human rights groups believed that the number was slightly lower than in 1996. Government agencies fund, exchange intelligence with, and direct operations of countermilitants as part of the counterinsurgency effort. Countermilitants are known to screen passersby at roadblocks and guard extensive areas of the Kashmir Valley from attacks by militants. In sponsoring and condoning countermilitant activity, which takes place outside the legal system, the Government cannot avoid responsibility for killings, abductions, and other abuses committed by these irregulars. Perhaps as many as 3,000 continue to operate in Jammu and Kashmir, particularly in the countryside, outside major towns. During 1997 the Government took steps to organize Kashmiri counter-militants as a battalion in the paramilitary forces as a means of bringing them under enhanced control and military discipline.

MiG-25R FOXBAT (MIKOYAN-GUREVICH)

One of the three Indian Air Force Reconnaissance Squadrons is equipped with 10 MiG-25R and 2 MiG-25U [trainer] aircraft outfitted to perform imagery intelligence collection.

Country of Origin; CIS (formerly USSR).
Similar Aircraft; F-14 Tomcat, F-15 Eagle, MiG-31 Foxhound.
Crew; One.
Role; Reconnaissance.
Armament; Air-to-air missiles.
Dimensions; Length: 70 ft (21.34 m). Span: 41 ft (12.6 m).
Wings; High-mounted, swept-back, and tapered with square tips.
Engine(s); Two turbojets. Large rectangular air intakes below the canopy and forward of the wing roots. Dual exhaust.
Fuselage; Long and slender with solid, pointed nose. Box-like from the air intakes to rear section. Bubble canopy.
Tail; Twin, sweptback, and tapered fins with angular tips. Flats mid- to low-mounted on fuselage, swept-back, and tapered with angular tips.
 

JAGUAR (BREGUET, BAe)

One of the three Indian Air Force Reconnaissance Squadrons is equipped with 8 Jaguar aircraft outfitted to perform imagery intelligence.

Countries of Origin; France, UK.
Similar Aircraft; F-4 Phantom II, Mitsubishi F-1, MiG-27 Flogger, AMX.
Crew; One; trainer--two.
Role; Reconnaissance
Armament; Cannon, rockets, bombs, missiles.
Dimensions; Length: 51 ft (15.54 m). Span: 28 ft (8.54 m).
Wings; High-mounted, swept-back, and modified delta with blunt tips.
Engine(s); Two turbofans mounted to the rear of the cockpit. Rectangular air intakes on sides of cockpit. Engine exhausts show prominently under the forward portion of the tail.
Fuselage; Long, pointed, chiseled nose. Body widens at the air intakes rectangular to the exhausts. Overhanging tail section. Two belly fins. Bubble canopy.
Tail; Tail flats and fin are swept-back and tapered with square tips. Flats are mid-mounted on the fuselage with a negative slant.
User Countries; Ecuador, France, India, Nigeria, Oman, UK.

The cabinet on 25 June 1997 approved of proposals for two new remote sensing satellites to be built by ISRO at Rs 390.07 crore. At a meeting, presided over by the prime minister, the cabinet approved the proposal to build an Indian Remote Sensing Satellite-Cartosat-1-at a cost of Rs 248.49 crore .collection.

Official Secrets Act (OSA)

Under the Official Secrets Act (OSA), the Government may restrict publication of sensitive stories, but the Government sometimes interprets this broadly to suppress criticism of its policies. Human rights activists state that government pressure caused one national, English-language daily to suppress some stories and transfer a staff reporter.

Newspapers Incitements to Offenses Act

The 1971 Newspapers Incitements to Offenses Act remains in effect in Jammu and Kashmir. Under the act, a district magistrate may prohibit the press from publishing material resulting in "incitement to murder" or "any act of violence." As punishment the act stipulates that the authorities may seize newspapers and printing presses. Despite these restrictions, newspapers in Srinagar regularly publish militant press releases attacking the Government and report in detail on alleged human rights abuses. The authorities allowed foreign journalists to travel freely in Jammu and Kashmir, where they regularly spoke with militant leaders, and filed reports on government abuses.

Special Protection Group Act

The Special Protection Group Act, which received the assent of the President on the 2nd June 1988 provides for the constitution and regulation of an armed force of the Union for providing proximate security to the Prime Minister of India and the members of his immediate family and for matters connected therewith. The SPG Act had an extremely significant fallout with far reaching implications. It legally circumscribed the parameters restricting SPG protection exclusively to the Prime Minister and his immediate family members. This became a controversial issue when the question of providing protection to Rajiv Gandhi was debated after he had ceased to be the Prime Minister of India in December 1989.

Criminal Procedure Code

The Criminal Procedure Code provides for an open trial in most cases, but it allows exceptions in proceedings involving official secrets, trials in which statements prejudicial to the safety of the State might be made, or under provisions of special security legislation. Sentences must be announced in public. The police must obtain warrants for searches and seizures. In a criminal investigation, the police may conduct searches without warrants to avoid undue delay, but they must justify the searches in writing to the nearest magistrate with jurisdiction over the offence. The authorities in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, and Assam have special powers to search and arrest without a warrant. The authorities sometimes require permits and notification prior to holding parades or demonstrations, but local governments ordinarily respect the right to protest peacefully. At times of civil tension, the authorities may ban public assemblies or impose a curfew under the Criminal Procedure Code. There are three classes of prison facilities. Prisoners are not classified by the nature of their crimes, but by their standing in society. Class "C" prisoners are those who cannot prove they are college graduates or income taxpayers. Their cells are overcrowded, often have dirt floors, no furnishings, and poor quality food. The use of handcuffs and fetters is common. Class "B" prisoners--college graduates and taxpayers--are held under markedly better conditions. Class "A" prisoners are prominent persons, as designated by the Government, and are accorded private rooms, visits, and adequate food, which may be supplemented by their families. Class "A" prisoners are usually held in government guest houses.

Indian Telegraph Act

The Indian Telegraph Act authorizes the surveillance of communications, including monitoring telephone conversations and intercepting personal mail, in case of public emergency or in the interest of the public safety or tranquillity. These powers have been used by every state government. The Union Government also uses the powers of the Indian Telegraph Act to tap phones and open mail.

Armed Forces Special Powers Act of 1958

The Armed Forces Special Powers Act of 1958 remains in effect in several states, i.e., in Jammu and Kashmir, Nagaland, Manipur, Assam and parts of Tripura.

Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act

Under the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act passed in July 1990, security forces personnel have extraordinary powers, including authority to shoot suspected lawbreakers and those disturbing the peace, and to destroy structures suspected of harbouring militants or arms.

Disturbed Areas Act

The Disturbed Areas Act has been in force in a number of districts in Andhra Pradesh for more than a year. The Disturbed Areas Act remains in effect in several states, i.e., in Jammu and Kashmir, Nagaland, Manipur, Assam and parts of Tripura. It gives police extraordinary powers of arrest and detention. Human rights groups allege that security forces have been able to operate with virtual impunity in parts of Andhra Pradesh under the act.

Jammu and Kashmir Disturbed Areas Act

Under the Jammu and Kashmir Disturbed Areas Act passed in July 1990, security forces personnel have extraordinary powers, including authority to shoot suspected lawbreakers and those disturbing the peace, and to destroy structures suspected of harboring militants or arms.

Public Safety Act

The Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act (PSA) of 1978 covers corresponding procedures for that state. Over half of the detainees in Jammu and Kashmir are held under the PSA. The Government acknowledges that, as of August 1997, it held about 1,600 persons in connection with the insurgency in 5 detention centers in Jammu and Kashmir, compared with 2,070 persons acknowledged held in 1995. Of these 1,298 were held under the Public Safety Act.

National Security Act (NSA)

The National Security Act (NSA) of 1980 permits detention of persons considered security risks; police anywhere in the country (except Jammu and Kashmir) may detain suspects under NSA provisions. Under these provisions the authorities may detain a suspect without charge or trial as long as 1 year on loosely defined security grounds. The state government must confirm the detention order, which is reviewed by an advisory board of three high court judges within 7 weeks of arrest. NSA detainees are permitted visits by family members and lawyers and must be informed of the grounds for detention within 5 days (10 to 15 days in exceptional circumstances). At the end of 1997 approximately 500 persons continue to be detained under the NSA. The NSA does not define "security risk." Human rights groups allege that preventive detention can be ordered and extended under the act purely on the opinion of the detaining authority. Such a subjective decision cannot be overturned by any court.

Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act (TADA)