Operations are categorized on the basis of the echelon supported. Strategic special operations forces support national or Ministry of People's Armed Forces objectives, operational supported corps operations, and tactical-supported manoeuvre divisions and brigades. Strategic missions of special operations forces in support of national and Ministry of People's Armed Forces objectives involve reconnaissance, sniper, and agent operations, but not light infantry operations, which primarily are tactical operations. The main objectives of these units are to secure information that cannot be achieved by other means, neutralize targets, and disrupt rear areas. In executing these operations, special operations troops may be disguised either as South Korean military personnel or as civilians. Strategic missions require deep insertions either in advance of hostilities or in the initial stages by naval or air platforms. Based on available insertion platforms, North Korea has a one-time lift capability of 12,000 persons by sea and 6,000 persons by air. Most North Korea special operations forces infiltrate overland and are dedicated to operational and tactical missions, that is, reconnaissance and combat operations in concert with conventional operations in the forward corps. Although it is unknown how forces will be allocated, limits on North Korea's insertion capabilities constrain operational flexibility and determine the allocation of strategic, operational, and tactical missions. North Korean army special operations forces units are broken down into three categories based on mission and mode of operation: agent operations, reconnaissance, and light infantry and sniper. The Reconnaissance Bureau has four sniper brigades and at least seven independent reconnaissance battalions. The Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau controls fourteen light infantry/sniper brigades: six "straight-leg" brigades, six airborne brigades, and two amphibious brigades. Four light infantry brigades of unknown subordination are under the operational control of the forward corps. In addition, each regular infantry division and mechanized brigade has an special operations forces battalion.

Below the ministry level, there are public security bureaus for each province and directly administered city. These bureaus are headed by either a senior colonel or a lieutenant colonel of police, depending on the size of the population. Public security departments at each city or county and smaller substations through the country are staffed by about 100 personnel. They are organized roughly parallel to the ministry itself and have several divisions responsible for carrying out various functions. The Public Security Bureau is North Korea's equivalent of a police force, and its duties are to maintain public security and investigate crime, issue citizen registration cards to monitor movement of the populace, and provide security for various facilities. Every thirty to forty North Korean households are organized into a managed by a Unit Supervisor, Chief of Heads of Households, and Sanitation Chief. The heads handle all day-to-day administration and work in cooperation with the Public Security Bureau to monitor members of the unit. Individual party committees have been installed at every level of the military and government, and all major economic and social organizations. This binds all the organizations to the party and makes for a more effective control mechanism. The Border Guards are the paramilitary force of the Ministry of Public Security. They are primarily concerned with monitoring the border and with internal security. The latter activities include physical protection of government buildings and facilities. During a conflict, they would probably be used in border and rear area security missions. Special Custody Areas, Political Prisoners Custody Zones, or Political Prisoners Concentration camps are some of the synonyms for approximately ten detention camps for political prisoners located in Yodock, Hoeryong, or other mountainous areas in North Korea. The total estimated number of prisoners, most of whom are interned without due process of law, stands at 200000, representing 0.8% of the population, or one prisoner for every 115 North Koreans. Internees include anyone declared "threats to the regime," usually a wide array of people designated "enemies of the state" such as purged "sectarians", counterrevolutionaries and anti-party elements; former landlords, Japanese collaborators, religious clergy, and families of defectors to the south. Residents repatriated from Japan accused of criticizing the system constituted the greater percentage of the internees in the past. They are being replaced by cadres who have been defeated in frequent political struggles and their families, whose numbers have been on the rise since the establishment of the North's cult of personality, for obvious reasons.