Joint Intelligence X (JIX) serves as the secretariat which co-ordinates and provides administrative support to the other ISI wings and field organisations. It also prepares intelligence estimates and threat assessments.

The Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB), responsible for political intelligence, was the most powerful component of the organisation during the late 1980s. The JIB consists of three subsections, with one subsection devoted to operations against India.

The Joint Counter Intelligence Bureau (JCIB) is responsible for field surveillance of Pakistani diplomats stationed abroad, as well as for conducting intelligence operations in the Middle East, South Asia, China, Afghanistan and the Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union.

Joint Intelligence / North (JIN) is responsible for Jammu and Kashmir operations, including infiltration, exfiltration, propaganda and other clandestine operations.

Joint Intelligence Miscellaneous (JIM) conducts espionage in foreign countries, including offensive intelligence operations.

The Joint Signal Intelligence Bureau (JSIB), which includes Deputy Directors for Wireless, Monitoring and Photos, operates a chain of signals intelligence collection stations along the border with India, and provide communication support to militants operating in Kashmir.

Joint Intelligence Technical: In addition to these main elements, ISI also includes a separate explosives section and a chemical warfare section. Published reports provide contradictory indications as to the relative size of these organizational elements, suggesting that either JIX is the largest, or that the Joint Intelligence Bureau is the largest with some sixty percent of the total staff. The Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) is the ISI's main international financial vehicle.

The Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence is of particular importance at the joint services level. The directorate's importance derives from the fact that the agency is charged with managing covert operations outside of Pakistan whether in Afghanistan, Kashmir, or farther afield. The ISI supplies weapons, training, advice and planning assistance to terrorists in Punjab and Kashmir, as well as the separatist movements in the Northeast frontier areas of India. The 1965 war in Kashmir provoked a major crisis in intelligence. When the war started there was a complete collapse of the operations of all the intelligence agencies, which had been largely devoted to domestic investigative work such as tapping telephone conversations and chasing political suspects. The ISI after the commencement of the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war was apparently unable to locate an Indian armoured division due to its preoccupation with political affairs. Ayub Khan set up a committee headed by General Yahya Khan to examine the working of the agencies. The ISI has been deeply involved in domestic politics and, has kept track of the incumbent regime's opponents. Prior to the imposition of Martial Law in 1958, ISI reported to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army (C-in-C). When martial Law was promulgated in 1958 all the intelligence agencies fell under the direct control of the President and Chief Martial Law Administrator, and the three intelligence agencies began competing to demonstrate their loyalty to Ayub Khan and his government. The ISI and the MI became extremely active during the l964 presidential election keeping politicians, particularly the East Pakistanis, under surveillance. The ISI became even more deeply involved in domestic politics under General Yahya Khan, notably in East Pakistan, where operations were mounted to ensure that no political party should get an overall majority in the general election. An amount of Rs 29 lac was expended for this purpose, and attempts were made to infiltrate the inner circles of the Awami League. The operation was a complete disaster.

Mr. Bhutto promoted General Zia-Ul-Haq in part because the Director of ISI, General Gulam Jilani Khan, was actively promoting him. General Zia, in return, retained General Jilani as head of ISI after his scheduled retirement. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto established the Federal Security Force and gave it wide-ranging powers to counter the influence of ISI, but the force was abolished when the military regime of Zia ul-Haq seized power in 1977. When the regime was unpopular with the military and the president (as was Benazir Bhutto's first government), the agency helped topple it by working with opposition political parties. The ISI became much more effective under the leadership of Hameed Gul. The 1990 elections are widely believed to be rigged. The Islami Jamhoori Ittehad [IJI] party was a conglomerate formed of nine mainly rightist parties by the ISI under Lt General Hameed Gul to ensure the defeat of Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) in the polls. Gul denies this, claiming that the ISI's political cell created by Z.A. Bhutto only 'monitored' the elections. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan made Pakistan a country of paramount geostrategic importance. In a matter of days, the United States declared Pakistan a "frontline state" against Soviet aggression and offered to reopen aid and military assistance deliveries. For the remainder of Zia's tenure, the United States generally ignored Pakistan's developing nuclear program. Pakistan's top national security agency, the Army's Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, monitored the activities of and provided advice and support to the mujahidin, and commandos from the Army's Special Services Group helped guide the operations inside Afghanistan. The ISI trained about 83,000 Afghan Mujahideen between 1983 to 1997 and dispatched them to Afghanistan. Pakistan paid a price for its activities. Afghan and Soviet forces conducted raids against mujahidin bases inside Pakistan, and a campaign of terror bombings and sabotage in Pakistan's cities, guided by Afghan intelligence agents, caused hundreds of casualties. In 1987 some 90 percent of the 777 terrorist incidents recorded worldwide took place in Pakistan.

The ISI continued to actively participate in Afghan Civil War, supporting the Talibaan in their fight against the Rabbani government. ISI has been engaged in covertly supporting the Kashmiri Mujahideen in their fight against the Indian authorities in Kashmir. Reportedly "Operation Tupac" was the designation of the three part action plan for the liberation of Kashmir, initiated by President Zia Ul Haq in 1988 after the failure of "Operation Gibraltar." The designation is derived from Tupac Amru, the 18th century prince who led the war of liberation in Uruguay against the Spanish rule. According to a report compiled by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) of India in 1995, ISI spent about Rs 2.4 crore per month to sponsor its activities in Jammu and Kashmir. Although all groups reportedly received arms and training from Pakistan, the pro-Pakistani groups were reputed to be favoured by the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence. As of May 1996, at least six major militant organizations, and several smaller ones, operated in Kashmir. Their forces were variously estimated at between 5,000 and 10,000 armed men. They were roughly divided between those who support independence and those who support accession to Pakistan. The oldest and most widely known militant organization, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), spearheaded the movement for an independent Kashmir. Its student wing is the Jammu and Kashmir Students Liberation Front (JKSLF). A large number of other militant organizations have emerged since 1989, some of which also support independence, others of which support Kashmir's accession to Pakistan. The most powerful of the pro-Pakistani groups is the Hezb-ul-Mujahedin. The other major groups are Harakat-ul Ansar, a group which reportedly has a large number of non-Kashmiris in it, Al Umar, Al Barq, Muslim Janbaz Force and Lashkar-e Toiba, which is also made up largely of fighters from Afghanistan and Pakistan. According to press reports, several hundred fighters from Afghanistan and other Muslim countries have also joined some of the militant groups or have formed their own. The Harakat ul-Ansar group, a powerful militant organization which first emerged in 1993, is said to be made up largely of non-Kashmiris.

The Federal Investigation Authority conducts the investigations on receiving reports of corruption, either through the P.M.'s Accountability and Coordination Cell or directly from the public. After the investigations, the cases are referred to the Chief Ehtesab Commissioner for trial by the Ehtesab courts. However, the Chief Ehtesab Commissioner, Mr Mujaddad Ali Mirza, has complained that the Federal Investigation Authority and the Anti-Corruption Police have failed to cooperate with the Commission. Police tactics in British India were never gentle, but in contemporary Pakistan, according to the Herald, a magazine published in Karachi, "The police have institutionalized torture to a point where it is viewed as the primary method of crime detention. Police torture has become so commonplace that it has slowly lost the capacity to shock and disgust." These charges were echoed by Amnesty International's especially bleak appraisal of Pakistan's human rights situation in its June 1992 "International News Release" report. The report, reflecting the law and order breakdown in Sindh and the government's reaction to it, stated that government opponents often are harassed, placed under arrest, and detained for unspecified periods of time. Scores of prisoners of conscience have been held for their political activities or religious beliefs. The practice of repeatedly bringing false charges against members of the political opposition is a widely used tactic in Pakistani politics and has been used to arrest thousands of opposition party activists. According to the United States State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1993, there were no significant efforts in 1992 or 1993 to reform either the police or the judicial system, and authorities continued to be lax in their prosecution of abuses in these areas. Pakistani and international human rights organizations have demanded that steps be taken to reverse the trend by bringing torturers to justice and by taking such procedural steps as reducing the time prisoners spend in places of first arrest, where most torture takes place.

The SSG was used in border situations and covert operations mostly, until 1985, when a PAN AM airliner was hi-jacked by anonymous terrorists. They were four in number, clad in ASF (Airport Security Force), beneath their cloths they were able to conceal Russian AKSU SMGs (7.62 x 39mm a.k.a. .30-.30 calibre) and TT33 30 bore pistols. Fortunately, an airhostess had discovered the fact, it was a really critical situation as all the passengers had boarded the plane along with the hijackers, and the pilot was preparing for take-off, the airhostess on discovering the fact rushed to the cockpit and reported to the pilot. The crew considered it wise to leave the plane unnoticed through the emergency hatch in the cockpit, hence disabling the plane from taking-off. News reached the ASF chief who reported the matter to the government and army. All this took place within an hour or so. When the hijackers discovered that the crew had deserted the plane, they fell in minor flux, as their plan seemed to have backfired. Soon, government officials who offered to negotiate the matter contacted them but the hijackers seemed very unproductive in that matter, and also threatened to shoot the passengers if they were not allowed to leave unharmed. The SSG was put on stand-by. During that time the government discussed the situation then the commander of the SSG, the Late Brig Tariq Mahmood (K.I.A. Also awarded ARMY'S MEDAL FOR BRAVERY) was given a go signal to execute the plan which was to breech and kill all the resistance in the plane. After that, at nighttime the SSGs operatives took action, they were armed with HK MP5 SMGs, Heckler and Koch's P7 9mm semiautomatic pistols as well AK47s (7.62 x 39mm a.k.a. 30-30) and Heckler and Koch G3 (7.62 x 51mm). They wore black uniforms and light body armor. They entered the plane by banging down the doors of the plane, the hijackers who were expecting an operation, resisted and opened fire on the commandos. Unfortunately, the passengers were not prepared for the fire and fell in disorder when the lights of the plane were shut down, so suddenly. SSG on the other hand was not accustomed to such situations and also had to open fire. Due to which many passengers were caught in the deadly firefight of lethal automatic weapons and heavy casualties took place. Although all the terrorists were killed and the coup ended, but not without 10+ innocent casualties. The SSG was not much commended the operation was called a failure. The case quietly sat down. It was suggested that the cause for the failure of the operation was the use of inappropriate weapons and tactics. The SSG was not yet trained to handle CQBs (Close Quarter Battles) at that time.

The Second Test
During the recent years, the Special Services Group has re-amped itself, acquiring more extensive training, especially in the tactics of CQB (close quarter Battle) advanced equipment and preparing itself for any such situation. The second test eventually came after nine years…in 1994, Islamabad. It was a normal day in the National Capital, when the news of the kidnapping of a school bus carrying more than 35 primary school children, all of whom were below 12 years of age, as well as two teachers and a driver. Authorities immediately fell in stress and pressure about how to stop this chaotic situation. Not only were the Government worried about the lives of the children, they were also trying to figure out a way handle the mediocrity. It was learned that the kidnappers were 6 Afghan militants, their motif was to get the Pakistani government to accept some of their extremely inexhorbitant demands that included giving them military assets along with fighter jets in the Pak-Airforce. The news played hell with the parents of the children, who were on the verge on going hysterical. Parents and media both stormed the offices of the authorities, trying to find out what steps were being taken to end the situation. The government fell a very tricky and difficult situation as the terrorists pressurized them at the same time. They indicated the terrorists that their demands were under consideration and the government will need a little time to fulfil their demands. The terrorists replied by saying that they will be allotted 72 hours before any "unpleasant event occurs". Then they asked for food for themselves and the hostages, which they were immediately given. Internally the government had decided to no to give in their demands, and they were planning to take the terrorists down. Many tactical and intelligence teams were called to the operation. Including ISI and SSG, it was decided that there should be a way of contact with the inside world. The terrorists had drawn the curtains of the place so there was virtually no contact inside. It was figured out that the terrorists might be convinced to let an ill child hostage and a teacher walk out of the house and receive medical treatment then they will be returned to the terrorists. That was made their key to the inside world, the two hostages were allowed free. They reported that the hostages were held in separate rooms, guarded by armed terrorists, the terrorists were armed with Kalashinkov assault rifles and pistols, they were wearing typical Afghan dress and army boots and MAY have body armour. During all that time they were supplied with food and water.