By the middle of the nineteenth century, Russia was, by all accounts, a "police state," not in the modern sense of the term, which connotes all the evils of Nazi Germany and Stalinism, but in the more traditional sense as it applied to certain European states in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, e.g., France and Prussia. These states, which incorporated secret political police, spying, and encroachments on individual rights with both paternalism and enlightenment, were motivated by a desire to reform and modernize. Russia's monarchical police state was similar to those in western Europe except that it lagged far behind in its political evolution and was much less efficient. The foundations of the tsarist police state were established in 1826, when Tsar Nicholas I formed the so-called Third Section, a political police whose purpose was to protect the state from internal subversion. The staff of the Third Section was small, numbering only forty fulltime employees, who were burdened with information-gathering and welfare functions that extended well beyond the realm of political surveillance. As a result, its role was vague and poorly defined, and its efforts to combat political dissent, on the whole, were ineffective. In 1880, as part of an effort to improve the effectiveness of the political police, the much-discredited Third Section was abolished and replaced by the central State Police Department under the Ministry of the Interior. Its chief responsibility was dealing with political crimes, and, although its staff consisted of only 161 full-time employees, it had at its disposal the Corps of Gendarmes, numbering several thousand, and a large contingent of informers. In addition, the notorious "security sections" were established in several Russian cities following the assassination of Alexander II in 1881. Despite the fact that its operations were strengthened, the political police was not successful in stemming the tide of the revolutionary movement, which helped to bring down the Russian monarchy in 1917. Police operations were hampered by the low quality of personnel and grave deficiencies in training. One of the greatest impediments to an effective political police was the general reluctance on the part of the Russian state to use violence against political dissenters. Herein lies one of the crucial differences between the monarchical police state of tsarist Russia and the Soviet regime, which from the outset used violence to preserve its rule and gradually extended the violence to affect broad segments of the population

The Bolshevik regime created a police system that proved to be far more effective than the tsarist version. It swept away the tsarist police, so despised by Russians of all political persuasions, along with other tsarist institutions, and replaced it with a political police of considerably greater dimensions, both in the scope of its authority and in the severity of its methods. However lofty their initial goals were, the Bolsheviks forcibly imposed their rule on the people. They constituted a dictatorship of a minority that had to establish a powerful political police apparatus to preserve its domination. The first Soviet political police, created in December 1917, was the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution and Sabotage (Vserossiiskaia chrezvychainaia komissiia po bor'be s kontrrevoliutsiei i sabotazhem--VChK; also known as the Vecheka or the Cheka). The Vecheka was very much an ad hoc organization, whose powers gradually grew in response to various emergencies and threats to Soviet rule. No formal legislation establishing the Vecheka was ever enacted. It was to serve as an organ of preliminary investigation, but the crimes it was to uncover were not defined, and the procedures for handling cases were not set forth. This situation was the result of the extralegal character of the Vecheka, which was conceived not as a permanent state institution but as a temporary organ for waging war against "class enemies." Given its militant role and supralegal status, it is not surprising that the Vecheka, which was headed by Feliks E. Dzerzhinskii, acquired powers of summary justice as the threat of counterrevolution and foreign intervention grew. After an attempt was made on Lenin's life in August 1918, the Vecheka unleashed its violence on a wide scale--the so-called Red Terror--which continued until 1920 and caused thousands to lose their lives.

The end of the Civil War (1918-21), the demobilization of the Red Army, and the introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1921 brought about a changed atmosphere that seemed incompatible with a terrorist political police. Lenin himself spoke of the need for a reform of the political police, and in early 1922 the Vecheka was abolished and its functions transferred to the State Political Directorate (Gosudarstvennoe politicheskoe upravlenie - GPU). When the Soviet Union was formed in December 1922, the GPU was raised to the level of a federal agency, designated the Unified State Political Directorate (Ob''edinennoe gosudarstvennoe politicheskoe upravlenie--OGPU), and attached to the Council of People's Commissars. On paper it appeared that the powers of the political police had been reduced significantly. Indeed, police operations during the NEP period were considerably less violent, and the staff and budget of the political police were reduced. Initially, the OGPU was subject to definite procedural requirements regarding arrests and was not given the powers of summary justice that its predecessor had. But the legal constraints on the OGPU were gradually removed, and its authority grew throughout the 1920s. The OGPU was drawn into the intraparty struggles that ensued between Stalin and his opponents and was also enlisted in the drive to collectivize the peasantry by force, beginning in late 1929, an operation that resulted in the death of upwards of 5 million people. In July 1934, the OGPU was transformed into the Main Directorate for State Security (Glavnoe upravlenie gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti--GUGB) and integrated into the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (Narodnyi komissariat vnutrennykh del--NKVD), which had been given all union status earlier that year. The functions of the security police and those of the internal affairs apparatus, which controlled the regular police and the militia, were thus united in one agency. The NKVD was a powerful organization. In addition to controlling the security police and the regular police, it was in charge of border and internal troops, fire brigades, convoy troops, and, after 1934, the entire penal system, including regular prisons and forced labour camps, or the Gulag. During the period from 1934 to 1940, the NKVD took charge of numerous economic enterprises that employed forced labour, such as gold mining, major construction projects, and other industrial activity. In addition, the Special Board, attached to the NKVD, operated outside the legal codes and was empowered to impose on persons deemed "socially dangerous" sentences of exile, deportation, or confinement in labour camps. The Special Board soon became one of the chief instruments of Stalin's purges.

Stalin's domination over the party was not absolute at this time, however. Dissatisfaction with his policies continued to be manifested by some party members, and elements existed within the leadership that might have opposed any attempt to use police terror against the party. Among Stalin's potential challengers was Sergei Kirov, chief of the Leningrad party apparatus. Conveniently for Stalin, Kirov was assassinated by a disgruntled ex-party member in December 1934. This provided Stalin with the pretext for launching an assault against the party. Although Stalin proceeded cautiously, the turning point had been reached, and the terror machinery was in place. From 1936 to 1938, the NKVD arrested and executed millions of party members, government officials, and ordinary citizens. The military also came under assault. Much of the officer corps was wiped out in 1937-38, leaving the country ill prepared for World War II. The era in which the NKVD, with Stalin's approval, terrorized Soviet citizens became known in the West as the great terror. The war years brought further opportunities for the political police, under the control of Lavrenty Beria, to expand its authority. The NKVD assumed a number of additional economic functions that made use of the expanding labour camp population. The NKVD also broadened its presence in the Red Army, where it conducted extensive surveillance of the troops. Toward the end of the war, the political police moved into areas formerly under German occupation to arrest those suspected of sympathy for the Nazis. They also suppressed nationalist movements in the Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and western Ukrainian republics. Beria himself steadily gained power and authority during this period. In early 1946, when he was made a full member of the Politburo and a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers (the new name for the Council of People's Commissars), he relinquished his NKVD post, but he apparently retained some control over the police through his protégés in that organization. In March 1953, following Stalin's death, Beria became chief of the MVD, which amalgamated the regular police and the security police into one organization. Some three months later, he made an unsuccessful bid for power and was arrested by his Kremlin colleagues, including Khrushchev.

The "Beria affair" and the shake-up in the Kremlin that followed his arrest had far-reaching consequences for the role of the police in Soviet society. The party leadership not only arrested and later executed Beria and several of his allies in the MVD but also took measures to place the political police under its firm control. Henceforth, violence was no longer to be used as a means of settling conflicts within the leadership, and widespread terror was not employed against the population at large. The Khrushchev period was important for the development of the internal security apparatus. Legal reforms, personnel changes, and the denunciation of Stalin had a marked effect on the position of the police and the legal organs. As the successor to Khrushchev, Brezhnev did much to reverse the tide of reforms, but later, under Gorbachev, reforms progressed again. The reforms brought opposition to Gorbachev from the police apparatus because the changes curtailed police powers. One of the first reforms instituted by the post-Stalin leadership under Khrushchev was a reorganization of the police apparatus. On March 13, 1954 a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet established the KGB, attached to the Council of Ministers. The establishment of a state security apparatus separate from that of the regular police was designed to diminish the formidable powers that the police had wielded when its activities were concentrated in one organization. Henceforth, the functions of ensuring political security would be ascribed to a special police agency, whose powers were substantially less than they had been under Stalin.

The party leadership also instituted significant legal reforms to protect citizens from police persecution. On May 24, 1955, a new statute on procurator supervision was enacted by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. This statute provided procedural guarantees of procuratorial power to protest illegalities committed by state agencies and to make proposals for eliminating these illegalities. Another reform that restricted the powers of the political police and protected citizens from police persecution was the enactment in December 1958 of the Fundamental Principles of Criminal Procedure, which were incorporated into the 1960 Russian Republic's Code of Criminal Procedure and were still in effect in 1989, although they had been amended several times. The new codes, which were established according to the Russian Republic model in the other republics as well, subjected the KGB to the same procedural rules to which other investigative agencies were subject and specified precisely the types of crimes the KGB was empowered to investigate. A new law on state crimes, enacted on December 25, 1958, and incorporated into the 1960 Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Republic, narrowed the range of political crimes that were embodied in the Stalinist codes and made criminal sanctions less severe. Khrushchev's policy of de-Stalinization also had significance for the role of the post-Stalin political police. His famous "secret speech," delivered at the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956, called attention to the crimes committed by the police under Stalin. This inevitably weakened the prestige of the KGB and demoralized its cadres, many of whom had participated actively in the purges. These police and legal reforms were diminished somewhat by the appointment in 1954 of two long-time police officials, Ivan Serov and Sergei Kruglov, to head the KGB and the MVD, respectively. Serov's past was heavily tainted by his participation in the Stalinist police repression, as was that of Kruglov. Both, however, had lent their support to Khrushchev when he made his move against Beria, and apparently they had to be rewarded. Although Khrushchev and the party leadership wanted to demonstrate that they were "cleansing the ranks" of the police by purging many officials, they retained others who were loyal and experienced.

In December 1958, Serov was removed from his post as KGB chief and replaced by Aleksandr Shelepin, a former Kosomol official. With his higher education in humanities and his untainted record, Shelepin did much to raise the stature of the KGB and to bring renewed efficiency and legitimacy to it. By the late 1950s, efforts were under way to improve the public image of the KGB by portraying its officials in a favourable light in the media and by publishing works on the history of the Soviet political police. In addition, changes in the legal codes in 1961 broadened the KGB's investigative powers. Shelepin himself may have been largely responsible for the campaign to rehabilitate the security police. Although he left his post as head of the KGB in December 1961, he continued to oversee the police in his capacity as Central Committee secretary, and his successor, Vladimir Semichastnyi, was a close ally. Both Shelepin and Semichastnyi appeared to have joined the ranks of opposition to Khrushchev sometime before his ouster in October 1964 and were actively involved in the plot to overthrow the De-Stalinization , legal reforms, and various other measures promoted by Khrushchev to curtail the activities of the security police had no doubt created resentment within its ranks and aroused the displeasure of leading KGB officials. Brezhnev evidently had learned a lesson from Khrushchev's experience and went out of his way to raise the status of the police and clamp down on political dissent. The KGB's investigative powers were extended in 1965 to include certain categories of economic crime, and it continued to be accorded favourable publicity in the Soviet press. Its growing prestige and authority accommodated those neoconservative trends that manifested themselves during the late 1960s and 1970s: curbs on cultural freedom, a crackdown on dissent, and a partial rehabilitation of Stalin.

Brezhnev and his party colleagues became worried about the ambitions of Shelepin, however, and decided to put an end to his influence over the security police. In May 1967, Semichastnyi was removed as KGB chief, and by November of that year Shelepin was out of the Central Committee Secretariat. The new KGB chairman was Iurii I. Andropov, a Central Committee secretary who had served as ambassador to Hungary and later as head of the Central Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries Department. He was apparently a neutral figure politically, agreed upon by all members of the collective leadership; Brezhnev, however, managed to bring in several of his own protégés to serve directly below Andropov. The most important of these was a KGB official named Semen Tsvigun, reportedly Brezhnev's brother-in-law, who was made first deputy KGB chairman in December 1967. Viktor M. Chebrikov was another official with links to Brezhnev who was brought to Moscow to serve in the KGB. The presence of his allies in the KGB leadership was a source of strength for Brezhnev, and he made certain that their careers prospered. In addition to encouraging favourable publicity for the KGB, Brezhnev was careful to ensure that employees of the KGB were well paid and enjoyed significant privileges and perquisites. Brezhnev may have underestimated the political prowess of Andropov, however. Andropov benefited from the increased powers and prestige that the KGB gained under the Brezhnev leadership and became a powerful political leader in his own right. As Brezhnev's death became imminent in 1982, Andropov began contending for the top party post. His success in reaching his goal in November 1982 was due partly to his attack, using KGB files as weapons, on the Brezhnevites for their involvement in corruption. Not surprisingly, Andropov's short tenure as general secretary (November 1982- February 1984) was marked by a stronger KGB role. Even Andropov's illness and death did not result in a decline for the KGB. On the contrary, the extended period of political upheaval in the Kremlin following his death seemed to increase the KGB's influence. Its officials received prominent coverage in the press, and KGB representation on party and state leadership bodies grew.

After gaining the post of general secretary in March 1985, Gorbachev moved with unprecedented speed to implement personnel changes in the party and government. His success in getting rid of so many potential political opponents in such a short time surprised Western Soviet experts, particularly because Gorbachev did not have a substantial power base or patronage network of his own when he took office. Gorbachev apparently relied on the same bases of support that Andropov had used in his ascent to the top, which included the KGB. According to Western experts, Gorbachev appealed to the KGB for help in purging the Brezhnev old guard. The main vehicle used by Gorbachev in carrying out these purges was the anticorruption campaign. By the late summer of 1985, hardly a day passed without a report in the press on cases on bribery, embezzlement, or other forms of economic crime. In addition to high-level party and state officials, MVD and Procuracy employees came under fire for their failure to uncover crimes. Even MVD chief Vitalii Fedorchuk fell victim to Gorbachev, losing his post in early 1986. Fedorchuk's replacement, Aleksandr Vlasov, was a former party apparatchik with no experience in law enforcement. Although the regular law enforcement agencies were subjected to sharp attacks for their failure to combat crime, the KGB remained unscathed, despite the fact that it was empowered by law to investigate certain types of economic crime. There was some turnover in key KGB posts, but these changes were not nearly as widespread as were the changes in the CPSU apparatus and in other state agencies. Numerous signs pointed to the fact that the Gorbachev leadership was cultivating good relations with the KGB by maintaining its high prestige and political status. KGB chairman Chebrikov was promoted to full membership in the Politburo just a month after Gorbachev came to power. He also figured prominently in the Soviet media. At the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress in February-March 1986, for example, he delivered a speech that was an unprecedented assertion of the power and authority of the KGB. Although Gorbachev continued to rely on the KGB in his drive to purge the party and state apparatus of corrupt officials, toward the end of 1986 signs indicated that his relations with this organization were becoming strained. The KGB cannot have been pleased about the reformist polices promoted by Gorbachev, in particular openness in the media and liberalization of cultural norms. Calls for reform of the judicial and legal systems, voiced with increasing frequency in the autumn of 1986, signified that the Gorbachev leadership was attempting to curtail arbitrary KGB actions against citizens. This attempt became even more apparent in January 1987, when Chebrikov acknowledged, on the front page of Pravda, that employees of the KGB had committed illegalities. Such an acknowledgment of KGB abuses was unprecedented. Even during the Khrushchev era, when the crimes of Stalin's security police were exposed, the KGB was never criticized in the press. Observers speculated that, having depended initially on KGB support to purge the Brezhnevites, Gorbachev decided by early 1987 that he was strong enough to embark on reforms that might antagonize this institution.

It was not long, however, before signs of opposition to Gorbachev's policies arose, and a "conservative backlash" occurred. Although the opposition appears to have been led by disgruntled party leaders such as Egor K. Ligachev, the second-ranking member of the Politburo, the KGB probably joined forces with these conservatives. Chebrikov's comments, in particular his strident speech delivered in September 1987, made it clear that the KGB would not allow the democratic reforms to go too far: "There must be a clear awareness that the restructuring is taking place in our state and society under the leadership of the Communist Party, within the framework of socialism and in the interests of socialism. This revolutionary process will be reliably protected against any subversive intrigues." The subsequent ouster of a leading proponent of Gorbachev's reforms, Moscow party chief Boris El'tsin, was an indication of the strength of the opposition to Gorbachev. Although he made some strategic retreats in early 1988, Gorbachev continued to pursue his policy of perestroika, and exposures of illegal KGB activities continued. Even more threatening for the KGB were unprecedented revelations about security police terror under Stalin. Although the role of the police in the purges had been discussed since the Khrushchev era, glasnost' resulted in a much more devastating critique of the role of the police during this period. Ethnic unrest of various nationalities, together with increasingly bold political demands by the Soviet intelligentsia, also presented the KGB with significant challenges. In a speech delivered in mid-April, Chebrikov expressed concern that things were going too far and that some individuals were "unleashing a wide-ranging arsenal of methods of social demagoguery and substituting bourgeois liberalism for the essence of the concept of socialist democracy." Subsequently, in October 1988 Chebrikov lost his position as chief of the KGB and was replaced by Vladimir Kriuchkov. KGB spetsnaz forces were assigned to storm the Russian Parliament building early on 21 August 1991 and seize key leadership personnel, including Boris Yeltsin. Units assigned this mission included the Al'fa (Alpha) counter terrorist group subordinate to the KGB's Seventh Main Directorate (Surveillance), and commanded by Hero of the Soviet Union, General Major Viktor Karpukhin. Another KGB unit was under the KGB's First Chief Directorate (Foreign Operations) and intended principally for operations abroad. It was commanded by an officer identified only as Col. Boris B. However, the commanders on the scene decided not to execute this plan, and some Alpha subgroup commanders and personnel refused to take part in the action, which contributed to the failure of the coup against Gorbachev, and ultimately the collapse of the Soviet Union.

On 21 August 1991 Vladimir Kryuchkov, KGB head and one of the leaders of the coup, was arrested. The next day, a reformer, Vadim Bakatin, was appointed in Kryuchkov's place. On 24 October 1991 Mikhail Gorbachev signed a decree abolishing the KGB. The Soviet Union's Committee for State Security dissolved along with the USSR in late 1991. However, most of its assets and activities have continued through several separate organizations. The Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) was the first element of the KGB to establish a separate identity [in October 1991] incorporating most of the foreign operations, intelligence-gathering and intelligence analysis activities of the KGB First Chief Directorate. The Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information (FAPSI), the Russian counterpart to the US National Security Agency. Formed in February 1994, FAPSI replaced the Administration of Information Resources (AIR) at the Presidential Office, which was formed from the KGB Eighth Chief Directorate and the Sixteenth Directorate, and like the NSA is responsible for communications security and signals intelligence. Some 8,000-10,000 troops that formerly constituted the KGB Ninth Directorate, which guarded the Kremlin and key offices of the CPSU, joined the Federal Protective Service [FSO - Federal'naya Sluzhba Okhrani - formerly known as the Main Administration for the Protection of the Russian Federation (GUO - Glavnoye Upravlenie Okhrani)] and the 1,000 man Presidential Security Service [PSB] with responsibilities similar to the American Secret Service. Internal security functions previously performed by the Second, Third and Fifth Chief Directorates and the Seventh Directorate were initially assigned to a new Ministry of Security. But agency was disbanded December 1993 and replaced by the Federal Counterintelligence Service. This 75,000-person agency was subsequently designated the Federal Security Service (FSB).

On 30 October 1997 the State Duma today voted down a draft federal law "On State Security Agencies in the Russian Federation" submitted by Sergey Skurikhin, a deputy of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia [LDPR]. It was backed only by LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, and opposed by the factions of the CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation], Our Home is Russia, Yabloko, and the Agrarian deputies group. A total of 148 deputies voted in favor of the draft law, 129 voted against; and with 11 abstentions. The Russian president and the Russian government did not support the adoption of the draft law. The law proposed the creation in Russia of a new state agency, the Russian Ministry of State Security, recombining Federal Security Service, the Foreign Intelligence Service, and the Federal Agency for Government Liaison and Information. In recent years the government appears to have dramatically augmenting the MVD forces. While some [disputed] reports claim that these forces now number 800,000 men, officially the MVD forces are acknowledged to include a force of 264,000. Equipped with heavy weapons and structured and organized to carry out purely military operations against external enemies, recent changes in the number, training, and mission of MVD forces suggest concern about domestic unrest. In February 1997 Interior Minister Anatoly Kulikov, a general with a well-deserved reputation as a hard-liner, was elevated to the rank of deputy prime minister. On 04 July 1994, FBI Director Louis Freeh and then-Russian Interior Minister Viktor Yerin signed a protocol providing for joint law enforcement efforts, which included opening an FBI attaché office in Moscow.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs is responsible for 743 correctional labor institutions, 168 pretrial detention facilities, and 13 prisons. In addition, the MVD maintains 60 educational labor colonies for juveniles. In 1994 the MVD received only 87 percent of its funds allocated by the federal budget. As a result, it is estimated that prisons were able in fact to provide only 60 to 70 percent of the daily food rations they envisioned providing and only 15 to 20 percent of needed medications and medical care. Prisoners and detainees must rely on families to provide them with extra food and routine medicines. A range of decrees, orders and instructions, often marked "secret", regulate the actions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). Most of these documents have not been published and are not made available upon request. MVD orders and instructions are issued for service purposes and are not supposed to be copied in any way or presented to organizations, societies, agencies, which are not involved in the monitoring of the functioning of the corrective labour institutions. The internal MVD instruction "Internal Regulation Rules of the Correctional Labour Institutions" of 1992 details the rules and limitations concerning day-to- day life in places of confinement. Special Order No. 13 of the MVD (15 January 1993) reintroduced the reduced norm of nutrition, previously abolished in 1988, for prisoners at penitentiaries serving disciplinary punishments in the so-called punishment-isolator (known by its Russian acronym SIZO), punishment cell (kartser) and in solitary confinement cells. Another secret MVD instruction facilitates the practical training of the special purpose detachments of MVD and OMON at SIZOs and correctional labour colonies. The instruction reportedly allows these units practice their skills on prisoners. During 1996 the Moscow Centre for Prison Reform reported that according to official MVD statistics over 3,000 detainees died in IVSs (temporary holding isolators) and SIZOs and over 9,000 convicts died in prisons and penal colonies.

The MVD was restricted to combating ordinary crime and, unlike the KGB, was subjected to constant criticism in the Soviet press, which attacked its inefficiency and corruption. In addition to the MVD, the Procuracy (Prokuratura) and the Ministry of Justice played important roles in implementing the laws and administering justice. The Ministry of Defense's Main Military Procuracy, along with the system of military tribunals, handled crimes within the armed forces. Both the KGB and the MVD played important roles in the succession crises that followed Brezhnev's death. The KGB, however, was more politically significant than the MVD and, after the early 1970s, had an increasing impact on Soviet domestic and foreign policy making. To reinforce their coercive role, the KGB and the MVD had special troops at their disposal, including the Border Troops, the Security Troops, and the Internal Troops. Internal security in the Soviet Union involved numerous organizations and was guided by the party leadership. It had always served more than ordinary police functions and had covered such areas as intelligence gathering and suppression of dissent. The party and the regime as a whole depended on the internal security apparatus to ensure their own survival. The President of the Russian Federation directly controls the activities of the intelligence, law enforcement, and defence activities of the Russian government. Intelligence activities are overseen by the Russian National Security Council and coordinated through the Permanent Interbranch Commissions of the National Security Council and their Chairmen. In addition to the three foreign intelligence agencies, the intelligence community also controls the Federal Customs Service and the newly organized Federal Security Service. The Federal Customs Service can provide the intelligence services with detailed information on the movement of goods and equipment in and out of Russia. Proprietary information such as customer lists could be derived from declarations made to the Customs Service. The Federal Security Service incorporates the functions of the Main Administration for the Protection of the Russian Federation and the Federal Counterintelligence Service. The combination of these functions has returned much of the internal security and counterintelligence functions formerly held by the KGB to a single agency. While the centralized Soviet decision making system dominated by the Politburo and the Central Committee has been abolished, new national security decision making structures have been marked by improvisation and ad hoc responses.

Security Council

The Russian Security Council was established to provide a high-level forum within which Russia's president can interact directly and concurrently with his key ministers and agency heads. However like the US National Security Council (NSC) the Russian Security Council is not a deliberative body that arrives at decisions on its own. Decisions are made by the President, , who chairs the Security Council, and issues executive orders or decrees. Although the Security Council was intended to be the primary forum for the integration and coordination of security policy, it has proven to be relatively ineffective in coordinating policy. Gen. Alexander Lebed, who was appointed secretary of the Security Council in June 1996, sought to make the Security Council an operational instrument for coordinating and integrating foreign and security policy. But he was replaced before his plans could be implemented. Lebed's successor, Ivan Rybkin, has little experience in security affairs, and the Council has primarily been preoccupied with Chechnya and internal security issues.

Defense Council

The Defense Council, established in July 1996 as part of the Presidential Apparatus, is charged with advising the president on important decisions on military policy. In addition to the Defense Ministry, membership includes other ministries and bodies such as the Interior Ministry and Border Guards. Initially set up to counterbalance Lebed's Security Council, under its secretary Yuri Baturin the Defense Council has become a key forum for the formulation and coordination of defence policy.

Intelligence Coordination

When these formal efforts against FAPSI failed, the Presidential Security Service was said to have devised a plan to discredit "inconvenient" officials by collecting compromising materials on these leaders, including instituting criminal cases against them. No less than half a dozen high- ranking functionaries have been forced to leave FAPSI due to financial scandals. FAPSI Financial and Economic Administration Director Vladimir Malinin resigned in the beginning of 1994 when an audit revealed a huge shortfall in the FAPSI. Two of his subordinates were caught during the commission of a crime. Chief of the armaments department Aleksey Domrayev and chief of the military-medical service Anatoliy Klyuyev have also resigned. And the agency's Deputy General Director Aleksandr Orlov went on leave and did not come back [he is rumored to have fled the country]. In March 1994 Valeriy Monastyretskiy, then head of the Roskomtekh firm which sold KGB property, was appointed Malinin's replacement as chief of the FAPSI Financial and Economic Administration. From 1980 he had worked in the KGB's - later FAPSI's Government Communications Directorate, and he left government service in 1992 to found several companies such as Roskomtekh with FAPSI financial assistance. On 12 April 1996 he was arrested on charges of misappropriating property and abuse of position. The FSB has alledged that Monastyretskiy began working for the German BND intelligence service not long before his arrest. Monastyretskiy in turn charged that he was a victim of Korzhakov and Barsukov's criminal interests. He alleged that he had learned that Barsukov's Main Protection Administration [GUO] had purchased special eavesdropping equipment from companies connected with the CIA, to be installed in government offices. According to Monastyretskiy, when he attempted to prevent this pervasive surveillance of the Russian bureaucracy, he found himself targetted FSB military intelligence.

The 1993 Presidential Decree establishing FAPSI assigned four matters to FAPSI's jurisdiction: special communications (including government communications); cryptographic and engineering­technical security of encrypted communications; intelligence gathering activities in the sphere of special communications; provision of special information to higher bodies of authority.

Observers from other Russian special services believe that this variety of tasks has prevented the FAPSI from working effectively, and in any event the agency has been repeatedly subjected to efforts to reorganize or dismember it. Like the NSA, FAPSI is responsible for communications security and signals intelligence. Its responsibilities under the 1996 Law on Foreign Intelligence include collection of information pertaining to "political, economic, military, science and technology through use of electronic means." FAPSI has both the authority and capability to penetrate all government and private information services in Russia. It also has reportedly been successful in collecting intelligence on foreign business ventures, including confidential bank transactions. Unlike NSA FAPSI operates both overseas and domestically, and is authorized to engage in commercial operations, leasing radio frequency bands and government communications lines to both domestic and foreign companies. Russian law prohibits government employees to engage in commercial activities or to combine their main job with business undertakings, but FAPSI is somewhat exceptional in this regard. The Simaco and Roskomtekh companies, founded with FAPSI's direct participation, were headed by ValeriyMonastyretskiy, who was appointed chief of the FAPSI Financial and Economic Administration in March 1994.

FAPSI provides Russia with so-called "special information" which is obtained by electronic intelligence methods. According to FAPSI General Director Colonel General Aleksandr Starovoytov, this accounts for some 80 percent of the most valuable and objective information obtained worldwide. FAPSI operates a HF/satellite network, for both SIGINT purposes and transmission of government and intelligence traffic. FAPSI works closely together with the GRU, Russia's military intelligence organization, sharing SIGINT facilities around the world, including those located in embassies and consulates. In 1993 Russia and Vietnam signed a contract to ensure the continued use of the SIGINT facilities in Cam Ranh Bay. In 1994 the Russians came to an agreement with the Latvian government, which gives them the right to use the SIGINT station in Skrunda till 1998. Russia's largest SIGINT facility abroad is the one in Lourdes, Cuba. Most of the RTTY and numbers transmissions heard in North America originate from various transmitter sites in Cuba. FAPSI performs services that extend beyond those of its nearest American counterpart, the National Communications System, as FAPSI is responsible for maintaining both government and presidential information system and telecommunication lines. It controls Russia's physical communications systems, including government telephone lines, high-frequency communications, and cryptography services. FAPSI initially maintained communications lines for the Russian President and security services, though these responsibilities were subsequently re-assigned to GUO, and then re-assigned back to FAPSI. These include:

ATS-1 ("Kremlin") telephone communications for senior leaders in the offices of heads of Russian Federation ministries and department(first deputy ministers upward), and also some other organs of authority.

ATS-2 ("Hotline") is similar, and is used by deputy ministers, heads of departments and main administrations in important ministries and departments, and a number of other officials at similar levels of responsibility.

High Frequency -- intercity coded telephone communications are used mainly by regional leaders and for conversations with them.

Special switchboard includes telephone communications for the most senior leaders, including the president and his assistants, the prime minister and his deputies, and the heads of the power structures.

FAPSI developed the protected, Special­purpose Federal Information and Telecommunications System (SFITS or ITCS) for state administrative agency communications. SFITS/ITCS will link most federal agencies, and include technical and administrative documents, government directives and legal information from both the executive and legislative branches of government. The new digital telecommunications system is referred to at FAPSI as "Area 98" since all its numbers will begin with 98. The Russian Federation president's edict No. 334 of 3 April 1995 gave the development of ITCS the status of a presidential program. The new system is being funded with money from the Hermes German Government credit, using communications equipment manufactured by Siemens with Russian encryption equipment. The new system operates on optical-fibre cables, laid in existing tunnels, with one such cable replacing hundreds of heavily armoured communication cables. The system will not be confined to a narrow circle as were previous systems. Rather there are plans for large numbers of subscribers. Base stations of this system have already been installed in government house, the State Duma, the Federation Council, and the Presidential Staff building on Staraya Ploshchad. Most of the Russian regions will be connected to the system during the second phase of implementation.

The information component of SFITS/ITCS being developed is a system of situation centres: The highest element is the Russian Federation president's situation centre; next come departmental and regional information analysis centres and focal points in organizations and institutions, together with mobile multifunctional complexes for use in wartime and in emergency situations. The telecommunications component of the SFITS/ITCS is the Russian Integrated State System of Confidential Communications [RISSCC]. The Atlas protected data transmission network was developed as a matter of priority and is now functioning with the aim of forming the nucleus of the RISSCC. A transport component was developed during the deployment of the Atlas packet switching data network [PSDN], ensuring the transmission of documentary information between the administrative centres of the Russian Federation components. Terminals set up in the supreme state organs ensure the exchange of classified information, and the technical questions involved in ensuring the interaction of this network with other communications networks, including Infotel, Relcom, and Rosnet, were resolved. As with other Russian government agencies, FAPSI has been unable to ensure full state funding for its programs. The shortage of money has prevented FAPSI from fully capitalizing on its scientific and technical groundwork in the sphere of ensuring information security. This has particularly been the case with respect to the inadequate pace of progress of work on developing ITCS, producing promising prototypes of cryptographic equipment in the required amounts, and on completing the formation of Russian-made protected operating systems. FAPSI has urged a halt to funding the programs for developing ITCS carried out by other agncies and departments in parallel and without coordination with the program for designing and developing ITCS. The funds allocated to these programs exceed the resources required to fund the federal program for designing and developing ITCS. Defunding these other non-FAPSI efforts would make it possible to fully fund the FAPSI program for designing ITCS.

FAPSI is also developing an Internet service provider to serve the Russian organs of state power; it will ensure the operation of a segment of the network called RGIN (Russian Government Internet Network). The RGIN network is already an officially registered part of the Internet community of networks. Although it is not authorized to monitor domestic voice traffic, FAPSI has not abandoned the Russian traditions of government monitoring of communications. FAPSI is empowered to monitor and register all electronic financial and securities transactions and to monitor other electronic communications, including private Internet access. In 1995 the Russian Duma refused to approve a proposed law banning all encryption systems that were not approved by FAPSI. However, the provisions of the law were instead implemented by Presidential Decree No. 334, issued on 03 April 1995 [not as sometimes reported as July 1995]. The decree states that FAPSI's expanded role is aimed at "intensifying the struggle against organized crime."

The Decree tasked FAPSI with establishing a country-wide telecommunications system to register operations, including securities transactions, on the financial market. The decree required commercial banks compliance in their dealings with the Central Bank of Russia. FAPSI was authorized to monitor, register, and record all electronic financial transactions in the country, and to require banks and other financial institutions to pay for the service. The money FAPSI raised was to be divided between FAPSI and a special Fund of the President's Programs. FAPSI is a major investors in the Relkom Joint-Stock Company, which controls Russia's largest electronic mail network handling telecommunications projects for the Russian Central Bank, the Finance Ministry, and the Defence Ministry. This participation seems to consist both of an effort to ensure control over major forms of communications, along with some profit-seeking interest as well. The 1995 Decree restricts the use of encryption software to only those programs approved by FAPSI. For acompany in Russia to use encryption it must be pre-registered with FAPSI. To register with FAPSI, users are required to assess the degree of confidentiality needed. The decree provided no indication as to what methods of encryption (if any) are authorized by FAPSI, and users must consult the encryption providers who can only discuss encryption upon gaining clearance from the FAPSI registration authorities. The Decree also instructed the Russian Federation Customs Committee to ban the import of any "encryption facilities" which lack a FAPSI approved licence.

APSI's Main Government Communications Directorate, directed by Lieutenant General Andrey Ponomarev, maintains communications lines for the Russian President and security services, though these responsibilities were subsequently re-assigned to GUO.

FAPSI's Scientific-Technical Centre software and hardware products for data protection include Verba [a cryptographic system to protect commercial information] an all-purpose protected subscribers' centre; and identification support hardware.

FAPSI Atlas Scientific-technical Centre is concerned with document managment, archives and related information systems.

Russian Academy of Cryptography is a sectoral academy, not a training but a scientific organization.

Financial-Economic Administration [FEU] includes the Economic Administration. Security Service ensures the security regime, the guarding of premises, and the protection of electronic intelligence. Security Service 4th Department is engaged in physical protection.

FAPSI subordinate organizations include NTT [science and technology center], TsITiS [Central Institute for Information and Communications], TsNKT [expansion unidentified], MO PNIEI [Design and Experimental Scientific Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense], and NPO Avtomatika.

Korzhakov was frequently accused of meddling in governmental affairs, as the Service gathered evidence on high government officials engaged in corruption, bribe-taking, and squandering money. Korzhakov's people studied the origin of capital at the National Sports Fund and in the end placed at the head of that purely commercial structure a staff member of the Presidential Security Service. The service engaged in the suppression of smuggling, as when on 29 February 1996 the Presidential Security Service completed an operation which confiscated a batch of jewels worth a total of $3 million delivered from London to Moscow at Sheremetevo-2. Reportedly the PSB acquired documents which implicated Anatoly Chubais in illegal financial machinations during the privatization period, in which his banker associates Gusinsky, Berezovsky, and Vladimir Potanin, In December 1994 Korzhakov organized an armed raid on the Moscow headquarters of Most Bank headed by Vladimir Gusinskii. Gusinskii is allied with Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, a potential rival to Yeltsin in the 1996 presidential elections. Soon after the raid, Luzhkov denied he had any desire to run for president, and Gusinskii has not surfaced in Russia since January 1995, when he moved his family to London. General of the Army F.D. Bobkov inspirer and creator of the Fifth Department, later first deputy chairman of the USSR KGB, serves as head of the analysis service of the Most financial group.

1996 began with skepticism that President Boris Yeltsin would allow elections to take place, and on 05 May 1996 Korzhakov explicitly called for postponing the elections. But Yeltsin finished first in the 16 June 1996 initial round of the Presidential elections with about 35% of the vote, and was scheduled to compete with Zyuganov in the runoff slated for 03 July 1996. On the evening of 19 June 1996 Sergei Lisovsky and Arkady Yevstafyev, who were allegedly carrying a case containing $500,000, were arrested while leaving the White House of Russia. After being questioned for 11 hours by Presidential Security Service, Lisovsky [a wealthy advertising and show business magnate] and Yevstafyev [ a close aide to former first deputy prime minister Anatoly Chubais] were released. Tipped off by Chubais, television networks broadcast updates on the unfolding scandal through the night, portraying the arrests as an attempted coup by Korzhakov.

Instigated by First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets [who supervised the defence industry], Federal Security Service (FSB) director Mikhail Barsukov, and Aleksandr Korzhakov [Barsukov's son is married to Korzhakov's daughter, and Korzhakov reportedly helped his in-law obtain the position of counterintelligence chief], the arrests were apparently part of a plan to discredit Yeltsin's re-election campaign. However, on 20 June the trio was abruptly fired by Yeltsin at the urging of Chubais. The three were hard-liners opposed to market reform, strong backers of the war in Chechnya, and opposed to holding the presidential election. Duma Speaker Gennadii Seleznev said that Korzhakov and Barsukov were fired because they "encroached on the holy of holies the secret financing of the Yeltsin campaign." According to one view the firings of Korzhakov, Barsukov, and Soskovets were the result of a battle between factions within the President's inner circle between a group that wanted to take power by force and a group that wanted to win the election "legitimately." Others saw the events in the context of an ongoing struggle between three groups: the former heads of the power ministries, representatives of the energy complex, and representatives from financial circles. Consequently the PSB no longer exists in the form it had under Alexander Korzhakov. The interference of the PSB in politics ended 20 June 1996 when Korzhakov was dismissed from his post. He was replaced by Anatoli Kuznetsov, a professional without political ambitions or interests, who first became a PSB officer when Ryzhkov was prime minister. Following Korzhakov's replacement, the FSB was incorporated into the Federal Protective Service (FSO) headed by Yuri Krapivin. Under the law of 06 June 1996, the PSS and FSO were two independent organizations.

Changes in the status of the PSB include: PSB is no longer an organization directly subordinate to the President; PSB no longer has the right to gather information for the purpose of ensuring the security of the President and the state; PSB no longer has the right to use the data bases of the Presidential staff, government staff, etc; PSB is no longer a separate legal entity with its own logo, stamp, bank accounts, etc; PSB no longer has the right to buy real estate on the territory of the Russian Federation, etc.

Meetings between Federal Border Service leaders and the representatives of Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, China, and India have focused on Russian efforts to persuade these states to abandon their support for the Tajik opposition. A Border Service delegation to Afghanistan in late 1996 discussed the possibility of creating a border security zone at least 25 km wide, within which the Border Service would be free to take any and all measures to prevent illegal border crossings. As of early 1996 fighting in Afghanistan had resulted in some 100,000 refugees fleeing to areas near the Tajik border. Despite the presence under CIS auspices of Russian peacekeeping troops in Abkhazia and predominantly Russian peacekeeping troops in Tajikistan, there remains disagreement among the various CIS countries over proposals for the joint protection of their borders with non-CIS countries (termed by Moscow the external CIS borders). Azerbaijan and Ukraine remain the most determined to manage the protection of their own borders without Russian or CIS assistance, and Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have also sought to distance themselves from joint protection proposals. The Intelligence Directorate accounts for less than one percent of the Border Troops' strength, which in 1994 amounted to approximately 200,000 troops. It includes an Intelligence Directorate and a secret service unit. Although administratively separate, its headquarters is located in the former KGB Lubyanka headquarters also occupied by the SVR. The Military Council of the Russian Border Guard troops is responsible for measures for strengthening of the Russian state border, including relations with other CIS members to enhance the protection of the Southern borders of the Commonwealth.

Colonel General Igor Mezhakov, deputy director of the FSB, was dismissed in September 1995. Rumours indicated that he was widely disliked, having been a member of the commission that investigated the role of the KGB leadership in August 1991 coup]. Lieutenant General Anatoliy Semenov, chief of the Antiterrorism Directorate, was dismissed from his position the same day as Mezhakov. Since spring of 1996 Semenov has been head of the president's Main Directorate of Cossack Troops. Lieutenant General Anatoliy Krayushkin, head of the Directorate of Records and Archives, left his job in September 1995. It was rumoured that he had fallen under suspicion in connection with a German intelligence agent. Lieutenant General Vladimir Tsekhanov, chief of the Economic Counterintelligence Directorate, was removed from his position in early summer 1996. He was one of the initiators of the scandal involving the joint-stock company Lenzoloto which resulted in criminal indictments. When senior Yeltsin aides Oleg Soskovets, Mikhail Barsukov, and Aleksandr Korzhakov were abruptly dismissed on 20 June 1996, Mikhail Barsukov had served as FSB head for less than a year. Barsukov took over the leadership of the FSB from Sergei Stepashin in July 1995 in the wake of the Budennovsk hostage crisis. Yeltsin named a deputy director of the Federal Security Service (FSB), Colonel General Nikolai Kovalev, as its new acting chief. Kovalev's intelligence service activity began in 1974 with his entrance in the KGB, where he joined the Fifth Directorate, which dealt with ideological questions and the questions related to dissidents. He served for two years in Afghanistan and later working in the Moscow and Moscow Oblast branches of the FSB before being made deputy director with responsibility for the Investigations Directorate, Directorate for Economic Counterintelligence, and Operational Reconnaissance Directorate. After his nomination to the FSB, Kovalev told the news media that he saw the emphasis of his activities in the economic security of Russia and in the fight against corruption. In addition, he promised to focus on measures to respond to increasing activities of foreign intelligence services in Russia.

The August law permits agents to open mail, tap telephones, monitor other forms of communication, and enter a private residence without a court order in cases of emergency that may lead to the commission of a serious crime or if Russia's political, military, economic, or environmental security is threatened. In these cases, a judge must be notified within 24 hours of the action. Within 48 hours of the start of such an action, the agency must either receive a court order permitting it or end it. The law does not define what would constitute either a case of emergency or the term "security." As is the case with the FSB law, oversight is weak. Information concerning the organization, tactics, methods and means of investigations is off limits to the prosecutor. Similarly, the role of the Parliament is limited. As an internal counterintelligence service, the FSB is responsible for civil counterespionage, the internal security of the Russian state, as well as the fight against organized crime. The Soviet scale of bugging conversations of citizens was unsurpassed. In Stalin's time Beria's department monitored the telephone conversations of thousands of people, ranging from state and public figures to writers and journalists. In the Khrushchev era surveillance was substantially curtailed, with a total ban on eavesdropping on Supreme Soviet deputies, other important party or state functionary and their families without the express authorization of the CPSU General Secretary. Eavesdropping on ordinary citizens required a specific reason, such as suspicion of espionage or dissidence. Surveillance of people suspected of crimes was initiated by the USSR Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, and required the written authorization of the Chief of the KGB 12th Directorate.

When Vadim Bakatin became leader of the KGB in 1991, he stated in a public interview that [apart from collection against foreign agent networks, foreign drugs couriers, and similar external targets] the KGB's technical resources allowed the simultaneous tapping of no more than 500 Russians. Cost was one limiting factor, since six operators are needed for round-the-clock tapping which with associated expenditure brings the annual cost of monitoring a single subject to upwards of 200 million rubles [at 1997 prices]. Informants in organizations of interest to the special services [the defense industry, scientific institutions, transport centers, ministries, or editorial offices] are frequently an easier and less expensive means of obtaining information than organizing tapping. Currently obtaining permission to monitor telephone conversations requires the presentation to a court of material supporting an investigation. With the approval of a judge, FSB department carrying out the investigation prepares written instructions for tapping. Premises used for tapping are subject to a maximum secrecy regime, and officers are prohibited from visiting the FSB's main building in the Lubyanka. These precautionary measures have been taken to preclude criminal or commercial compromise of FSB surveillance operations. A supervisory prosecutor can arrive without warning wherever FSB officers are carrying out tapping and check which telephone numbers are being monitored at that time and whether the relevant permission has been granted. Despite these precautions, even FSB officers fear tapping, and particularly do not trust the municipal telephones installed in their offices. Under the revised law on Russian foreign intelligence of January 1996, the FSB is also authorized to work outside Russia in certain target areas in cooperation with the Russian foreign intelligence services. The FSB is also seeking expanded cooperation with the intelligence and secret services of the other former Soviet republics. In September 1996 the managers of most CIS secret services initiated an information system for their managers of the security organs and special services to improve the communication between the involved Secret services. A central data bank was established in September 1996 at the FSB which serves to support the fight against organized crime.

During the Soviet period, the KGB was the arbiter of state secrets, and the FSB has regained considerable operational and legal authority for controlling state secrets. In September 1995, FSB Chief General Barsukov was named deputy chairman of a new State Committee to Control State Secrets and given authority to define state secrets and to protect them using newly countenanced counter-intelligence operations. Harassment of domestic critics, ecologists and certain other groups indicate a resurgence of FSB internal power. The nation's leadership appears to be increasing its political support for the FSB. This may enable it to reestablish its bureaucratic authority over security and CI. In addition, the expulsion of a British businessman and the press articles highlighting the need for a stronger FSB suggest that the FSB will also take a harder line against Western commercial or academic research in Russia. In 1995 and 1996 the FSB reports that a total of around 400 foreign intelligence agency staff members were uncovered and put under supervision. The FSB reported stopping the activity of 39 foreign intelligence service agents who were Russian citizens, and stopping more than 100 attempts by Russian citizens to pass secret material to foreigners. A spate of articles in the national and provincial press by spokesmen for the FSB trumpets the service's role in protecting the state from foreign subversion. For example: In a series of press articles in January and February 1996, FSB officers noted that the service has the responsibility to monitor foreign astronauts at "Star City" and to prevent the emigration of Russian scientists.

The FSB has also recently bragged about the arrest of Turkish North Korean spies. At the end of June 1997 the Moscow City Court sentenced a certain Makarov, an adviser in the CIS and Baltic's Division of the Consular Services Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to seven years imprisonment. The FSB established that Makarov was recruited by the CIA back in the spring of 1976, when he was working at the Soviet Embassy in Bolivia. He continued subsequently to carry out espionage activity, making other official trips abroad. In particular, he was stationed in Spain from 1989 through 1991. For "fees" totaling $21,000, Makarov delivered a large quantity of secret information to the CIA. The arrest of an RVSN [Strategic Missile Forces] officer was reported in March 1997. Major Dudinka was attempting to get $500,000 from a foreign intelligence service. He had put highly sensitive information on a diskette—concerning the command and control system for a missile army and troop location information.

In December 1995, FSB personnel detained Major Dudnik, a retired officer of the Russian Center for Space Reconnaissance, at a Moscow metro station as he was handing over top secret satellite photographs to Israeli intelligence operative Reuven Dinel. During the course of further investigation it was ascertained that the officer was not acting alone, but with two accomplices, one of whom continued to serve in the Center for Space Reconnaissance of the GRU [Main Intelligence Directorate] of the General Staff. All three were arrested. While Dinel, working in Moscow under cover as Israeli Embassy secretary, was declared persona non grata and expelled from the country. Finkel was convicted of espionage after passing information on secret defense research to CIA representatives for monetary reward. Nordstrom, a Swedish military intelligence communications officer, was caught carrying out an operation to contact an agent in St. Petersburg, and expelled from Russia. The activities of US citizen Oppfelt [as transliterated], who, having made contact with a Pacific Fleet officer, was collecting information of a covert nature on naval facilities, were cut short and he was expelled from Russia. In late 1996 the FSB arrested former Russian Foreign Ministry staffer and British agent Platon Obukhov, who had been passing political and strategic defense information to the British special services. The FSB characterized the case as the biggest British special service failure since the time of Penkovskiy. On 29 May 1997 the trial of V. Sentsov, a worker at a defense institute, opened in Moscow. He was charged with treason in the form of espionage and the transfer of Russian defense and technological secrets to British intelligence.

The Federal Security Service has arrested some people on false pretexts for expressing views critical of the Government, and in particular, for voicing criticism of the security services. The FSB has also targeted national security and environmental researchers. The Russian press indicates that Russian citizens interested in military issues or military-industrial polluters have become a target of the FSB. Viktor Orekhov, a former KGB officer who assisted dissidents under the Soviet regime, was arrested in 1995 on charges of illegally possessing a firearm soon after he made unflattering remarks about his former boss, now the FSB chief of intelligence for the Moscow region, in an article. Within a matter of weeks Orekhov had been tried, convicted, and sentenced to 3 years in prison at hard labor. This sentence was subsequently reduced to 1 year. Noting the speed with which he was tried and sentenced in the usually slow court system, Orekhov alleged that he was targeted for retribution by the security services because of his human rights work. The FSB's influence and interest in the case was extensively reported in the domestic and foreign press. Former KGB Major Vladimir Kazantsev was arrested on 21 August 1995 after he gave an interview to the Moscow News newspaper in which he described purchases by the KGB's central directorate for security of illegal eavesdropping devices from foreign firms. At year's end, Kazantsev had been released from custody, but the case continued to be investigated.

Vil Mirzayanov was detained by the Ministry of Security in the Fall of 1992 on the charge of disclosing state secrets. Mirzayanov had publicly written that Russia was working on a nerve gas weapon that question had been tested after President Yeltsin said in January 1992 that his country would comply with the US-Soviet agreement on nonproliferation of chemical weapons. Vladimir Uglev, who was one of the chief chemical weapons designers, corroborated Vil Mirzayanov's allegations though no charges were filed against Uglev for revealing state secrets because he had deputy's immunity as an elected official. Authorities arrested Vladimir Petrenko, a former military officer in Saratov Oblast, in mid-1995 following his research into the danger posed by military chemical warfare stockpiles. He was held in pretrial confinement for seven months on what Amnesty International and Russian human rights observers believe is a trumped-up charge of assault. In December 1995 FSB agents confiscated material on human rights abuses in Chechnya from a group of Russian human rights activists on their way to an international meeting. Nikolay Shchur, chairman of the Snezhinskiy Ecological Fund, was held in pretrial confinement for six months following his survey of military pollution near Chelyabinsk. The FSB accused the Norwegian environmental Bellona Foundation of collecting state secrets on Russia's Northern Fleet in October 1995. The group had been gathering material for a second report on the Fleet's nuclear waste. The FSB raided the group's Murmansk office, confiscating all material on the Fleet's nuclear waste sites as well as computers and video cameras, interrogated researchers working on the study, and searched many of their homes. Others cooperating with Bellona in Murmansk, St. Petersburg, and Severodbinsk also were interrogated and subject to apartment searches.

The FSB is one of the few Russian government institutions that retains the vertical structure of federal control, with Administrations at the Oblast level, despite the desire of local leaders to subordinate these territorial directorates to their interests. The Chelyabinsk Oblast Administration of the FSB has a staff of slightly more than 300 officers are working in the entire oblast. The Administration previously had a counterintelligence division, which has been transformed into a counterintelligence operations division with a broader range of responsibilities. The counterintelligence division was based on functions of defence, but the counterintelligence operations division presupposes not only the defence of the state against the actions of foreign intelligence services, but also carrying out of operations to exert an effect on those services. The Administration's former economic counterintelligence division has been transformed into the division for counterintelligence at strategic objectives, which includes closed cities and other objectives. It provides for the security of objectives in the defence complex, the protection of secrets, and the prevention of diversionary and sabotage activities. Directorate T is responsible for counter-terrorism activities. The FSB Antiterrorist Centre is a special unit, formed in 1995, that encompasses FSB combat and operational counter-terrorist units. In 1996 the Centre responded to 420 alerts that terrorist acts were being prepared, including 35 alerts of possible terrorist acts against foreign citizens. During that year the Antiterrorist Centre carried out more than 200 special and combat-operation operations, including actions directed against 11 organized criminal groups engaged in illegally supplying arms to Central Russia from the North Caucasus republics and the Baltic countries.

The GRU is increasingly focused on target areas, in which civil and military interests intersect. In an interview one of the main priorities of the organization is to prevent Russia from sinking "to the status of a third world country." An agreement on intelligence cooperation between Russia and China was signed in Beijing at the end of the summer of 1992. It envisaged the restoration of the cooperation in the area of intelligence which had been cut off in 1959. This secret treaty covered the activities of Russian Military Strategic Intelligence (GRU) and the Foreign Intelligence Service, which are cooperating with the Chinese People's Liberation Army's Military Intelligence Directorate. The FSB and the GRU Intelligence Directorate of the ZakVO [Transcausasus Military District] (now the GRVZ [Group of Russian Forces in Transcaucasia]) acted jointly in the 1991 "New Year coup" in Georgia. However, the two agencies were reportedly supporting different sides the war in Abkhazia. The GRU, which is subordinate to the General Staff, is organized into Directorates, Directions, and Sections, which are responsible for the proccurement and processing of intelligence, as well as for supporting activities.

The First Deputy Director of the GRU, a post held by a Colonel General, is responsible for all intelligence procurement operations, other than those performed by other main directorates. In addition to a number of subordinate Directorates, four Directions report to the First Deputy Director:

First Direction is responsible for agent intelligence in the Moscow region

Second Direction was responsible for agent intelligence in Berlin

Third Direction is responsible for national liberation movements

Fourth Direction carries out agent operations from Cuban territory

The First Directorate (agent intelligence) consisted, in the mid-1980's, of five Directions, each of which was responsible for collection in European countries. Each Direction included a separate Section covering an individual country.

The Second Directorate (front intelligence) includes a number of Directions responsible for operational intelligence collection and dissemination in the Western Hemisphere.

First Direction controls tactical level reconnaissance.

Second Direction manages agent recruitment and the development of agent networks in or adjacent to areas of wartime responsibility.

Third Direction is responsible for spetsnaz operations within target countries.

Fourth [Information] Direction is responsible for intelligence collection management and analysis.

Fifth Direction is responsible for signals (SIGINT) and electronic [ELINT].

Sixth Direction special purpose [osnazovtsi] signals troops are responsible for special signals.

Seventh Direction is responsible for ciphers and communications security.

The Third Directorate includes a number of Directions responsible for operational intelligence collection and dissemination in Asia.

The Fourth Directorate includes a number of Directions responsible for operational intelligence collection and dissemination in Africa and the Middle East.

The Fifth Directorate manages operational intelligence, and intelligence organizations within fronts, fleets, and military districts. In the army, all of the chiefs of the military district intelligence fall under the command of the Fifth Directorate head. And fleet intelligence officers (Naval Staff Second Directorate Chiefs) are under the control of naval intelligence, which in turn falls under the Fifth Directorate of the GRU.

The Sixth Directorate, headed by a Lieutenant General, is responsible for electronic intelligence. This includes clandestine collection from embassies in foreign states, as well as Electronic Intelligence Regiments which are directly subordinated to the Sixth Directorate, which also controls the activities of electronic intelligence assets which are organic to land, sea and air combatant forces.

The Cosmic Intelligence Directorate is responsible for space-based intelligence collection. It includes activities at launch sites, a variety of research institutes, and a central coordinating facility.

The Chief of Fleet Intelligence, an office held by a Vice Admiral, is a Deputy of the GRU Director, although operational tasking and coordination is conducted through the Fifth Directorate. Fleet Intelligence consists of five Directorates:

Northern Fleet Intelligence Directorate

Pacific Fleet Intelligence Directorate

Black Sea Fleet Intelligence Directorate

Baltic Fleet Intelligence Directorate

Fleet Cosmic Intelligence Directorate, responsible for space-based ocean surveillance

The Chief of Information, a Colonel General, is responsible for the Information Service, responsible for intelligence processing.

The Information Command Post tasks and receives agent reports, technical collection data from overhead systems, as well as from other GRU sources.

The Institute of Information studies open source materials.

The Seventh Directorate is responsible for all aspects of NATO, and includes six Directions covering specific topical areas.

The Eighth Directorate conducts studies of individual countries, both in the NATO region and around the world.

The Ninth Directorate conducts studies of foreign military technology, in close coordination with the domestic armaments industry. It is concerned with both copying and countering potential adversary weapons systems, and engages in foreign materiel acquisition and exploitation.

The Tenth Directorate covers military economics, including foreign military production and sales, as well as economic security related issues.

The Eleventh Directorate is focused on strategic nuclear questions, including assessments of the readiness and alert levels of potential adversaries, as well as support to arms control negotiations.

The scope of activities of the Twelfth Directorate remain obscure.

The Political Department is responsible for personnel security and reliability.

The Personnel Directorate is responsible for the recruitment, training and professional development of GRU staff.

The Administrative/Technical Directorate is responsible for financial management, including foreign currencies and other valuable items of use in international operations.

The Financial Directorate is responsible for domestic financial management, excluding foreign operations.

The Operational Technical Directorate, headed by a Lieutenant General, is responsible for the development of intelligence collection systems. Work is conducted at several scientific institutes and enterprises.

The First GRU Department is responsible for all aspects of replicating foreign identity documentation to support clandestine GRU operations, such as forging passports.

The Eight Department is responsible for the security of internal GRU communications.

The structural subdivisions of the federal and many regional organs of state rule, enterprises, institutions, and organizations operate as part of this state system for the protection of information from technical intelligence services. One major accomplishment since the creation of the Commission has been the creation of a specialist training system for the protection of state secrets and information. The Commission has also established standards for licensing enterprises and organizations for providing sphere of information protection services, as well as standards for the certification of technical information protection systems. Systematic monitoring of information protection in ministries and departments, at enterprises, institutions and organizations permits the analysis of the effectiveness of the adopted protection measures and determination of ways to improve information protection systems. The most recent instance involved the widespread use of inexpensive imported mini-ATS [automatic telephone exchanges]. Russian Federation federal and regional agencies, and enterprises and organizations that accomplish defence orders and carry out state deliveries were purchasing imported automatic telephone exchanges. Analysis conducted by Russian State Technical Commission experts indicated the possibility exists of their remote control ("police modes") either for bugging rooms or blocking their operations. Following notification from the State Commission, managers began to assess not only the monetary benefit of low cost but also the operation hazards of these systems.

Criminal and commercial structures are carrying out extensive communications monitoring, using modern equipment which is sometimes better than that of state agencies. There is widespread tapping of cellular telephones of all standards and of pagers, and there is a brisk business in intercepting reports and passing them on to well-heeled companies. The punishment for tapping under existing law is laughable is a relatively trivial fine. The Commission is concerned with the implementation of the State Program for Guaranteeing the Protection of State Secrets in the Russian Federation. It is also currently focused on draft legislation clarifying the goals, tasks, and organizational basis of information protection counteracting technical intelligence services. The Russian Federation draft law "On Information Protection From Loss Through Technical Channels and Counteracting Technical Intelligence Services" was prepared at the request of the Federation Assembly State Duma Committee on Security and has been submitted to the committee.

The Russian Draft Information Security Act aims at covering almost all fields, including: Administrative and Physical Protection, Protection against unauthorized access to information in single systems (somehow comparable to COMPSEC), Protection of information and availability in networks (comparable to COMSEC), Protection of Electronic Document Interchange, including regulation of digital signatures, Protection from compromising secrecy by detection of signals and electromagnetic radiation (TEMPEST-like), Protection from malicious software (viruses etc), and Protection against threats to Intellectual Property, illegal copying etc.

The KGB also had a broad network of special departments in all major government institutions, enterprises, and factories. They generally consisted of one or more KGB representatives, whose purpose was to ensure the observance of security regulations and to monitor political sentiments among employees. The special departments recruited informers to help them in their tasks. A separate and very extensive network of special departments existed within the armed forces and defence related institutions. Although a union-republic agency, the KGB was highly centralized and was controlled rigidly from the top. The KGB central staff kept a close watch over the operations of its branches, leaving the latter minimal autonomous authority over policy or cadre selection. Moreover, local government organs had little involvement in local KGB activities. Indeed, the high degree of centralization in the KGB was reflected in the fact that regional KGB branches were not subordinated to the local soviets, but only to the KGB hierarchy. Thus, they differed from local branches of most union-republic ministerial agencies, such as the MVD, which were subject to dual subordination. The KGB was directed by a chairman who was formally appointed by the Supreme Soviet but actually was selected by the Politburo one or two first deputy chairmen, and several (usually four to six) deputy chairmen. Key decisions were made by the KGB Collegium, which was a collective leadership body composed of the chairman, deputy chairmen, chiefs of certain KGB directorates, and one or two chairmen of republic KGB organizations

As a state committee with ministerial status, the KGB operated on the basis of a statute (polozhenie), confirmed by the Council of Ministers, that set forth in legal terms the KGB's powers and duties. Unlike the majority of statutes governing ministerial agencies, the KGB's statute was not published. Nevertheless, Soviet textbooks on administrative law offered useful statements about the KGB's role and functions. The KGB's tasks were generally defined in official Soviet publications as encompassing four areas: the struggle against foreign spies and agents, the exposure and investigation of political and economic crimes by citizens, the protection of state borders, and the protection of state secrets. In addition, the KGB was charged with a wide range of preventive tasks, which were designed to eliminate the causes of both political and ordinary crimes. In other words, the KGB was tasked with ferreting out potential threats to the state and preventing the development of unorthodox political and social attitudes among the population. Western estimates of KGB manpower have ranged from 490,000 in 1973 to 700,000 in 1986. There are no published estimates of the KGB budget. Many KGB personnel were institutions to which they were assigned, and the KGB received support and services from the military and other institutions, rendering a meaningful budgetary accounting particularly problematic. Official Soviet sources did not discuss the internal structure of the KGB in detail. Nevertheless, some information on KGB organization and functions has been revealed by Soviet defectors and other sources. In 1988 the KGB had five chief directorates and three known (possible another) directorates that were smaller in size and scope than the chief directorates, as well as various other administrative and technical support departments.

The First Chief Directorate (Foreign Operations) was responsible for all foreign operations and intelligence gathering activities. It was divided into both functional services--training and management of covert agents, intelligence analysis, and collection of political, scientific, and technological intelligence and geographic departments for different areas of the world. The Directorage included a spetsnaz group formed in August 1981 to conduct external reconnaissance, sabotage, training and security missions, though in practice the unit was particularly active in internal-security actions.

The Second Chief Directorate was responsible for internal political control of Soviet citizens and foreigners residing within the Soviet Union, including both diplomats and tourists.

The Third Chief Directorate [Armed Forces ]dealt with military counterintelligence and political surveillance of the Soviet armed forces. The Armed Forces Directorate was divided into twelve major departments that oversaw all the various military and paramilitary formations of the Soviet government. Officers from the Directorate were stationed at every echelon of Soviet armed forces down to the company level, in each military district, with every naval group, at each military front. These KGB officers reported through their own chain of command to KGB headquarters.

The Fifth Chief Directorate also dealt with internal security. Created in 1969 late 1960s to combat political dissent, it took up some of the tasks previously handled by the Second Chief Directorate. The Fifth Chief Directorate had special operational departments for religious dissent, national minorities, the intelligentsia and the artistic community, and censorship of literature.

The Seventh Directorate (Surveillance) handled surveillance, providing personnel and technical equipment to follow and monitor the activities of both foreigners and suspect Soviet citizens. Much of this work was centred in the Moscow and Leningrad areas, where tourists, diplomats, foreign students, and members of the Soviet intelligentsia were concentrated. The Al'fa (Alpha) counter terrorist group was subordinated to Seventh Main Directorate. Alpha was involved in many counter terrorist and internal-security missions since its formation in 1974 and was heavily active in special-operations tasks in Afghanistan.

The Eighth Chief Directorate was responsible for the highly sensitive area of communications. The Communications Directorate was tasked with monitoring foreign communications. The Directorate was also responsible for the cryptological systems used by KGB divisions, the transmission of communications to KGB stations overseas, and the development of secure communication equipment.

The Ninth Directorate [Guards Directorate] provided bodyguards for principal Party leaders and their families, and the Kremlin and other major government facilities around the Soviet Union.

The Sixteenth Directorate [former State Communications Department] maintained the telephone and radio systems used by all Soviet government agencies.

Directorate S recruited, trained, and managed KGB officers assigned to foreign countries under false identities. Most of the staff of the Directorate have either served as illegals, or have served abroad under diplomatic cover.

Directorate T was created from the former Department 10 in 1963 to intensify the acquisition of Western strategic, military and industrial technology. By 1972 Directorate T had a headquarters staff of several hundred officers subdivided into four Departments in addition to specialists stationed at major Soviet embassies around the world. The Directorate's operations were coordinated with the scientific and technical collection activities of other KGB elements, and with the State Scientific and Technical Committee ( GNTK).

Directorate I was established in 1969 to review past operations as a guide to improving future initiatives, although in practice it was said to function more as a dumping-ground for aging or inept officers.

Special Service I was responsible for the correlation and dissemination of routine intelligence collected by the First Chief Directorate, apart from technical intelligence collected and processed by Directorate T. Other related responsibilities included publication of a weekly intelligence summary for Party leaders, briefing officers prior to foreign assignment, conducting special studies at Central Committee direction. The products of the Information Service did not consist of finished estimative intelligence, but rather of raw reports that were provided to senior leaders who drew their own conclusions.

Special Service II was tasked countering foreign intelligence agencies, including penetrating foreign security, intelligence and counter-intelligence services to undermine their effectiveness in countering the activities of the KGB. Special Service II was also responsible for the security officers tasked with monitoring Soviet civilians stationed abroad, including Soviet nationals working as correspondents, trade representatives, Aeroflot clerks, or any other capacity.

Department A was responsible for clandestine initiatives and campaigns to influence foreign governments and publics, as well to shape perceptions of individuals and groups hostile to Soviet interests. The majority of the Departments activities were implemented by other KGB elements, or other Soviet organizations.

Department V was responsible for "wet affairs" (mokrie dela) -- murders, kidnappings, and sabotage -- which involve bloodshed. Previously known as the Thirteenth Department or Line F, the Department was enlarged and redesignated in 1969, and tasked with sabotaging critical infrastructure so as to immobilize Western countries during future crises. The Department employed officers stationed in Soviet embassies, illegals stationed abroad, and the services of professional.

The operational core of the First Chief Directorate lay in its geographical departments [numbering ten in the early 1970s and growing to eleven by the late 1980s]. The geographic Departments were responsible for the majority of the KGB enterprises abroad. The duties of this department included the staff of KGB "legal" Residencies [rezidenty] in Soviet embassies, operating under legal cover while engaged in intelligence collection, espionage, and active measures, as well as KGB illegals [apart from those operating under assignment from the Executive Action and Disinformation Departments]. They also managed operations initiated through international communist-front organizations, as well as other agent of influence operations.

1st Department - United States and Canada

2nd Department - Latin America

3rd Department- United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Scandinavia

4th Department - Federal Republic of Germany, Austria

5th Department - France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Ireland

6th Department - China, North Vietnam, North Korea

7th Department - Japan, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the rest of Asia

8th Department - Arab nations, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Greece, Iran, Afghanistan, and Albania

9th Department - English-speaking nations of Africa

10th Department - French-speaking nations of Africa

The 11th Department, formerly known as the Advisers Department, conducted liaison with counterpart services in Cuba and Eastern European countries.

The 12th [Cover Organs] Department provided KGB personnel with cover jobs in other Soviet institutions, as diplomats, journalists, tourists, or delegates to conferences.

The 13th Department provided secure communications with Residencies, officers, and agents in the field.

The 14th Department supplied forged passports and other documents, invisible writing materials, incapacitating chemicals, and other technical devices required in Foreign Directorate operations. Specialists in Soviet embassies monitored local communications and provided technical assistance to the Residency.

15th Department maintained the operational files and archives of the First Chief Directorate.

The 16th Department performed routine personnel functions and recruits prospective staff officers for the First Chief Directorate. Many officer candidates were recruited from the Institutes of International Affairs and Eastern Languages in Moscow.

The KGB had a variety of domestic security functions. It was empowered by law to arrest and investigate individuals for certain types of political and economic crimes. It was also responsible for censorship, propaganda, and the protection of state and military secrets. In carrying out its task of ensuring state security, the KGB was empowered by law to uncover and investigate certain political crimes set forth in the Russian Republic's Code of Criminal Procedure and the criminal codes of other republics. According to the Russian Republic's Code of Criminal Procedure, which came into force in 1960 and has been revised several times since then, the KGB had the authority, together with the Procuracy, to investigate the political crimes of treason, espionage, terrorism, sabotage, anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, divulgence of state secrets, smuggling, illegal exit abroad, and illegal entry into the Soviet Union. In addition, the KGB was empowered, along with the Procuracy and the MVD, to investigate the following economic crimes: stealing of state property by appropriation or embezzlement or by abuse of official position and stealing of state property or socialist property (see Glossary) on an especially large scale.  In carrying out arrests and investigations for these crimes, the KGB was subject to specific rules that were set forth in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Procuracy was charged with ensuring that these rules were observed. In practice, the Procuracy had little authority over the KGB, and the latter was permitted to circumvent the regulations whenever politically expedient. In 1988 closing some of these loopholes was discussed, and legal experts called for a greater role for the Procuracy in protecting Soviet citizens from abuse by the investigatory organs. As of May 1989, however, few concrete changes had been publicized.  It is important to note that the KGB frequently enlisted the MVD and the Procuracy to instigate proceedings against political nonconformists on charges that did not fall under the KGB's purview. Dissidents were often charged for defaming the Soviet state and violating public order. Sometimes the KGB arranged to have them charged for ordinary crimes, such as hooliganism or drug abuse.

The intensity of KGB campaigns against political crime varied considerably over the years. The Khrushchev period was marked by relative tolerance toward dissent, whereas Brezhnev reinstituted a harsh policy. The level of political arrests rose markedly from 1965 to 1973. In 1972 Brezhnev began to pursue détente, and the regime apparently tried to appease Western critics by moderating KGB operations against dissent. There was a sharp reversal after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, and arrests again became more numerous. In 1986, Gorbachev's second year in power, restraint was reintroduced, and the KGB curtailed its arrests. The forcible confinement of dissidents in psychiatric hospitals, where debilitating drugs were administered, was an alternative to straightforward arrests. This procedure avoided the unfavourable publicity that often arose with criminal trials of dissenters. Also, by labelling dissenters madmen, authorities hoped to discredit their actions and deprive them of support. The KGB often arranged for such commitments and maintained an active presence in psychiatric hospitals, despite the fact that these institutions were not under its formal authority. The Gorbachev leadership, as part of its general program of reform, introduced some reforms that were designed to prevent the abuse of psychiatric commitment by Soviet authorities, but the practical effects of these changes remained unclear in 1989. In addition to arrests, psychiatric commitment, and other forms of coercion, the KGB also exercised a preventive function, designed to prevent political crimes and suppress deviant political attitudes. The KGB carried out this function in a variety of ways. For example, when the KGB learned that a Soviet citizen was having contact with foreigners or speaking in a negative fashion about the Soviet regime, it made efforts to set him or her straight by means of a "chat." The KGB also devoted great efforts to political indoctrination and propaganda. At local and regional levels, KGB officials regularly visited factories, schools, collective farms, and Komsomol organizations to deliver talks on political vigilance. National and republic-level KGB officials wrote articles and gave speeches on this theme. Their main message was that the Soviet Union was threatened by the large-scale efforts of Western intelligence agencies to penetrate the country by using cultural, scientific, and tourist exchanges to send in spies. In addition, the KGB claimed that Soviet citizens were barraged by hostile propaganda from the West as part of an effort to undermine the Soviet system.

Another important facet of KGB preventive work was censorship of literature and other media, which it exercised at both an informal and a formal level. The KGB censored informally by harassing writers and artists, arranging for their expulsion from professional organizations or from their jobs, and threatening them with prosecution for their unorthodox views. Such forms of intimidation forced many writers and artists to exercise self censorship by producing only what they thought would be acceptable. The KGB maintained strong surveillance over the Union of Writers, as well as over the journalists' and artists' unions, where KGB representatives occupied top administrative posts. The KGB played an important role in the system of formal censorship by taking part in the work of the Main Administration for Safeguarding State Secrets in the Press (Glavnoe upravlenie po okhrane gosudarstvennykh tain v pechati--Glavlit). Some Western specialists believe that at least one of Glavlit's deputy chiefs was a KGB official and that the KGB assisted in Glavlit's compilation of its Censor's Index, a thick volume, updated frequently, listing all military, technical, statistical, and other subjects that could not be publicized without special permission from the Central Committee. Another important internal security task of the KGB was to provide the leadership with information about the dissident movement and the political attitudes and opinions of the public as a whole. This task by its very nature gave the KGB influence over policy, particularly because Soviet leaders had no direct contact with dissidents and nonconformists and thus relied on KGB information about motives and foreign connections and on its estimates of numbers and support for various groups. The situation probably changed somewhat after Gorbachev introduced the policy of glasnost' in early 1987. After that the KGB no longer had a monopoly on information about the country's political mood because Soviet citizens expressed their views more freely in the press. Nevertheless, the KGB's information gathering continued to be important because direct criticism of the political system was suppressed. Computers no doubt improved KGB methods of processing information and conducting research.

The KGB was given considerable latitude in carrying out the party leadership's policy toward dissent. In other words, the Politburo decided on broad policy guidelines, but the KGB made the day-to-day decisions. Many dissidents, for example, viewed the KGB as extremely powerful and as enjoying considerable autonomy in implementing regime policy. Although the party leadership clearly determined the general policy toward dissent, it had an interest in promoting the idea that the KGB was responsible because the KGB could then be blamed for the injustices suffered by citizens. Furthermore, the image of the KGB's omnipotence has no doubt helped to prevent anti-Soviet behaviour. As Seweryn Bialer, a Western Sovietologist, observed of the Soviet system, "Without doubt the key to stability has been the high visibility of the coercive apparatus and policies." The KGB played an important role in furthering Soviet foreign policy objectives abroad. In addition to straightforward intelligence collection and counterintelligence, the KGB participated in the Kremlin's program of active measures. KGB officials also contributed to foreign policy decision making. 

The First Chief Directorate of the KGB was responsible for KGB operations abroad. The longtime head of the First Chief Directorate, Vladimir Kriuchkov, who had served under Andropov and his successors, was named head of the KGB in 1988.

The Second Chief Directorate also played a role in foreign intelligence in 1989. It recruited agents for intelligence purposes from among foreigners stationed in the Soviet Union, and it engaged in counterintelligence by uncovering attempts of foreign intelligence services to recruit Soviet citizens.

The First Chief Directorate was responsible for all international Soviet clandestine activities, apart from military intelligence collection by the GRU and political initiatives of the Communist Party itself.

The KGB also was heavily involved in the support of "wars of national liberation" in the Third World. Together with satellite intelligence services, the KGB helped to organize military training and political indoctrination of leftist guerrillas, as well as providing arms and advisers. The manipulation of wars of national liberation enabled the Soviet Union to influence the political future of the countries in question and to make their new governments more responsive to Soviet objectives. The Soviet regime concentrated mainly on African countries until the late 1970s but then extended its support for "national liberation movements" to Central America, where it has regularly employed the services of Cuba. The KGB relied heavily on the intelligence services of satellite countries in carrying out both active measures and espionage operations. The intelligence services of the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Cuba formed important adjuncts to the KGB. Although formally subordinated to their own governments, these satellite intelligence services were, according to many Western experts, heavily influenced by the KGB. A former official in the Czechoslovak intelligence service stated that Soviet intelligence was informed about every major aspect of Czechoslovak intelligence activities, and Soviet advisers (called liaison officers) participated in planning major operations and assessing the results. As far back as the 1960s, the KGB introduced a new element of coordination with the satellite intelligence services through the creation of departments for disinformation in East German, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian intelligence services and the establishment of direct lines of communication from these departments to the KGB. Soviet active measures involved not only KGB and satellite intelligence services but also several other Soviet agencies, which all participated in a coordinated effort to further Soviet policy objectives. In addition to the KGB, the Central Committee's International Department took a leading role in directing and implementing active measures

The KGB participated in the foreign policy decision-making process at the highest level because its chief was a member of the Politburo. At the same time, it influenced the formulation of foreign policy at a lower level as an executor of that policy, a provider of information, and a generator of ideas, solutions, and alternatives. Thus, for example, when the Kremlin decided to invade Czechoslovakia in 1968, KGB chief Andropov, who was an expert on Eastern Europe and had a direct line of intelligence from Czechoslovakia, presumably influenced the decision-making process significantly. Furthermore, the KGB, as the main provider of intelligence to the leadership, was in a position to influence decision making by screening and interpreting the information. The KGB probably favoured the invasion because of the threat posed by a possible spillover of unrest into the Soviet Union. Also, efforts by Czechoslovak reformers to reorganize their security police jeopardized KGB operations in Czechoslovakia. Considerable evidence showed that the KGB, in order to bolster the prointerventionist position, used intelligence and covert action to produce proof of counterrevolution in Czechoslovakia. Andropov did not always favour military intervention as a solution to international problems, however. Other considerations, such as the Soviet Union's international image, no doubt affected his views on the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan (which he reportedly did not favour) and the 1980-81 Polish crisis (where he probably was among those who opposed an invasion). Both these crises occurred at a time when the KGB was trying to mobilize West European public opinion against plans by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to introduce intermediate-range missiles in Europe.

The Border Troops Directorate administered approximately nine border districts (pogranichnye okruga), which covered the nearly 63,000 kilometres of the state border. Border district boundaries were distinct from civil or military district boundaries. The nine border districts were subdivided into detachments (otriady), covering specific sections of the border, border command posts (pogranichnye komendatury), passport control points (kontrol'no-propusknye punkty), and border outposts (zastavy). The border area was divided into a border zone, which included the territory of the district and settlements adjacent to the state border, and the border strip, which was approximately two kilometres in depth, running directly along the border. Only permanent residents or those who had obtained special permission from the MVD could enter the border zone. Entry into the border strip was forbidden without special permission from the Border Troops. Soviet sources repeatedly stressed that a border guard was not only a soldier but also a defender of Soviet ideology. His mission entailed sensitive political tasks, such as detecting subversive literature, and shooting citizens attempting to escape across the border. Enlisted men were trained with their operational units, whereas officers were trained in special Border Troops schools, such as the Dzerzhinskii Higher Border Command School and the Higher Border School in Moscow. Military-political officers received training at the Voroshilov Higher Border Military Political Academy, founded in the 1930s and located outside Leningrad. In 1972 a higher border military-political school was created in Golytsin, near Moscow. More recently, higher border command faculties were set up at the Frunze Military Academy and the Lenin Military-Political Academy. The period of instruction at the Dzerzhinskii Higher Border Command School was four years. Officer candidates, who were screened carefully by their local KGB offices before admittance, took general higher education courses along with specialized military and political studies.

To ensure a high level of discipline among personnel of the Border Troops, much attention was devoted to political training and indoctrination. For this purpose, a network of political organs, the Political Directorate of the Border Troops, was established within the Border Troops. It had political departments within all the border districts, detachments, and education institutions, and a network of full-time party political officers worked among all troop units. They conducted political study groups, gave propaganda lectures, and worked to increase the level of combat effectiveness among the troops. The Border Troops Directorate protected Soviet land and sea borders.
In addition to the various directorates and a special network of training and education establishments, the KGB included a variety of other organizations: a personnel department, a secretariat, a technical support staff, a finance department, an archives, an administration department, and a party committee. Most of these bodies had counterparts within the different directorates. Party committees, which existed in every Soviet organization, handled political indoctrination of personnel. Heads of party committees arranged regular meetings to discuss party matters and served as liaisons between the party and the KGB at various levels, although party membership was probably universal among KGB employees. At the republic level, KGB organization was probably similar to that of the central KGB, although republic KGBs did not supervise units of the Border Troops, which were administered centrally. Nor did they include functions of the Third Chief Directorate, which was organized primarily along military service lines or by military district. In addition, functions such as communications and foreign espionage may have been administered only in Moscow. Although the security police was always a government rather than a party institution, the party considered this agency to be its own vital arm and sought to maintain the closest supervision and control over its activities. The KGB was nominally subordinate to the Council of Ministers. But the CPSU, not the government, exercised control and direction. Aside from the Politburo, which probably issued general policy directives, another vehicle for such party control was, according to Western specialists, the State and Legal Department of the Central Committee Secretariat. This department supervised all government agencies concerned with legal affairs, security, and defence, including the Ministry of Defence. It implemented party control by approving personnel appointments and exercising general oversight to ensure that these agencies were following party directives. From 1968 to 1988, the chief of this department, which probably had a staff of fifty to sixty employees, was Nikolai Savinkin. From the available evidence, it appears that the department did not involve itself as deeply in KGB affairs as it did in the activities of other state agencies, such as the MVD. Given the sensitive nature of KGB functions, the party leadership may have been reluctant to allocate to the State and Legal Department the most important decisions about KGB personnel and policy. Rather, the Central Committee secretaries charged with oversight responsibilities for the State and Legal Department probably made the key decisions. Such a portfolio was an important of political power for a Central Committee secretary and was therefore a highly coveted responsibility. In January 1987, Anatolii Lukianov was brought into the Secretariat to supervise the State and Legal Department. He was, however, only a junior secretary, so Gorbachev or another senior secretary may have had the ultimate responsibility. Lukianov, an apparent ally of Gorbachev, had attended Moscow University's Law Faculty when Gorbachev was there in the early 1950s.

The MVD had a wide array of duties. It was responsible for uncovering and investigating certain categories of crime, apprehending criminals, supervising the internal passport system, maintaining public order, combating public intoxication, supervising parolees, managing prisons and labour camps, providing fire protection, and controlling traffic. Until early 1988, the MVD was also in charge of special psychiatric hospitals, but a law passed in January 1988 transferred all psychiatric hospitals to the authority of the Ministry of Health. As a union-republic ministry under the Council of Ministers, the MVD had its headquarters in Moscow and branches in the republic and regional government apparatus, as well as in kraia and cities. Unlike the MVD, the internal affairs apparatus was subject to dual subordination; local internal affairs offices reported both to the executive committees of their respective local soviets and to their superior offices in the MVD hierarchy. The MVD headquarters in Moscow was divided into several directorates and offices. The Directorate for Combating the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation was established in the late 1960s to control such white-collar crime as embezzlement and falsification of economic plan records. The Criminal Investigation Directorate assisted the Procuracy, and on occasion the MVD, in the investigation of criminal cases. There was a separate department for investigating and prosecuting minor cases, such as traffic violations, and the Maintenance of Public Order Directorate, which was responsible for ensuring order in public places and for preventing outbreaks of public unrest. The members of the militsiia (uniformed police), as part of the regular police force, were distinguished by their gray uniforms with red piping. The duties of the militsiia included patrolling public places to ensure order and arresting persons who violated the law, including vagrants and drunks. Resisting arrest or preventing a police officer from executing his duties was a serious crime in the Soviet Union, punishable by one to five years' imprisonment. Killing a policeman was punishable by death.

The Office of Visas and Registration was charged with registering Soviet citizens and foreigners residing in each precinct of a city and with issuing internal passports to Soviet citizens. Soviet citizens wishing to emigrate from the Soviet Union and foreigners wishing to travel within the Soviet Union had to obtain visas from this office. The Office of Recruitment and Training supervised the recruitment of new members of the militsiia, who were recommended by work collectives and public organizations. The local party and Komsomol bodies screened candidates thoroughly to ensure their political reliability. Individuals serving in the militsiia were exempt from the regular military draft. Although a component of the armed forces, the Internal Troops were subordinate to the MVD. Numbering approximately 260,000 men in 1989, they were one of the largest formations of special troops in the Soviet Union. The Internal Troops were first established in 1919 under the NKVD. Later they were subordinated to the state security police, and then in 1934 they were incorporated into the expanded NKVD. They were back under the authority of the security police in the early 1950s, but when the MVD was established in 1954, control of the Internal Troops shifted to the MVD. The chief of the Internal Troops from 1954 to late 1987 was Ivan Iakovlev. Iakovlev's successor was Iurii Shatalin. Like the regular army, the Internal Troops for the most part were composed of conscripts, who were obliged to serve for a minimum of two years. The Internal Troops accepted candidates for commission both from the ranks of the armed forces and from civilian society. The MVD had four schools for training members of the officer corps, as well as a separate school for political officers. The Internal Troops supported MVD missions by supplementing the militsiia in ensuring crowd control in large cities and, in emergencies, by helping to fight fires. These troops also guarded large-scale industrial enterprises, railroad stations, certain large stockpiles of food and material, and certain communication centres that were strategically significant. One of their most important functions was that of preventing internal disorder that might threaten the regime's political stability. They took a direct role in suppressing anti-Soviet demonstrations in the non-Russian republics and strikes by Soviet workers. In this capacity, the Internal Troops probably worked together with the MVD Security Troops. There was little evidence to support the theory that the Internal Troops would serve as a counterweight to the regular armed forces during a political crisis. Most Internal Troops units were composed of infantry alone and were not equipped with artillery and tanks; in 1989 there was only one operational division of the Internal Troops in Moscow. According to some Western analysts, the Internal Troops were to perform rear security functions in the event of war, just as they did in World War II.

The September 1992 law 'On the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs' defines their responsibilities as: assisting Internal Affairs organs in maintaining public order and public safety and in providing the necessary lawful procedures during a state-of-emergency; protecting important state facilities, communications installations and special cargo as well as assisting in accidents involving nuclear material; guarding forced labour institutions, escorting convicts and prisoners.

In November 1993 the VVMVD had nearly 234,000 men, and following the breakup of the Soviet Union the Internal Troops became a component of the MVD entirely separate from the Armed Forces of Russia. As such, they are state organs intended to provide domestic security in peacetime which do not possess the organizational structure for conducting ground combat actions against a foreign enemy. Functions carried out by Russia's Internal Troops include disaster relief and security, counter-drug and counter-terrorism efforts, and peacekeeping operations.

Internal Troop organizational elements include: operational large units (divisions and brigades) and troop units (regiments, separate battalions) comprising; the MVD federal mobile reserve; special motorized troop units which support public order in most of Russia's large cities; large units and troop units for guarding important state facilities, including nuclear arms and nuclear energy complexes and also special cargo; large units and troop units for guarding forced labour institutions [this responsibility, involving some 100,000 men, has been transferred to the criminal punishment system].

As of 1994 large units and troop units were subordinated to seven Internal Troop districts. Two company sized MVD units, the Special purpose company (RSN) and the Special purpose militsiia detachment (OMSN), were created in December 1978 and 1980, respectively, from the MVD Dzerzhinskii Division as counterterrorist units. Under Gorbachev both companies grew to battalion size. The OMON [Detachments of Special Designation] were created in 1987. By 1991 there were an estimated 9,000 OMON troops deployed throughout the USSR, while another estimate suggested that as of late summer 1992, there were 5,500 OMON personnel organized into 20 detachments around Russia. Created to deal with terrorist incidents, serious criminal activities and the "maintenance of public order," OMON units are organized like SWAT teams or light infantry, depending on their roles. These units also are deployed to conflicts beyond their immediate operating areas. OMON units gained notoriety for their repressive and lethal activities in the Baltic republics and are based in many other republic areas. In the face of growing drug-cultivation problems the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union, the Ministry of Internal Affairs Militia OMON were employed starting in 1992 in drug-eradication efforts.

Internal troop spetsnaz units fell under the control of the MVD in 1992, and they continue to be deployed to trouble spots and are among the most experienced and effective of all Russian forces in dealing with interethnic conflict. Activated in 1978, these forces have grown substantially and are currently organized in brigade, battalion and company increments. The MVD published a vast amount of popular literature devoted to the glorification of the MVD in order to attract well-qualified cadres to its ranks. The fact that MVD salaries were considerably lower than those for the MVD and that working conditions were generally poor (long hours and out-of-date equipment) made recruitment somewhat difficult. The MVD underwent an extensive purge in the mid-1980s as part of the party's effort to rid the organization of corruption and inefficiency. Over 170,000 police officers were fired between 1983 and 1988 for irresponsibility, lack of discipline, and violations of the law. The chief vehicle for party control over the MVD was the State and Legal Department of the Secretariat, which had a special section for supervising the MVD. This section presumably participated in the selection of MVD personnel and evaluated the MVD's work in terms of how well it carried out party directives.

By late 1986, the Gorbachev regime was stressing anew the importance of individual rights in relation to the state and criticizing those who violated the procedural laws in implementing Soviet justice. This signalled a resurgence of socialist legality as the dominant trend. It should be noted, however, that socialist legality itself still lacked important features associated with Western jurisprudence. In particular, the ultimate control of the legal system lay with the party leadership, which was not democratically elected by, and therefore not responsible to, the public at large The Procuracy was the most powerful institution in the Soviet system of justice relating to nonpolitical matters. It was a hierarchical organization representing all public prosecutors, all the way down to the city or village level. As specified in the Soviet Constitution, the procurator general of the Soviet Union was appointed by the Supreme Soviet and controlled Procuracy officials throughout the system. Employees of the Procuracy were not subject to the authority of their local soviets, but they were subject to the authority of the party. The Procuracy had a wide range of functions, involving itself at all stages in the criminal process. Procurators carried out investigations of the majority of cases; supervised investigations carried out by the MVD, the MVD, and the Procuracy's own employees; authorized arrests; prosecuted offenders; and supervised prisons. In addition, procurators supervised parole and the release of prisoners and referred judicial decisions to higher courts for review. Procurators also oversaw the operation of all government bodies, enterprises, officials, and social organizations to ensure that they were observing the law. Although the Procuracy possessed the formal authority to supervise the MVD in carrying out arrests and investigations in political cases, there was little evidence that the Procuracy actually exercised this function. Military justice in the Soviet Union was administered by the Main Military Procuracy, which was subordinated to the procurator general and responsible for ensuring that laws were observed within the military. It also supervised criminal investigations of armed forces personnel carried out by its employees, as well as by the MVD (in cases of political crime). Military cases were tried in military tribunals, which were under the authority of the Supreme Court.

The court structure in the Soviet Union, set forth in the Constitution and governed by several all-union and republic statutes, was quite complex. In courts of first instance, one judge sat with two elected people's assessors (lay judges), who were ordinary citizens, elected at general meetings of factories, offices, collective farms, or residential blocks for a term of two years. Appellate and review procedure came before a bench of three judges. Although a legal education was not required and any citizen over the age of twenty-four could in principle be elected to the post of judge, more than 95 percent of all judges had higher legal education. The party carefully screened candidates for election to the position of judge, which had a term of five years. Most judges above the local level were party members. In addition to determining innocence or guilt, judges performed an important function of socialization, often lecturing defendants for failing to uphold socialist values. Judges were part of the union-republic Ministry of Justice and the fifteen republic ministries of justice. There was no system of binding precedent, but supreme courts at all-union and republic levels gave "guiding explanations" to be follow Advocates, or defence attorneys, were controlled by the Ministry of Justice at the all-union and republic level and at the local level by the justice department of the local soviet. Advocates were usually law school graduates with some practical training. The Soviet Union had approximately 18,000 advocates, organized into colleges of around 150 attorneys each. These colleges maintained consultation bureaus, each with a staff of about twenty, in most towns and cities. The bureaus provided legal advice on a variety of issues, such as divorce, custody, inheritance, property rights, and housing disputes. The bureaus also offered legal defence for persons accused of criminal offences. According to the 1977 Constitution, all defendants had the right to legal counsel. Legal fees were set by the state and were low enough for most people to afford. According to Soviet émigrés, however, many defence lawyers expected additional payments or gifts "under the table."

Legal advisers to government agencies and departments, enterprises, factories, and state farms were called iuriskonsul'ty. Numbering approximately 29,000 in 1989, they represented their employer in court and drafted internal rules, contracts, and commercial documents. The fundamental principles of the civil and criminal branches of Soviet law were established at the all-union level and then set down in the legal codes of the republics. The Civil Code dealt with contract law, tort law, and law governing wills and inheritance. Separate codes existed for family law and labour law. The Criminal Code concerned itself with all aspects of criminal behaviour. The Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Republic were revised completely (along with the codes of the other republics) in 1960, incorporating the 1958 Fundamental Principles of Criminal Procedure, approved by the Supreme Soviet. These codes represented a sharp departure from the Stalinist criminal codes, which had provided a formal legal basis for the arrest and prosecution of innocent citizens on groundless charges. Under the Stalinist code, for example, an individual could be prosecuted for committing an act not specifically prohibited by the criminal code but "analogous" to such an act. The 1960 codes abolished the principle of analogy. The 1960 codes defined political crimes in a more restricted form and made punishments considerably less severe. They also established procedural rules to govern the arrest and detention of suspected criminals. According to the law, a suspect could not be detained for more than three days without a warrant. Thereafter, permission for detention had to be obtained from the procurator or from the courts. The maximum period of pretrial detention was nine months. At the end of such detention, the accused was entitled to the services of a defence lawyer. The trial itself was supposed to be public, with the prosecution conducted by the procurator, who could recommend sentencing.

Despite the existence of formal laws to protect the rights of the accused, ample evidence indicated that these laws were not adhered to when political or other interests of the party came into play. The party was the ultimate authority in the administration of justice, and party officials frequently interfered in the judicial process to protect their own interests. Party approval was required before appointment to any important position in the legal apparatus, and this control over personnel appointments gave the party substantial power. The party also exerted influence in the oversight of the legal and judicial organs. The party sometimes interfered in the administration of justice. CPSU officials put pressure on procurators, judges, and defence attorneys in the conduct of individual cases. In some instances, party officials pressed members of the legal system to arrest and convict innocent persons who were viewed as politically unorthodox. (In these cases, the MVD was often the agency exerting such pressure on behalf of the party.) At other times, party officials arranged to have crimes covered up or ignored to protect their personal or economic interests. This situation frequently occurred with corruption and bribery offences. The Soviet Union did not publish comprehensive crime statistics, so it is difficult to compare its crime rates with those of other countries. According to Western observers, robberies, murders, and other violent crimes were much less prevalent than in the United States. This was explained by the large police presence, strict gun controls, and the relatively low incidence of drug abuse. By contrast, white-collar economic crime was extremely common. Bribery and covert payments for goods and services were universal, mainly because of the lack of goods and services on the open market. Theft of state property was practiced routinely by employees, as were other forms of petty theft. In 1989 the Gorbachev leadership was making a concerted effort to curtail such white-collar crime. Revelations of corruption scandals involving high-level party employees appeared in the Soviet media on a regular basis, and there were many arrests and prosecutions.

The fourth-generation photoreconnaissance satellite provides the Russians with increased operational capabilities. The spacecraft flies elliptical orbits at altitudes of 170 kilometres, which improves resolution. The principal improvements in the systems are the ability to return film canisters without deorbiting the spacecraft, and the extension of orbital lifetime. The productive lifetime of the fourth generation satellite now averages 60 days per mission. During the last 5 years, the Russians have launched 6 high resolution satellites, and 1 topographic mapper annually. During the Persian Gulf War the former Soviets launched 4 fourth-generation satellites in a period of less than 90 days, illustrating the ability of the Russians to surge reconnaissance systems in times of crisis or international tension. The ground track of these satellites was aligned with the Persian Gulf region to provide additional coverage during daylight hours. The fifth-generation satellite is an electrooptic imaging system that provides the Russians with near real-time imagery. The fifth-generation imagery satellite greatly improves the reconnaissance capabilities of the Russian Federation. It provides quicker return of intelligence data and ends the restrictions posed by the limited amount of film that can be carried by a photoreconnaissance satellite. In general, the fifth-generation satellite is used for global reconnaissance, and the third and fourth generation satellites are used for coverage of particularly sensitive areas.

Overall, the Russians have continued to maintain a robust space reconnaissance program, despite predictions that the program would wane after the demise of the Soviet Union. The Russians have been able to maintain a constellation of 160 satellites in orbit simultaneously, the same level as under the Soviet Union, despite a 35 percent reduction in launches. The one major problem faced by the Russians is the lack of an all weather/day/night imaging system. Both electro-optic and photographic systems require daylight and clear weather to be able to image an area. In the 1980s, the Soviet attempted to develop a synthetic aperture radar (SAR) system to provide all weather and night coverage. This program failed to develop a militarily acceptable product, and the resulting Almaz spacecraft was converted into a commercial mapping system. No comparable SAR system is currently known to be under development. The Russians have a number of programs that can provide MASINT data. The Russian Prognoz satellite has infrared detection capabilities similar to those provided by the U.S. Defense Support Program (DSP) satellite system. The Prognoz can be used to conduct a variety of missions in support of infrared intelligence (IRINT). Other MASINT-related systems include a wide variety of sophisticated radar systems that can be used for radar intelligence (RADINT), a well-developed acoustic intelligence (ACOUSTINT) program for antisubmarine warfare, and a highly developed nuclear intelligence (NUCINT) program that collects samples from nuclear testing. Russia continues to maintain one of the most sophisticated SIGINT programs in the world. The GRU's Sixth Directorate uses over 20 different types of aircraft, a fleet of 60 SIGINT collection vessels, satellites, and ground stations to collect signals intelligence. Together with FAPSI, the GRU operates SIG1NT collection facilities in over 60 diplomatically protected facilities throughout the world. These agencies also operate large ground collection facilities within the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States, at Cam Rank Bay, Vietnam, and at Lourdes, Cuba. These activities provide the Russians with worldwide SIGINT collection capabilities.

The SIGINT facility at Lourdes is among the most significant intelligence collection capabilities targeting the United States. This facility, less than 100 miles from Key West, is one of the largest and most sophisticated SIGINT collection facilities in the world. It is jointly operated by the GRU, FAPSI, and Cuba's intelligence services. The complex is manned by over 1,000 Russian personnel and is capable of monitoring a wide array of commercial and government communications throughout the southeastern United States, and between the United States and Europe. Lourdes intercepts transmissions from microwave towers in the United States, communication satellite downlinks, and a wide range of shortwave and high-frequency radio transmissions. It also serves as a mission ground station and analytical facility supporting Russian SIGINT satellites. The facility at Lourdes, together with a sister facility in Russia, allows the Russians to monitor all U. S. military and civilian geosynchronous communications satellites.[17] It has been alleged that the Lourdes facility monitors all White House communications activities, launch control communications and telemetry from NASA and Air Force facilities at Cape Canaveral, financial and commodity wire services, and military communications links. According to one source, Lourdes has a special collection and analysis facility that is responsible for targeting financial and political information. This activity is manned by specially selected personnel and appears to be highly successful in providing Russian leaders with political and economic intelligence.

The former Soviet Union also used a variety of other means to collect signals intelligence. The Soviets operated SIGINT collection sites in over 60 countries from diplomatically protected embassies, consulates, trade legations, and residences. It is possible that these activities are continuing in the United States. The location of a number of Russian diplomatic facilities in the United States would provide Russian SIGINT collectors with access to sensitive information. Russian collection activities could derive sensitive information on Government policies from monitoring Government activities in the Washington, DC area, and sensitive financial and trade information using Russian facilities located in New York, San Francisco, and Seattle. The location of microwave towers and cellular communication repeaters in the vicinity of Russian diplomatic facilities in these cities increases the potential damage from collection activities. In the past, vans from the Soviet Mission to the United Nations were observed in the vicinity of the GE Americom satellite ground station in Vernon Valley, NJ, and vans from the San Francisco consulate were observed in the vicinity of AT&T microwave towers in Northern California. In both cases, the vans appeared to be conducting SIG1NT monitoring at these facilities.

The Russians have probably also continued the Soviet practice of using covert mobile collection platforms. During the Cold War, the Russians frequently used tractor-trailers, and other vehicles with concealed SIGINT collection equipment to gather intelligence in Western Europe. Western intelligence officials estimate that the Soviets conducted over 7,000 covert vehicular SIGINT operations in NATO countries annually. During these operations, the Soviets gathered electronic order of battle (EOB) data, monitored exercise communications, conducted direction finding operations, and calibrated Soviet SIGINT satellites to determine geolocation accuracies. The Soviets also allegedly used clandestine collection vans located in Mexico to monitor activities at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. Vans operating from Tijuana, Mexico reportedly were able to monitor all of Southern California and Western Arizona. There have also been reports that Aeroflot aircraft and clandestine collection vehicles have been used to collect SIGINT data inside the continental United States.

The Russians also use satellites for collecting SIGINT. The first Soviet SIGINT satellite was the Cosmos 189 ELINT satellite, which was launched in 1967. Over the next 24 years, the Soviets placed over 200 SIGINT satellites into orbit. The Russians continue to maintain a robust presence in space. During 1994, the Russians conducted 48 spacecraft launches, 50 percent of which were military missions including advanced imagery systems, ocean reconnaissance, and electronic intelligence collection. In 1995, the Russians have programmed 45 space launches; again approximately 50 percent will be military missions. The GRU is tasked with operating Russian ELINT satellites. ELINT satellites use active and passive techniques to detect specific targets. They complement the data provided by imaging satellites and assist in developing a more complete picture of an adversary's forces or intentions. These satellites are designed to track and geolocate radio and radar emanations of ships at sea, mobile air defence radars, fixed strategic early warning radars, and other military emitters for the purpose of identification, location, and signals analysis. The data can then be used for targeting, offensive and defensive engagement planning, and countermeasure development. Collection activities are managed by the Cosmic Intelligence Directorate, and data analysis is performed by the Decrypting Service of the Sixth Directorate. Currently, there is no evidence of the existence of a Russian COMINT satellite, however, it is likely that the Russians could develop such a system if they wished. Between 1962 and 1994 the USSR/Russian Federation placed more than 800 photo reconnaissance spacecraft into Earth orbit on dedicated military missions (another 25 spacecraft were lost in launch failures). These missions have ranged in length from only a few days to more than 400 days, a record set by Kosmos 2267 in 1994. Only seven dedicated military photo recons were launched during each of 1993 and 1994. However, on average more than two spacecraft were operational during the entire period, and no observation gaps appeared (Figure 6.2). Declassified photographs with resolutions of 2-30 m can now be purchased commercially, while resolutions on the order of one-third meter have been acknowledged.

Since the first Soviet photo spacecraft was successfully orbited (Kosmos 4 in 1962), a variety of specialized spacecraft have been developed. Today, four basic classes of the 6-7 metric-ton photo recons are operational, and a possible new generation spacecraft began flight testing in the second half of 1994 (Figure 6.3). All such spacecraft are now launched by the Soyuz-U/U2 launch vehicle from either the Baikonur or Plesetsk Cosmodromes. Whereas most spacecraft physically return film to Earth for development and processing, some, longer duration spacecraft possess either digital transmission or dual transmission/capsule capabilities. Unlike many satellites designed to photograph the Earth, Russian photo recons fly in posigrade (normally 63 degree-83 degree) orbits rather than sun-synchronous trajectories. Consequently, when altitude restoration manoeuvres are made every 7-10 days, the satellite's argument of perigee is normally adjusted to keep perigee phased with acceptable lighting conditions. For example, during a typical 2-month mission, the argument of perigee will be rotated progressively from ascending passes (first month) to descending passes (second month). Fifth-generation satellites are an exception with arguments of perigee normally maintained between 80 degrees and 110 degrees. In 1963-1964 the Soviet Troops of Defence (PVO) established two new commands: PRO and PKO. PRO, meaning antimissile defence, was charged with detecting, intercepting, and destroying enemy ballistic rockets, while the PKO, meaning anti-space defence, was responsible for "destroying the enemy's cosmic means of fighting". In 1992 the USSR Space Units which include PRO and PKO were essentially transferred to the CIS United Armed Forces. However, on 7 May 1992 the armed forces of the Russian Federation were established with specific air and space defence missions.

To implement a space control regime and to fulfil its space defence obligation, the PKO began developing ASAT capabilities. Today, the Russian Federation is commonly believed to have acquired four basic ASAT systems with varying degrees of effectiveness. However the operational status of these systems is a topic of considerable debate. The Russian Federation is the only member of the European space community known to operate ELINT satellite systems. Since 1967 approximately 200 spacecraft have been orbited by the former Soviet Union/Russian Federation for dedicated ELINT missions. Additional spacecraft may have carried ELINT packages as secondary payloads. During 1993-1994, a total of 11 Russian ELINT spacecraft, representing three classes of vehicles, were launched, although one satellite failed to reach orbit due to a booster malfunction. At the beginning of 1995 the integrated Russian ELINT constellation consisted of 11 primary spacecraft. Two of the three ELINT networks established and maintained by the USSR/CIS are believed to be global in nature, i.e., they are designed to detect land-based as well as sea. based electronic signals. The principal mode of operations is for each satellite to record the type of signal received and to determine the direction of the transmitter from the satellite's position. These data are then stored and forwarded to special receiving stations or are relayed in near realtime via data relay satellites. Analysts on the ground can then combine the data from seven satellites to pinpoint the location of the receiver and to determine the type of the emitter. For mobile targets, the frequency of ELINT overflights is crucial to maintaining an accurate knowledge of the target's position. Historically, ELINT systems have played a major role in Soviet military doctrine. With the dramatic increase of radio and radar emitters on the battlefield during the past 30 years, the value of ELINT satellites has also risen. In the former Soviet Union, the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Staff (GRU) was tasked with the primary responsibility for global ELINT satellite systems. Collection activities were managed by the Satellite Intelligence Directorate, while the data analysis function was performed by the Decrypting Service.

At the end of 1994 the Russian global ELINT satellite capability was distributed between a second-generation, store/dump system nearing the end of a long (15 year) service record and a more advanced model which will probably remain the principal intelligence gathering system for the remainder of this decade. The former has apparently been reduced to a constellation of three or less spacecraft, known as Tselina D, placed in orbital planes 30 degrees apart at altitudes of 635-665 km, while the latter is now represented by four spacecraft, known as Tslenia 2, in orbital planes 40 degrees apart at altitudes of 850 kms. For more than 30 years (1962-1994) the USSR/CIS orbited on average five spacecraft per year believed to be associated with the support of national security systems. However, since 1991 these activities have markedly decreased with only one such mission in each of 1993 and 1994. Moreover, unique orbital operations associated with some of these spacecraft have essentially ceased. Through the years a wide variety of passive and active spacecraft have been launched in this program by Kosmos-2, Kosmos-3M, Tsyklon-3, and Zenit-2 launch vehicles. In general, satellites are inserted into low, nearly circular orbits (350-550 km) or into moderately eccentric orbits between 200 km and 2,600 km. The primary inclinations used have been 50.7 degrees, 65.8 degrees, 74 degrees and 82.9 degrees. The first inclination has not been used since 1987 when the last space mission was flown from the Kapustin Yar Cosmodrome. Specific techniques and orbital profiles have evolved, but minor military satellites have fallen into two basic categories: those which release multiple objects during their missions and those which do not. The former class of satellites have been linked to the calibration and testing of USSR/CIS radars, in particular ABM radars, while the latter group probably perform a variety of functions, including atmospheric density investigations.

The two missions launched in 1993-1994 for the Russian Military Space Forces were simple, 2-m-diameter spheres inserted into moderately elliptical orbits by Kosmos-3M boosters from Plesetsk. Kosmos 2265, launched in October, 1993, into an orbit of 291 km by 1573 km, was reportedly a Yug spacecraft with no exterior coverings or appendages, ideal for uniform optical and radar reflections. Kosmos 2292, launched in September, 1994, into an orbit of 400 km by 1,954 km, appears to have been a Vektor-class spacecraft. Although similar in size and shape to the Yug, Vektor satellites are covered with solar cells and carry four deployable antennas. Seven spacecraft launched since 1974 (beginning with Kosmos 660) belong to the Kosmos 2292 class, and all are still in orbit. A total of 20 spacecraft with sub-satellite release capabilities, designated Romb, were orbited during 1980-1990 with demonstrated capacities of 8-37 sub-satellites. These spacecraft normally begin life in nearly circular orbits of approximately 500 km altitude. The ejection events may occur at anytime and may involve only a few or many objects, although almost always in even numbers. For example, Kosmos 2053 was launched on 27 December 1989 and by the end of 1992 had released a total of 37 objects during nine operations spanning 18 months. The smallest number released at one time was two and the largest number was eight. In contrast, Kosmos 1494 waited five months before ejecting its full complement of 25 subsatellites in a week's time. Many of the sub-satellites appear to be ejected in opposite pairs from the parent satellite. In many cases the release of a batch of new sub-satellites with diameter of 30 cm is closely tied to the decay of an earlier set While a link between the sub-satellites and testing ABM radars dates back to at least 1981, an analysis by G. E. Perry of the Kettering Group strongly suggests that this is still a principal objective. His work showed a close correlation between ejection events and immediate passes over the Moscow area. During 1993-1994 only one ejection event involving a single sub-satellite from Kosmos 2106 (launched in 1990) was detected, occurring in early February 1993.

SSV-33 Project 1941

The SSV-33 was the sole Project 1941 "Titan" 'KAPUSTA' class command ship. This 36,000 ton nuclear-powered command ship, built on the hull of a Kirov class cruiser, served the combined roles of fleet flagship, space tracking ship, missile tracking ship, electronic intelligence ship, and communications relay ship. Designated a Sudno Suyazyy ["communications vessel"], the NATO designator 'KAPUSTA' means 'cabbage', in reference to the large dome on the forward superstructure. The vessel is laid up in the Pacific fleet because of high operating costs.

SSV Bal'zam

An-12 CUB (ANTONOV)

Country of Origin; CIS (formerly USSR).
Similar Aircraft; C-130 Hercules, C-160 Transall, G.222.
Crew; Six.
Role; Medium-cargo/transport (100 equipped troops, vehicles, and weapons), ECM, ELINT.
Armament; Twin 23-mm cannons in tail.
Dimensions; Length: 121 ft, 4 in (37 m). Span: 124 ft, 8 in (38 m). Wings; High-mounted with drooping outer wing panels, back-tapered leading edges, straight trailing edges, and blunt tips.
Engine(s); Four turboprop engines mounted under the wings’ leading edges.
Fuselage; Round, slender body with stepped cockpit and glassed-in nose. Landing gear pods bulge at lower body midsection. Upswept rear section.
Tail; Flats are unequally tapered with blunt tips and mounted high on the fuselage. Fin is tapered with a blunt tip and a step in the leading edge. Two 23-mm guns in tail turret. 

USER COUNTRIES: Angola, Afghanistan, Bulgaria, CIS, Czech Republic, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, People’s Republic of China (Y-12), Poland, Slovakia, South Yemen, Sri Lanka, Syria (Y-12), Yugoslavia

Il-20 COOT-A (ILYUSHIN)

The Il-20 is a military version of the Il-18 passenger airplane, with electronic equipment and an array of external antennae. It is still used by the Russian Air Force as flying command post. This version is sometimes unofficially referred to as Il-20 or Coot-A in NATO code. A maritime reconnaissance and anti-submarine aircraft, the Il-38, was also developed from the Il-18.

Country of Origin; CIS (formerly USSR).
Similar Aircraft; P-3C Orion, An-24 Coke, An-12 Cub.
Crew;. Five.
Role; Electronics surveillance.
Armament; None.
Dimensions; Length: 117 ft, 9 in (35.9 m). Span: 122 ft, 7 in (37.4 m).
Wings; Low-mounted and unequally tapered with blunt tips and positive slant.
Engine(s); Four turboprops mounted in the wings and extending forward of the wings.
Fuselage; Round, cigar-shaped tapered at the rear and a rounded nose. Stepped-up cockpit. Bulges on sides of fuselage aft of the cockpit. Pod carried on the fuselage bottom is a SLAR.
Tail; Back-tapered fin with square tip. Equally tapered flats, mid-mounted on the fuselage.

USER COUNTRIES: Afghanistan (Il-18), CIS.

MiG-25RB FOXBAT (MIKOYAN-GUREVICH)

The FOXBAT A aircraft, originally designed to counter high-altitude threats, has been deployed in a high-altitude reconnaissance variant. This MiG-25RB variant can be fitted with reconnaissance/elint packs or airborne side-looking radar. In October of 1971 two MiG-25s made reconnaissance flights over Sinai and Israel. On both occasions Israeli F-4E Phantoms failed in attempted intercepts

Country of Origin; CIS (formerly USSR).
Similar Aircraft; F-14 Tomcat, F-15 Eagle, MiG-31 Foxhound.
Crew; One.
Role; Intercepter, reconnaissance.
Armament; Air-to-air missiles.
Dimensions; Length: 70 ft (21.34 m). Span: 41 ft (12.6 m).
Wings; High-mounted, swept-back, and tapered with square tips.
Engine(s); Two turbojets. Large rectangular air intakes below the canopy and forward of the wing roots. Dual exhaust.
Fuselage; Long and slender with solid, pointed nose. Box-like from the air intakes to rear section. Bubble canopy.
Tail; Twin, sweptback, and tapered fins with angular tips. Flats mid- to low-mounted on fuselage, swept-back, and tapered with angular tips.

USER COUNTRIES: Algeria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, CIS, Iraq, Syria, Ukraine

M-17 "Mystic"

The Myasishchev M-17 "Mystic" (Ram-M) high-altitude aircraft is the Soviet equivalent of the U-2. This twin-boomed aircraft with a high aspect ratio wing was initially developed to shoot down US reconnaissance balloons drifting over the USSR in the mid-1950s. Subsequently it was modified as single-seat reconnaissance and research aircraft. The first two prototypes (Mystic-A) had a single turbojet engine, and were used for aerodynamic and atmospheric research. The subsequent M-55 (Mystic-B), also designated M-17R, was a twin-jet version built by the Molniya Scientific and Industrial Enterprise (which absorbed the Myasishchev Bureau). Cameras and other sensors are housed in a large compartment in the lower fuselage.

Country of Origin; Russia 
Builder; Myasishchev / Molniya 
Span; 122 ft 11 in length 75 ft height 15 ft 5 in. 
Engine; RKBM Rybinsk RD-36-51V turbojet, 15,430 lb thrust 
Max Epeed; 435-466 mph at height 
Ceiling; 65,600 ft 
Landing Run; 5,745 ft 
Endurance; 4 hours at 65,500 ft. 5 hours at 55,775 ft. 6 hours 30 min - maximum

Yak-25RV Mandrake

Yak-25RV Mandrake is a single-seat high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft generally comparable to the American RB-57D. This derivative of the basic Yak-25 design replaces the swept wing with a high aspect ratio straight wing. A total of 165 were built, including two unmanned versions.

Country of Origin; Russia 
Builder; Yakovlev 
First Flight; 1959 
Crew; 1 
Span; 23.4 meters length height 
Weight; 9,000 kg 
Engine; Two R-11B-300 
Max Speed; 870 km/h 
Ceiling; 21,000 meters 
Landing Run; range 3,900km

Yak-27R Mangrove

The Yak-27V Flashlight was an high-altitude fighter, equipped with an additional rocket engine, which did not enter operational service. The 'Mangrove' Yak-27R reconnaissance aircraft was more successful, with about 180 built.
Country of Origin; Russia
Builder; Yakovlev
First Flight; 1958
Crew; 2
Weight; 11,700 kg
Engine; Two RD-9F
Max Speed; 1,285 km/h
Ceiling; 16,500 meters
 

DR-3 / M-141 REYS (TUPOLEV)

The Reys (voyage) was developed by the Tupolev design bureau in the 1970s. The DR-3 is very similar to the DR-5.

Country of Origin; CIS.
Similar Aerial Platform; DR-5, Banshee, Crecerelle.
Role; Tactical reconnaissance UAV.
Armament; None.
Dimensions; Length: 23 ft (7.3 m). Span: 9 ft 10 in (3 m).
Wings; Low-mounted and delta-shaped with square tips. Small, swept-back canards.
Engine(s); Large, jet on top rear of fuselage. Large air intake.
Fuselage; Long, slender, tapers to the front, blunt rear. Pitot tube.
Tail; Short, swept-back fin on top of engine. Tail cone.

USER COUNTRY: CIS

SHMEL-1 Yak-061 (YAKOVLEV)

Shmel-1 was designed for day and night surveillance and monitoring operations. This system has been exported to other countries under the name of Malakhit.

Country of Origin; CIS.
Similar Aerial Platform; None.
Role; Remote terrain observation.
Armament; None.
Dimensions; Length: 9 ft, 1 in (2.78 m). Span: 10 ft, 6 in (3.25 m).
Wings; High-mounted and straight with blunt, negative slanted tips.
Engine(s); Prop-engine and has a round enclosure at the rear in the opposing position.
Fuselage; Rounded, bullet nose. Pads on feet of four curved legs for landing.
Tail; Three swept-back stabilizers on rear of craft forming the engine housing.

Spetsnaz has trained the Republican guard of Syria, Iraq and Iran and they have been involved in training other special forces units across the world. These internal troop units originally were raised for internal use against counter revolutionaries and other undesirables. There has always been a certain amount of shifting of personnel and units between both the GRU who control SPETSNAZ and the MVD with OSNAZ MVD and OSNAZ KGB or FSB, especially between the latter two. Today OSNAZ is a term mainly used in connection with GRU controlled COMINT, ELINT and radio surveillance units within the Armed Forces. Spetsnaz carry out reconnaissance and social warfare missions in peacetime as well as in war. There are 20 Spetsnaz brigades plus 41 separate companies thus a total strength of around 30,000 troops.

The Centre of Special Operations (CNS) headquarters is a huge complex of buildings and training areas (dozens of hectares worth of land, 76 training facilities, etc). It is located in the town of Balashikha-2 only 10 kms away from the Moscow ring. The average training lasts about 5 years. All operatives undergo special airborne and firearms training. Roughly one third of them have special mountain training; another third have special counter-sabotage diving training. Spetsnaz operatives always improve on their skills in countless exercises and special operations (including constant service in North Caucasus). The unit utilizes a wide range of modern Russian and foreign weapons and equipment, some modified from the original versions to fit the unique needs of the unit.

The Spetsnaz have created a fierce reputation as one of the best special forces in the world today due to the very harsh standards of their training. During the Cold War these units were deployed in Eastern Europe in order to carry out reconnaissance and sabotage missions against the NATO forces in the event of a war in Europe. The units of Spetsnaz GRU have no official names such as the case with units of MVD Spetsnaz. They are generally referred to by unit numbers. Spetsnaz GRU teams usually wear standard issue VDV uniforms, light blue VDV berets and unit patches in order to avoid identification. However they can also wear different uniforms, for instance they would wear the uniform of a unit which is stationed nearby in order to blend in.

A Spetsnaz brigade consists of three to five Spetsnaz battalions, a signals company, support units, and a headquarters company containing highly skilled professional soldiers responsible for carrying out assassinations, kidnappings, and contact with agents in the enemy rear area. The organisation reflects its emphasis on sea infiltration, with up to three frogman battalions, one parachute battalion, and a mini-submarine battalion, as well as the signals company, headquarters company, and support elements.

The Soviet Naval Spetsnaz came in to being in 1957 by order of Defence Minister Georgy Zhukov. The Black Sea fleet created their Spetsnaz unit in 1967. A marine counter terrorist and counter sabotage unit was created in 1969 as Protivodiversionniye Sili I Sredstva (counter sabotage forces and resources) counter underwater forces. In 1970 the Main intelligence service of a General staff (GRU) created a top secret reconnaissance sabotage group Delfin (Dolphin) for operations against sea bases of foreign states. Instructors from group Delfin prepared the combat swimmers for KGB groups Alfa and Vympel. At the fall of the Soviet Union each of the Soviet Red Banner Fleets (four total) had a Naval Spetsnaz Brigade assigned to it. Russian Naval Infantry or the Russian Marines are specialised amphibious infantry, but by no means are they Spetsnaz troops as Naval Special Operations would be carried out by Delfin (Naval Spetsnaz) troops rather than the Marines which are intended to spearhead amphibious invasions.

On operations the majority of Spetsnaz soldiers carry a 5.45mm AKS-74 rifle and a 5.45mm PRI automatic pistol. All also carry combat knives which are specially designed for Spetsnaz troops. One such design is the NR-2, an ingenious device which in addition to the blade incorporates a short 7.62mm calibre barrel in the handle and is fired by clipping the scabbard and knife together to give some control. Quite when such a weapon would be used instead of a knife or a pistol is open to question. Spetsnaz troops are also trained in all types of foreign weapons.

Those joining Spetsnaz with no previous military experience must be given the normal recruit's basic training in discipline, marching, field craft,
weapons handling, and range work. Once the recruit moves on to proper
Spetsnaz training however the pressure intensifies: weapons handling, including the use of foreign weapons and marksmanship; physical fitness, with an emphasis on endurance and strength; tracking, patrolling, camouflage, and surveillance techniques, including survival in a wide variety of harsh environments; hand to hand combat, both unarmed and with knives (both hand held and throwing), and assassination of designated targets; sabotage and demolitions; language training and prisoner interrogation; infiltration by air, including parachuting for fixed wing aircraft, and exit from helicopters by ropes or parachute.

On January 20, 1991 the Riga OMON attacked Latvia's Interior Ministry, killing six people during the January 1991 events in Latvia (following the republic's declaration of independence). Seven OMON members were subsequently found guilty by the Riga District Court and received suspended sentences. A series of hit and run attacks on border outposts of the newly-independent Republic of Lithuania during January-July 1991 resulting in several summary execution style deaths of the unarmed customs officers. Some sources say that the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev had lost control of the unit. The Lithuanian government continues to demand that the persons suspected in these incidents be tried in Lithuania. Violent and often armed clashes occurred between the Georgian SSR's OMON and the opponents of the Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia prior to the Georgian Civil War of 1991-1993.
The Moscow OMON and units brought in from the other cities took part in defending the public order during the political crisis in September-October 1993. Some sources report that OMON members behaved brutally in clashes with demonstrators, beating up people including members of the Supreme Soviet of Russia.

In August 1996 a group of 30 Chechen OMON members were reportedly captured and executed in Grozny, the Chechen capital during the battle for the city. In June 2007 OMON failed to protect gay rights activists including  European Parliament members from hate violence in Moscow, detaining the activists instead of the attackers. This is because the mayor of Moscow did not want the parade to take place. In November 2007 the brutal actions of OMON militsya against peaceful demonstrators and the arrests of opposition figures were harshly criticised by the European Union institutions and governments.

OMON is still active in the Second Chechen War. Almost every Russian city sends on a regular basis small units of police (often composed of OMON members) for tours of duty in Chechnya lasting several months, while the Chechen Republic has also formed its own OMON detachment. OMON sustained heavy losses in the second conflict as well, including the March 2000 ambush in which more than 30 OMON servicemen were killed (including nine captured and executed), the July 2000 suicide bombing which inflicted more than 100 casualties at the OMON base in Argun, and the April 2002 attack which killed 21 Chechen OMON troopers in central Grozny. Control and discipline is questionable in Chechnya, where the members of the group were noted to engage in or fall victim to several deadly friendly fire and fratricide incidents. In the bloodiest incident at least 24 Russian OMON officers were killed and more than 30 wounded when two units (from Moscow and Sergiyev Posad) fired on each other in Grozny on March 2, 2000. Among other incidents several Chechen OMON servicemen were abducted and executed in Grozny by Russian military servicemen in November 2000, members of the Chechen OMON clashed with the Ingush police on the Chechen-Ingush border resulting in eight fatalities and about 20 injuries in September 2006, and the Chechen OMON clashed with a group of Chechen GRU commandos following a standoff in Grozny resulting in five dead and several wounded in 2007.

In the course of the Chechen conflict the OMON has been accused of severe human rights abuses including abducting, torturing and killing civilians. As of 2000, the bulk of war crimes recorded by international organisations in Chechnya appeared to have been committed by the OMON. An OMON detachment from Moscow region took part in the April 1995 rampage in the village of Samashki, during which up to 300 civilians were reportedly killed in the result of a cleansing operation conducted there by the MVD forces. Two Russian OMON units (from St. Petersburg and Ryazan) were also linked with the Novye Aldi massacre in which at least 60 civilians were robbed and then killed by the Russian forces entering Grozny in February 2000. In 1999 a group of OMON members shot dead around 40 refugees near Grozny. In April 2006 the European Court of Human Rights found Russia guilty of the forced disappearance of Shakhid Baysayev, a Chechen man who had gone missing after being detained in a March 2000 security sweep by the Russian OMON in Grozny. In 2007, the Khanty-Mansi OMON officer Sergei Lapin was sentenced for the kidnapping and torture of a Chechen man in Grozny in 2001, with the Grozny court criticising the conduct of the OMON serving in Chechnya in broader terms. In an event related to Chechnya several OMON officers were accused of starting the May 2007 wave of ethnic violence in Stavropol by assisting in the racist murder of a local Chechen man.

Most members retire at the age of approximately 45 years and receive practically no financial aid from the state afterwards. They are also sometimes not paid for their service (in 2001 for example some 50 OMON members from Moscow filed a lawsuit claiming they were not paid for one month of combat operations in Chechnya). Due to the use of OMON members in high risk situations especially in Chechnya the group often loses members in combat.
Members of OMON are supposed to be extremely fit and experts in small arms and hand-to-hand combat. Males between the ages of 22 and 30 who have completed their two year military service can apply to join OMON (the application includes medical and psychological tests, as well as speed and fitness). The initial training lasts for four months where applicants are extensively trained in the use of different weaponry and close combat, and to follow orders at any cost. Special emphasis is placed on urban combat and entering and clearing buildings. The application procedure closes with a final test where the applicant has to fight three to five trained members of OMON by hand wearing boxing gloves. Fewer than one in five applicants pass and are selected to join.

"Alfa Group" or Group A a special forces (Spetsnaz) or special operations detachment OSNAZ unit attached to the KGB was created on 28 July 1974 within the First Chief Directorate of the KGB on the orders of Yuri Andropov then Chairman of the KGB. It was intended for counter terrorism operations to give the KGB the capacity to respond to such incidents as the 1972 Munich massacre on its own territory. However from the beginning its assigned missions far exceeded its formal scope. The Group was tasked with liberating hijacked airliners within the Soviet Union such as Aeroflot Flight 6833 as well as making sensitive arrests such as that of CIA spy Adolf Tolkachev. Their most notable mission during the Soviet period was the attack on the Amin's palace in Afghanistan on 27 December 1979, the special operation which began the Soviet-Afghan War. The operation involved storming a high hill under extremely heavy fire and lots of intense close combat resulting in the death of the Afghan president, Hafizullah Amin, and his approximately 200 elite guards. In the operation Alfa group lost only two men while the other Soviet forces lost 19. Other governmental buildings such as the Ministry of Interior building, the Internal Security (KHAD) building and the Darul Aman Palace were also seized during the operation, which Alfa group's veterans called the most successful in the group's history. The unit served extensively in the following Soviet occupation of Afghanistan as well.

In October 1985 Alfa was dispatched to Beirut, Lebanon when four Soviet diplomats had been taken hostage by militant Sunni Muslims. By the time Alfa was onsite one of the hostages had already been killed. The perpetrators and their relatives were identified by supporting KGB operatives and the latter were taken hostage. Following the standard policy of 'no negotiation' Alfa proceeded to sever some of their hostages' body parts and sent them to the perpetrators with a warning that more would follow if the Russian hostages were not released immediately. The tactic was a success and no other Russian national was taken hostage in the Middle East for the next 20 years until the 2006 abduction of Russian diplomats in Iraq. During the Soviet coup attempt of 1991 the Alfa group (under the command of Major General Viktor Karpukhin) was assigned the task of entering the White House, Russia's parliament building and killing Boris Yeltsin and the other Russian leaders following a planned assault on the entrance by paratroopers. This order was unanimously refused. Unit members mingled through the crowds and assessed the possibility of undertaking such an operation. According to their statements in the following months it could have been carried out with success and achieved its main objectives within 20 to 25 minutes but would have resulted in hundreds if not thousands of civilian deaths.

An agreement on intelligence cooperation between Russia and China was signed in Beijing at the end of the summer of 1992. It envisaged the restoration of the cooperation in the area of intelligence which had been cut off in 1959. This secret treaty covered the activities of Russian Military Strategic Intelligence (GRU) and the Foreign Intelligence Service, which are cooperating with the Chinese People's Liberation Army's Military Intelligence Directorate. Although the SVR [along with other agencies] is involved in industrial espionage, there are signs that the data being collected by Russian intelligence agencies are not being used effectively. In a 7 February 1996 Security Council meeting [which included FSB Director Mikhail Barsukov and SVR Director Vyacheslav Trubnikov] President Yeltsin ordered top state officials to close the technology gap with the West by more efficiently using industrial intelligence. Yeltsin complained that less than 25 percent of the information collected by Russian spies abroad was used in Russia, even though he claimed information was derived directly from foreign blueprints and manuals. SVR economic intelligence activities includes the identification of both threats to Russian interests [attempts to pressure Russia in world markets for arms or space technology) as well as emerging opportunities such as advantageous market trends for particular types of commodities and raw materials. Priority is attached to ensuring balanced development of relations with foreign countries in such spheres as currency and finance, export and import transactions for strategic raw materials, and in the high technology sphere. The SVR is frequently commissioned to ascertain the business reputation and real potential of foreign firms and individual dealers who intend to establish business relations with Russian state organizations. It also seeks to identify foreign firms attempting to persuade certain Russian partners to conclude illegal export deals, and to track of Russian capital going abroad. In addition to the economic, scientific, and technical focus of collections efforts noted above, human intelligence (HUMINT) collection against American intelligence agencies also has been ongoing, as exemplified by the 1996 arrests of a Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) agent (Earl Edwin Pitts) and CIA operations officer (Harold James Nicholson). The end of 1996 was also marked by the case of former SVR Colonel Vladimir Galkin, provoking a noisy scandal that added tension to Russian-American relations and relations between the SVR and the CIA.

Headquartered in Moscow, the SVR has offices in Russian embassies, consulates and trade establishments throughout the world. As with its predecessor, the First Chief Directorate of the KGB, it is likely that the SVR continues to be composed of three separate Directorates, and three Services: Directorate S, which is responsible for illegal agents (those under deep cover) throughout the world; Directorate T, responsible for the collection of scientific and technological intelligence; and Directorate K, which carries out infiltration of foreign intelligence and security services and exercises surveillance over Russian citizens abroad.

Service I, which analyzes and distributes intelligence collected by SVR foreign intelligence officers and agents, publishes a daily current events summaries for the Politburo, and make assessments of future world developments; Service A, which is responsible for planning and implementing active measures; and Service R, which evaluates SVR operations abroad.

The Foreign Intelligence Academy is the main training establishment for the SVR.