TERRORISTS
 

Abu Nidal Organization
a.k.a. Fatah Revolutionary Council, Arab Revolutionary Council, Arab Revolutionary Brigades, Black September, and Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims. International terrorist organization led by Sabri al-Banna. Split from PLO in 1974. Made up of various functional committees, including political, military, and financial. Has carried out terrorist attacks in 20 countries, killing or injuring almost 900 persons. Targets include the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Israel, moderate Palestinians, the PLO, and various Arab countries. Major attacks included the Rome and Vienna airports in December 1985, the Neve Shalom synagogue in Istanbul and the Pan Am Flight 73 hijacking in Karachi in September 1986, and the City of Poros day-excursion ship attack in July 1988 in Greece. Suspected of assassinating PLO deputy chief Abu Iyad and PLO security chief Abu Hul in Tunis in January 1991. ANO assassinated a Jordanian diplomat in Lebanon in January 1994 and has been linked to the killing of the PLO representative there. Has not attacked Western targets since the late 1980s. Has several hundred plus militia in Lebanon and limited overseas support structure. Al-Banna may have relocated to Iraq in December 1998, where the group maintains a presence. Has an operational presence in Lebanon in the Bekaa Valley and several Palestinian refugee camps in coastal areas of Lebanon. Also has a presence in Sudan and Syria, among others. Has demonstrated ability to operate over wide area, including the Middle East, Asia, and Europe. Has received considerable support including safe haven, training, logistic assistance, and financial aid from Iraq, Libya, and Syria (until 1987), in addition to close support for selected operations.

Abu Sayyaf Group
Smallest and most radical of the Islamic separatist groups operating in the southern Philippines. Split from the Moro National Liberation Front in 1991 under the leadership of Abdurajik Abubakar Janjalani, who was killed in a clash with Philippine police on 18 December 1998. Some members have studied or worked in the Middle East and developed ties to Arab mujahidin while fighting and training in Afghanistan. Uses bombs, assassinations, kidnappings, and extortion payments to promote an independent Islamic state in western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, areas in the southern Philippines heavily populated by Muslims. Raided the town of Ipil in Mindanao in April 1995, the group's first large-scale action. Suspected of several small-scale bombings and kidnappings in 1998. Unknown  but believed to have about 200 members. The ASG operates in the southern Philippines and occasionally in Manila.
Probably receives support from Islamic extremists in the Middle East and South Asia.

Alex Boncayao Brigade
The ABB, the urban hit squad of the Communist Party of the Philippines, was formed in the mid-1980s. Responsible for more than 100 murders and believed to have been involved in the 1989 murder of US Army Col. James Rowe in the Philippines. Although reportedly decimated by a series of arrests in late 1995, the murder in June 1996 of a former high-ranking Philippine official, claimed by the group, demonstrates that it still maintains terrorist capabilities. In March 1997 the group announced that it had formed an alliance with another armed group, the Revolutionary Proletarian Army. Approximately 500 members. Operates exclusively in Manila.

al-Jihad
a.k.a. Jihad Group, Islamic Jihad, Vanguards of Conquest, Talaa' al-Fateh, Egyptian Islamic extremist group active since the late 1970s. Appears to be divided into two factions: one led by Ayman al-Zawahiri--who currently is in Afghanistan and is a key leader in terrorist financier Usama Bin Ladin's new World Islamic Front--and the Vanguards of Conquest (Talaa' al-Fateh) led by Ahmad Husayn Agiza. Abbud al-Zumar, leader of the original Jihad, is imprisoned in Egypt and recently joined the group's jailed spiritual leader, Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman, in a call for a "peaceful front." Primary goal is to overthrow the Egyptian Government and replace it with an Islamic state. Increasingly willing to target US interests in Egypt. Specializes in armed attacks against high-level Egyptian Government officials. The original Jihad was responsible for the assassination in 1981 of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Appears to concentrate on high-level, high-profile Egyptian Government officials, including cabinet ministers. Claimed responsibility for the attempted assassinations of Interior Minister Hassan al-Alfi in August 1993 and Prime Minister Atef Sedky in November 1993. Has not conducted an attack inside Egypt since 1993 and never has targeted foreign tourists there. Has threatened to retaliate against the United States, however, for its incarceration of Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman and, more recently, for the arrests of its members in Albania, Azerbaijan, and the United Kingdom. Probably several thousand hardcore members and another several thousand sympathizers among the various factions. Operates in the Cairo area. Has a network outside Egypt, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, and Sudan.
Not known. The Egyptian Government claims that Iran, Sudan, and militant Islamic groups in Afghanistan--including Usama Bin Ladin--support the Jihad factions. Also may obtain some funding through various Islamic nongovernmental organizations.
 

al-Qaida
Established by Osama Bin Ladin about 1990 to bring together Arabs who fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet invasion. Helped finance, recruit, transport, and train Sunni Islamic extremists for the Afghan resistance. Current goal is to "reestablish the Muslim State" throughout the world. Works with allied Islamic extremist groups to overthrow regimes it deems "non-Islamic" and remove Westerners from Muslim countries. Issued statement under banner of "The World Islamic Front for Jihad Against The Jews and Crusaders" in February 1998, saying it was the duty of all Muslims to kill US citizens, civilian or military, and their allies everywhere. The organization's primary goal is the overthrow of what it sees as the corrupt and heretical governments of Muslim states, and their replacement with the rule of Sharia (Islamic law). Al-Qaida is intensely anti-Western, and views the United States in particular as the prime enemy of Islam. Bin Ladin has issued three "fatwahs" or religious rulings calling upon Muslims to take up arms against the United States.

Osama bin Ladin entered on his current path of holy warrior in 1979, the year Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan. He transferred his business to Afghanistan including several hundred loyal workmen and heavy construction tools and set out to liberate the land from the infidel invader. Recognizing at once that the Afghans were lacking both infrastructure and manpower to fight a protracted conflict, he set about solving both problems at once. The first step was to set up an organized program of conscription. Together with Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood leader Abdallah Azzam, he organized a recruiting office Maktab al-Khidamat.
MAK advertised all over the Arab world for young Muslims to come fight in Afghanistan and set up branch recruiting offices all over the world, including in the U.S. and Europe. Bin Ladin paid for the transportation of the new recurits to Afghanistan, and set up facilities to train them. The Afghan government donated land and resources, while bin Ladin brought in experts from all over the world on guerilla warfare, sabotage, and covert operations. Within a little over a year he had thousands of volunteers in training in his private bootcamps. It is estimated that as many as 10,000 fighters received training and combat experience in Afghanistan, with only a fraction coming from the native Afghan population. Nearly half of the fighting force came from bin Ladin's native Saudi Arabia. Others came from Algeria (roughly 3,000), from Egypt (2,000), with thousands more coming from other Muslim countries such as Yemen, Pakistan and the Sudan.

The war in Afghanistan was the stage for one of the last major stand-offs between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The Americans at that time had the same goals as bin Ladin’s mujahedin the ousting of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. In what was hailed at the time as one of its most successful covert operations, America’s Central Intelligence Agency launched a $500 million per year campaign to arm and train the impoverished and outgunned mujahedin guerrillas to fight the Soviet Union. The most promising guerilla leaders were sought out and sponsored by the CIA. U.S. official sources are understandably vague on the question of whether Osama bin Ladin was one of the CIA’s chosen at that time. Bin Ladin’s group was one of seven main mujahedin factions. It is estimated that a significant quantity of high tech American weapons, including stinger anti aircraft missiles, made their way into his arsenal. The majority of them are reported to be still there. The Mujahedin were wildly successful. In ten years of savage fighting they vanquished the Soviet Union. What had begun as a fragmented army of tribal warriors ended up a well organized and equipped modern army, one capable of beating a super power. The departing Soviet troops left behind an Afghanistan with a huge arsenal of sophisticated weapons and thousands of seasoned Islamic warriors from a variety of countries.

Some of these veterans returned to their own countries and got on with their lives. Others returned to their own countries steeped in Islamic fundamentalism and a will to topple “western-influenced, infidel governments” in favor of Islamic regimes. They used the knowledge gleaned in the Afghan war to set up guerilla and terror cells. In Egypt and Algeria, the “Afghan Veterans,” as they came to be called, aided Islamic extremists in their fight against the secular governments. In most Arab countries, the veterans were not at all welcome, and the governments kept a close eye on their doings. However, in some countries the Afghan veterans were accorded a warm welcome. Such was the case in Sudan, where the government gave them jobs, helped them to set up training camps, and appointed some of them to government posts. In addition to these facilities established in “friendly” Arab countries, the majority of the mujahedin training camps in Afghanistan continued to operate, supplying Islamic mercenaries to conflicts in a number of countries. Afghanistan was still seen as the hearth-stone of the mujahedin, from whence trained fighters could be sent out to fight wherever they were needed. Mujahedin veterans began showing up in Islamic struggles in such places as Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Chechnya.

Toward the end of the war in Afghanistan, bin Ladin split with MAK cofounder Azzam in the late 1980s, and in 1988 formed al-Qaida to continue the work of the Jihad. While Azzam continued to focus on support to Muslims in Afghanistan, bin Ladin turned his attention to carrying the war to other countries. In late 1989 Abdallah Azzam died in the explosion of a car bomb, generally blamed on a rival Afghani faction. Several rumours circulating at the time blamed bin Ladin himself for the attack. After the victory in Afghanistan, Osama bin Ladin returned to his native Saudi Arabia to take up the fight against the infidel government there. The Saudis were not disposed to tolerate his calls to insurrection, and quickly acted against him. In April 1994, his Saudi citizenship was revoked for irresponsible behavior and he was expelled from the country. Together with his family and a large band of followers, Bin Ladin moved to Khartoum in Sudan. There he set up factories and farms, some of which were established solely for the purpose of supplying jobs to out-of-work mujahedin. He built roads and infrastructure for the Sudanese government and training camps for the Afghan Veterans. Among bin Ladin’s numerous Sudanese commercial interests are: a factory to process goat skins, a construction company, a bank, a sunflower plantation, and an import-export operation.

His construction company el-Hijrah for Construction and Development Ltd. in partnership with the National Islamic Front and the Sudanese military built the new airport at Port Sudan, as well as a 1200km long highway linking Khartoum to Port Sudan. Another company reputed to be owned by bin Ladin is the Wadi al-Aqiq Company, an export-import firm. He also runs the Taba Investment Company Ltd. and the el-Shamal Islamic Bank in Khartoum, a joint effort with the NIF, in which bin Ladin is said to have invested $50 million. For many years, bin Ladin lived in Khartoum, in a residence guarded by the local security forces, while he was arranging for many of the Afghan veterans to move to Sudan. Bin Ladin is said to be close to Sudanese leader Omar Albashir, and to Hassan Turabi, the head of the National Islamic Front (NIF) in Sudan. However, Sudan long on the U.S. State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism in recent years began to thaw toward the West. As a gesture toward the United States, the Sudanese government requested that bin Ladin depart. In May 1996, he moved to Afghanistan, leaving behind him in Sudan a network of Afghan Veterans and several successful factories and corporations. Several major companies in Sudan are linked to him, and are believed to be doing double duty as logistics support for bin Ladin’s network.

In February 1998, bin Ladin announced the formation of an umbrella organization called The Islamic World Front for the struggle against the Jews and the Crusaders (Al-Jabhah al-Islamiyyah al-`Alamiyyah li-Qital al-Yahud wal-Salibiyyin) Among the members of this organization are the Egyptian al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya and the Egyptian al-Jihad. Both of these groups were have been active in terrorism over the past decade. (see Attacks of al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya and al-Jihad). The founder members of the Front include, besides bin Ladin; Dr. Ayman al- Zawahiri, leader of the Egyptian Jihad; Rifa'i Ahmad Taha, a leader of the Islamic Group. The Islamic Group is linked with the al-Dir al-Bahri massacre in Luxor in November 1997,which claimed the lives of 58 tourists; and some leaders of extremist fundamentalist movements in Pakistan.

On May 28, 1998 the Islamabad daily, The News reported that Osama bin Ladin had announced the formation of an International Islamic Front for Jihad against America and Israel. Talking to a group of journalists who had traveled from Pakistan to meet him at his base in Khost in southern Afghanistan, he said leaders of Islamic movements in several countries, including Pakistan had evinced interest in joining the front. He stated that Dr Aiman Al-Zawahiri, leader of the Jamaat-ul-Jihad in Egypt who was present at the time, had played a crucial role in launching the front. Bin Ladin justified the formation of the anti-American and anti-Israeli front by arguing that Muslims everywhere in the world were suffering at the hands of the U.S. and Israel. He said the Muslims must wage holy war against their real enemies not only to rid themselves of unpopular regimes backed by the Americans and Israelis but also protect their faith. When a reporter maintained that bin Ladin and his colleagues could not possibly take on the world's only superpower, bin Ladin contended that the US was vulnerable and could be defeated in war. This would happen in the same way as the USSR suffered humiliation at the hands of the Afghan and Arab mujahideen in Afghanistan and was eventually dismembered. On 14 May 1998, The London Al-Quds al-'Arabi published an article to the effect that clerics in Afghanistan had issued a fatwa stipulating the necessity to move U.S. forces out of the Gulf region.

Addressing Muslims the world-over, the Afghan ulema said: “The enemies of Islam are not limited to a certain group or party; all atheists are enemies of Islam, and they take one another as friends.” The Afghan ulema declared jihad based on the rules of the Shari'ah against the United States and its followers. They urged Islamic governments to perform the duty of armed jihad against the enemies of Islam, pointing out that if Muslims are lax in their responsibility, the enemies of Islam will occupy the two holy mosques as well, just as they occupied the al- Aqsa Mosque. They stressed, in a statement attached to the fatwa, that: “This fatwa with the evidence and the rulings issued by early and current ulema, on which it is based is not merely a fatwa issued by the ulema of a Muslim country, but rather a religious fatwa that every Muslim should adopt and work under. 

There are probably a few hundred Arab volunteers still living in Afghanistan. They are the leftovers of the several thousand Arabs who came to Afghanistan via Pakistan in the 1980s to take part in the jihad against the USSR's Red Army and the Afghan communists. Those left behind have nowhere else to go because they risk being caught should they venture to return home. No other country would be willing to accept them. In any case, present day Afghanistan continues to be their safest hideaway. The ones who have returned to their countries have mostly joined the political and military struggle aimed at bringing an Islamic change there. Known as Arab-Afghans, these battle-hardened Islamists have come to be known as the most radical and dangerous of the fighters who have taken up arms against the Algerian and Egyptian governments. The Paris al-Watan al-'Arabi estimated on 26 June 1998, that the fact that bin-Ladin has shown up again in the press clearly indicates his emergence as a leader of the revolutionary council that was eventually established. According to the newspaper, a Dutch official who closely follows developments in the new Islamic Front, in cooperation with European organs, believes that relations were actually reorganized among the organizations which used to cooperate and coordinate with each other on the organizational and logistical levels on a new basis that gives an organizational working configuration to past relations. This is a new and important development. According to the Dutch official, this confirms the seriousness of this event, which requires larger and more accurate coordination between the European and U.S. authorities. It also calls for cooperation by some of the Middle Eastern authorities. 

The organizations whose membership in the Islamic Front was announced are the Egyptian Jihad, the Egyptian Armed Group, the Pakistan Scholars Society, the Partisans Movement in Kashmir, the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh, and the Afghan military wing of the Advice and Reform commission led by Osama bin Ladin. All these organizations once cooperated and coordinated with one another, but without any specific configuration or mechanism for such cooperation. Moreover, each of these organizations had freedom of action, and they determined their own objectives independently. Cooperation among these organizations was only at the level of those who carry arms, which is one of the organizational levels of each organization. There were no means of cooperation and coordination among the people of the call, another of the organizational levels. This is due to the fact that Afghanistan enhanced relations among the carriers of arms and created a kind of interpersonal cohesion. According to this evaluation, the threat posed by this new front is due to the fact that it combines all the organizational levels, by establishing a shura [consultative] council. According to most assessments, this council is led by Osama Bin Ladin. This increases the front's effectiveness. It can be said that the Islamic Front has now moved from the constituent and organizational phase to the operational phase. 

Conducted the bombings of the US Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on 7 August that killed at least 301 persons and injured more than 5,000 others. Claims to have shot down US helicopters and killed US servicemen in Somalia in 1993 and to have conducted three bombings targeted against the US troop presence in Aden, Yemen in December 1992. Linked to plans for attempted terrorist operations, including the assassination of the Pope during his visit to Manila in late1994; simultaneous bombings of the US and Israeli Embassies in Manila and other Asian capitals in late 1994; the midair bombing of a dozen US trans-Pacific flights in 1995; and a plan to kill President Clinton during a visit to the Philippines in early 1995. Continues to train, finance, and provide logistic support to terrorist groups that support these goals.

Also responsible for the 2001 air attack on the twin towers in New York
The following list of American grievances against bin Ladin and his network was taken from a U.S. State Department Fact Sheet:
Bin Ladin's followers conspired to kill US servicemen in Yemen who were on their way to participate in the humanitarian mission "Operation Restore Hope" in Somalia in 1992, and plotted the deaths of American and other peacekeepers in Somalia who were there to deliver food to starving Muslim people. Bin Ladin's network assisted Egyptian terrorists who tried to assassinate Egyptian President Mubarak in 1995 and who have killed dozens of tourists in Egypt in recent years. The Egyptian Islamic Jihad, one of the key groups in the network, conducted a car bombing against the Egyptian embassy in Pakistan in 1995 that killed over 20 Egyptians and Pakistanis.

Members of bin Ladin's network plotted to blow up US airliners in the Pacific and separately conspired to kill the Pope. His followers bombed a joint US and Saudi military training mission in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in 1995. Bin Ladin's network has publicly and repeatedly articulated a clear and violent anti-US agenda: In August 1996, bin Ladin issued a "declaration of war" against the United States. In February 1998, bin Ladin stated "If someone can kill an American soldier, it is better than wasting time on other matters." In February 1998, the bin Ladin network's World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders declared its intention to attack Americans and our allies, including civilians, anywhere in the world. In May 1998, bin Ladin stated at a press conference in Afghanistan that we would see the results of his threats "in a few weeks."

Bali 2002: For months the Indonesian government had denied allegations that al-Qaida militants were setting up shop in the country. When Singapore’s investigation into a plot to bomb Western interests pointed to the involvement of Indonesian operatives, Indonesia refused even to entertain the possibility. Now, in the wake of what is being called the worst terrorist act in Indonesian history, these denials appear not only preposterous, but criminally remiss. There can be little doubt that the bombing of Bali’s popular nightclub district was aimed at the throngs of Western tourists who frequent the island’s nightspots. Nor do many doubt that Islamic militants linked to al-Qaida were ultimately behind the attack, which came on the second anniversary of the bombing of the USS Cole. What is in doubt is whether the lesson has been learned. The attack on foreign visitors to Bali was only the latest and the most deadly attack on foreign visitors in Asia. This atrocity was preceded by attacks on French engineers, foreign diplomats, and Christian aid workers in Pakistan; by bombings targeting American forces in the Philippines; and by shooting attacks on American soldiers in Kuwait. Nor was this by any means the first attack against non Muslims in Indonesian cities; in December 2000, a series of well coordinated blasts targeted churches in Jakarta and elsewhere, killing more than 20 people.

To say that the writing was on the wall would be a considerable understatement. Al-Qaida’s influence on the Islamic militant culture of Southeast Asia runs deep perhaps even deeper than anyone had previously suspected. Only since the September 11 attacks in the United States has the full extent of al-Qaida involvement in the region begun to emerge. What at first appeared to be a ragtag assortment of unrelated militant groups has now been revealed as an intricate web of mutual operational support, based on personal connections and shared ideology. While al-Qaida’s influence has extended to virtually every part of Southeast Asia, Indonesia has provided particularly fertile ground, due to the current lack of a stable government and a recent history of brutal repression. Ironically, it was the Suharto government’s suppression of Muslim religious groups that gave al-Qaida a foothold in Indonesia. In a region where the line between political activism and militant terrorism is a thin one, Suharto’s attempt to wipe out his political adversaries pushed many Muslim fundamentalists across the line, straight into the arms of al-Qaida.

Denied a chance to play a role in Indonesian politics, many Indonesian Islamists cultivated the dream of “Daulah Islamiah Raya,” an Islamic super-state that would include all of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Sultanate of Brunei, and parts of the southern Philippines, Thailand and even Cambodia. This notion of a global, or at least regional, Islamic nation was shared by the Wahhabi fundamentalists who eventually formed the Taliban, and by Osama bin Ladin’s network for global jihad. Always seeking to extend his influence, Osama bin Laden reached out to the disparate local extremist groups, offering financial and operational assistance. In return, he won new recruits to his cause of liberating Muslim lands from Western influence.

On Christmas Eve, 2000, twenty bombs tore through Christian churches in Jakarta and eight other Indonesian cities. Twenty-two people were killed and nearly a hundred wounded. Dozens of other churches narrowly missed destruction because the bombs were defused or failed to explode. Two would-be attackers were killed when the bombs they were assembling exploded prematurely. A similar accident led Indonesian police to Iqbal Uzzaman, a Veteran of the Afghan war who had recruited at least 12 of the bombers. Uzzaman told interrogators that the attacks had been the brainchild of a man known as Hambali who he said had arrived in the city of Bandung with plans for 30 simultaneous attacks on “infidel targets.” Hambali had access to plenty of money, and brought along two assistants to build the bombs. Uzzaman was to provide the foot soldiers and Hambali would provide the wherewithal to carry out the attacks. While Uzzaman and nine of his recruits are currently serving time in Indonesian prisons, Hambali has disappeared without a trace. Six days after the church bombings, five nearly simultaneous explosions rocked the Philippine capital of Manila, killing another 22 people. More than a year later, Philippines police arrested an Indonesian citizen, Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi, who had once worked as an explosives expert for the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The new bombings were not the work of the MILF; a check of al-Ghozi’s cell-phone records revealed that immediately before and after the Manila bombings he had called a number belonging to Hambali. Al-Ghozi said that Hambali, who had visited Manila a short time before, had funded and coordinated the bombings. Al-Ghozi also led police to a cache in General Santos City on the island of Mindanao containing a tonne of Anzomex explosive, 300 detonators, six 400-meter rolls of detonating cord and 17 M16 assault rifles.

That al-Ghozi’s arrest was able to throw light on the Manila blasts was pure serendipity, since he was arrested in connection with a totally different incident. In December 2001, Singaporean authorities arrested 13 members of a cell planning attacks on Western interests in that country. Al-Ghozi had acquired the explosives uncovered on Mindanao as part of this cell’s plan. According to Singapore’s Home Affairs Minister, the explosives were “destined to be smuggled from Mindanao to Indonesia, and then to Malaysia and finally to Singapore.” The Mindanao cache was only part of the picture: Singaporean investigators eventually concluded that the cell had intended to blow up seven targets on the island with trucks, each carrying three times as much explosives as that used to level the Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995. Eight of the men arrested in Singapore had trained at al-Qaidah camps in Afghanistan. The cell consisted of local Muslims belonging to Jemaah Islamiah, a clandestine Islamist group with ties to similar groups in Malaysia and Indonesia. Several of the men were reported to be members of Singapore’s armed forces. The cell, which was formed as far back as 1993, followed a classic al-Qaida pattern: Local militants formed cells of between three and four men, who were then provided with instruction and aid by al-Qaida “consultants.” Members of the Singaporean cell knew these “foreign experts” only as “Mike” and “Sammy.” Both men were experts in explosives and undercover work, and met with the cell several times during October 2001.

The plan they helped develop required the cell’s local members to scout out and videotape potential targets, arrange for travel documents, and acquire the explosives to be used in the attacks. Mike reportedly instructed members of the cell to purchase some 20 tonnes of ammonium nitrate fertilizer. The actual attacks would be carried out by suicide bombers brought in by Sammy by which time the local cell members were to have left the country. The plan’s targets included the American, Australian and Israeli embassies in Singapore, as well American ships in Singapore’s harbor. The plot, code named Operation Jibril, was apparently known to Singaporean authorities as early as October 2000. Singapore government sources said the arrest of the local members of the cell thwarted a serious effort to launch attacks. However, the two al-Qaida experts managed to slip out of the country some time in late December. The arrest of Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi in mid-January in the Philippines was based on information provided by Singapore. Al-Ghozi, it turned out, was the explosives expert known to the Singaporean cell as “Mike.” The second al-Qaida consultant was later picked up by United States security agents in Oman. Sammy turned out to be Jabarah Mohammed Mansour, a Canadian citizen of Kuwaiti descent. Mansour proved extremely cooperative in answering questions about al-Qaida, and reportedly provided his interrogators with details about the network’s training methods and operational techniques, including means of blending in with the local population while planning an attack.

But it was the interrogation Rohman al-Ghozi and the other members of the Singapore cell that provided the most information about al-Qaida’s Southeast Asian cells. Among the information al-Ghozi provided was the name of the brains behind the Singapore operation. According to his affidavit, al-Ghozi had been working under the orders of Hambali, whom he described as the operational commander of Jemaah Islamiah. However, the name Hambali, which now appeared to be connected with virtually every major terror attack in Southeast Asia, was also connected with al-Qaida. It was Hambali who ordered a member of the Singapore cell to videotape possible targets on the island; and when police arrested the cell members in December 2001, they discovered a copy of the tape. A second copy had been sent by courier to bin Ladin’s operations chief, Mohammed Atef reportedly to get final approval for the planned attack. The tape, which was found in Atef’s house in Kabul, Afghanistan, after his death, shows scenes of a bus stop, a Mass Rapid Transport (MRT) underground railway station, and an area where U.S. personnel congregate. There was also footage of a line of bicycles with carry-boxes strapped to them, which the narrator suggested could be used to carry explosives to a target. The tape provided the first direct link between the Jemaah Islamiah group and the al-Qaida leadership in Afghanistan. Hambali reportedly paid for the delivery of the tape to Atef, as well as training in Afghanistan for at least seven members of the Singapore cell.

The plot to bomb Western targets in Singapore dates back to 1993, when Ibrahim Maidin visited Afghanistan. On his return to Singapore he began recruiting like-minded Muslims to attend private classes on Islam. He also founded Jamaah Islamiah’s first Singapore cell, coordinating meetings with Hambali, who directed the organization’s regional operations from his base in Kuala Lumpur. In 1994, Maidin began sending recruits for religious and military training in Malaysia. There, Hambali chose some of the more promising trainees to be sent on for further training at al-Qaida camps in Afghanistan. There they received training in the use of AK-47 assault rifles, mortars, and military tactics. An encrypted diskette recently seized by authorities showed a letter nominating two cell members for special training in ambush, assassination, sniper operations and field engineering. By 1997, the Fiah Ayab cell, the first of four Singapore Jemaah Islamiah cells was ready for action. The cell had contacts, through Hambali, with the central al-Qaida leadership, but for reasons unknown, the attacks which the cell was to have carried out never materialized. Al-Qaida’s leadership was at the time busy with the final stages of the bombings of the American embassies in East Africa and this may have caused the Singapore plot to have been put on hold. Whatever the reason, it was not until 2001, that the network’s second cell, Fiah Musa, became operational. This cell was coordinated by Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana, a 39-year-old Singaporean businessman who served with Hambali on the Jemaah Islamiah’s regional operations council in Malaysia. It was Bafana who arranged for the two al-Qaida experts, al-Ghozi and Mansour, to visit Singapore.

Meanwhile, Hambali was arranging to procure the explosives needed by the group. He contacted Yazid Sufaat, a Malaysian businessman and former military officer, and directed him to order four tonnes of ammonium nitrate. Sufaat placed the order through his company, Green Laboratory Medicine, and, according to Malaysian authorities, stashed the material at the port town of Muar on the West Coast of Malaysia. Al-Ghozi had advised the members of the Singapore cell that they would need some 21 tonnes of ammonium nitrate to carry out the planned attacks, and instructed the cell members to acquire the material from local suppliers. It was this that proved their undoing; members of the cell placed an order for seventeen tonnes of ammonium nitrate with a local company, which immediately alerted Singapore’s security agency, the ISD. The ISD launched an investigation, working on the assumption that foreign members of Jemaah Islamiah were seeking to infiltrate Singapore. However in November 2001, Mohammed Aslam bin Yar Ali Khan, a Singaporean of Pakistani descent and believed to have links to al-Qaida was captured in Afghanistan. It turned out that he had links to the local cell, whose existence the ISD had not hitherto suspected. Ali Khan’s arrest led the ISD directly to other cell members, and their interrogations eventually led to the capture of al-Ghozi and Mansour.

Yazid Sufaat, the Malaysian businessman who had procured the explosives for the cell, was arrested in December 2001, upon returning home from a visit to Afghanistan. Investigators soon connected him with two of the September 11 hijackers, Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, who had stayed with Sufaat while attending a crucial January 2001 planning meeting in Kuala Lumpur. Then, in August 2001, FBI agents raided the Minneapolis of Zacarias Moussaoui, believed to be the “missing” 20th hijacker in the September 11 attacks. Among Moussaoui’s papers, the agents discovered letters from a Malaysian company called Infocus Tech. The letters, identifying Moussaoui as the company’s “marketing consultant” for the United States, Britain and Europe, were signed “Yazid Sufaat, Managing Director.” According to FBI sources quoted by Newsweek magazine, Sufaat had also agreed to pay Moussaoui $2,500 a month during his stay in the United States, along with a lump sum of $35,000 to get him started. Sufaat told interrogators that he had made these arrangements on the orders of Hambali and of Jemaah Islamiah’s spiritual leader Abu Bakar Ba’yasir. Hambali, meanwhile, had once more managed to disappear without a trace. What’s more, so did the explosives stored at Muar.

Hambali’s links to international terrorism did not start with the Singapore plot. He had in fact been involved in high-profile attacks against the United States long before anyone had heard of al-Qaida. Much of what is known of Hambali’s involvement in international terrorism has emerged since September 11, 2001. What is disquieting is how little was previously known; for nearly a decade, he had been a pivotal figure in Islamic extremist terrorism, and yet had managed to remain virtually unknown. The picture that has emerged September 11 is of terrorist mastermind who has already served as coordinator for dozens of high-profile attacks. Police and security officials around the region suspect he may have set in motion other elaborate, and as yet undiscovered, terror plots before disappearing in January of 2001, apparently headed for Pakistan. As police investigations continue, each passing week uncovers more of what is now clearly an elaborate umbrella organization for al-Qaida linked terrorist activity in Southeast Asia, virtually all of which is coordinated by Hambali. Hambali Riduan Issamudin, now 37 fought alongside thousands of other young Muslims from around the world in the Afghan war against the Soviet Union. Upon his return from Afghanistan, he married a Chinese Malaysian woman and gave every impression of settling down to a modest life in Kuala Lumpur.

However, in the background he organized classes for the teaching of Jihad, together with an Indonesian cleric named Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. This was a partnership that would last up to the present. Today, both men are instrumental in the running of Jemaah Islamiah, with Hambali providing the practical know-how and tactical experience and Abu Bakar serving as the organization’s ideologue. The fundamental doctrine of the group is “Daulah Islamiah Raya,” the ideal of creating Islamic state in SoutheAsia that would include Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Sultanate of Brunei, the South Philippines, Thailand and Cambodia. Most of these countries now have terrorist and tribal groups all seeking the same objective, which greatly facilitated the formation of regional ties by Jemaah Islamiah. But Hambali’s aspirations did not stop with Southeast Asia; he is now known to have been intimately involved in planning and carrying out attacks against American interests, including the first World Trade Center bombing in February 1993. Together with Wali Khan Amin Shah, one of those eventually jailed in the bombing, Hambali established a company called Konsojaya. The company’s ostensible business was exporting palm oil from Malaysia to Afghanistan; however, it also served as a conduit for the funding of Jihad.

After the World Trade Center bombing, Hambali used the company to supply Wali Kahn and Ramzi Yousef with cash to escape to the Philippines. Hambali has also been implicated in Operation “Bojinka” a plot to blow up twelve American airliners over the Pacific. Wali Khan was eventually jailed for the bombing of a Philippine Airlines plane in December 1994 that killed a Japanese businessman. The bombing is believed to have been a dry run for Operation Bojinka. This operation too, is believed to have been the brainchild of Hambali. The Philippines cell that was to have carried it out was funded by Hambali’s company Konsojaya. Hambali is also thought to have raised funds, bought arms and recruited fighters for a jihad against Indonesian and Filipino Christians.

An investigation into the company provided investigators with the first clear indications of Hambali’s links to al-Qaida’s Afghanistan-based leadership. Phone taps by Philippine police showed that frequent calls were made from the Konsojaya offices in Malaysia to the Manila offices of Mohammed Khalifa, bin Laden’s brother-in-law, who runs a charity organization for al-Qaida. In addition to coordinating Jemaah Islamiah’s local groups, Hambali is the chief Southeast Asian representative and logistical coordinator for al-Qaida. He organized travel itineraries, accommodation and welcome dinners for hijackers Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, and a suspect in the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole, and met with Zacarias Moussaoui. Intelligence officials in the region say they believe that Hambali was instrumental is setting up the meeting in Kuala Lumpur during which plans for the September 11 attacks were finalized. Some even believe that Hambali was one of the chief architects of the attacks, perhaps using the 1995 plot as a blueprint. Hambali’s whereabouts today are unknown. He reportedly left Malaysia on February 23 of this year for Indonesia. Two days later, he left Indonesia for an unknown location. While the whereabouts of Hambali are unknown, the location of his partner in the Jemaah Islamiah leadership, Abu Bakar Ba’aysir, has never been in doubt; he still lives and teaches quite openly on the Indonesian island of Java. An Islamic cleric of Yemeni origin, Abu Bakar, now 64, heads the Mujahidin Council of Indonesia. He is also believed to be a key figure in the Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM), an Islamic militant group that advocates the overthrow of the Malaysian government. Since last August, Malaysia has detained dozens members of the KMM.

More importantly, Abu Bakar has been identified as the amir, or supreme leader of Jemaah Islamiah by several members of the group’s Singapore cells. Both Singapore and Malaysia have urged Indonesia to arrest Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, saying that his continued freedom of action undermines peace in the region. However, Indonesian officials say that there is insufficient evidence against him; after all, he has not broken any Indonesian laws. Singapore countered by offering to allow Indonesian authorities access to imprisoned members of Jemaah Islamiah. The offer was made after Indonesia sent a letter to Singapore Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew demanding he clarify his controversial statement that leaders of extremist cells were at large in Indonesia. Indonesia denounced Lee’s claim as provocative and unsubstantiated, but the Singapore foreign ministry said that proof could easily be provided. Indonesia’s reluctance to act against Abu Bakar and other militant preachers is part and parcel of the country’s unstable political situation. Ba’asyir is an unapologetic admirer of Osama bin Laden, and openly expresses a loathing of American leaders and Jews. But he has steadfastly denied that he is involved in any terrorist activities. However, the recent interrogation of an al-Qaida militant have begun to provide what American officials say as conclusive evidence that Ba’asyir is more than just a rabble-rouser.

The prisoner, Omar al-Farouq, served as a liaison between Jemaah Islamiah to al-Qaida’s senior leadership. His interrogation has provided a clearer picture of Jemaah Islamiyah. Al-Farouq said Ba’asyir had provided resources and logistical support for the planned attack on the American Embassy. The evidence provided by al-Farouq has led Washington to increase its pressure on Indonesia to arrest Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. Yet the Indonesian government, wary of a backlash by the country’s religious Muslims, has done little more than call Abu Bakar in for questioning. Some Indonesian Muslims see Abu Bakar as a legitimate Islamic cleric, albeit one with militant views, and America’s war on terrorism as a war on Islam. Meanwhile, Abu Bakar continues to live his normal life, teaching at the same school.

However, Indonesian military sources quoted by TIME magazine said privately that they believed Abu Bakar to be a key link in the network of regional terrorist cells. Nor is Abu Bakar and his ilk Indonesia’s only terrorist problem. Indonesian has been plagued by a sectarian conflict in the Moluccas islands, where for three years Muslim militants have been waging a jihad against Christian villagers. The jihad groups have kept the fires of sectarian violence raging in the Moluccas, and are vocal in their calls to eradicate Christianity from the Islands. This conflict has drawn Islamic militants from all over the region to take part, playing much the same role in Southeast Asia that the Afghan conflict did a generation earlier. Foreign trainees have flocked to the Islands, bringing with them arms and explosives. They leave with a stronger connection to militant Islam, as well as valuable fighting experience. The central government has thus far been either unable or unwilling to come to grips with the problem, even as evidence mounts that foreign terrorist groups are exploiting the conflict to gain a foothold in Indonesia.

Those efforts that have been made have been hampered by sympathy for the militant groups on the part of some elements of the Indonesian military. Indonesian police and military officials have publicly denied that foreign terrorist groups have set up training camps in the country. However, members of an al-Qaida cell arrested in Spain last year told investigators that they had trained in a makeshift training facility on the island of Sulawesi. The camp, officials said, was located in dense jungle near the port city of Poso. Sulawesi has been the scene of some of the area’s most intense fighting between Muslims and Christians which has claimed more than 1,000 lives to date. Indonesian military sources have hinted that al-Qaida militants may have been behind some of the fighting. The officials said the Poso camp was operated by al-Qaida members with the assistance of local Muslim militants. Unlike other paramilitary training facilities in Indonesia, a country where political groups often have armed wings, this camp was a well-kept secret.

Indonesian intelligence officials estimated that over the past year several hundred people, many of them from Europe, Pakistan and the Middle East, entered the country posing as aid workers to reach the camp. The officials said that in August and October of 2000, police briefly detained several non-Indonesians traveling in the Poso area, but they were released after showinglocal officials a letter fra Muslim charity based in southern Sulawesi stating they were going to Poso to help rebuild mosques. A senior Indonesian intelligence official said investigators subsequently discovered that the charity, known as the “Crisis Prevention Committee,” had connections to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida. Police have concluded the foreigners were probably going to or from the camp when they were detained.

The Bali attack has shown the folly of the government’s continued refusal to deal with this trend; Indonesia now has no choice but to crack down on Islamist terrorists. But this will not be easy, as the country has still not fully recovered economically or politically from the harsh Suharto regime. Most Indonesians are loath to return to the years when even peaceful Islamic political activists were routinely jailed. At the same time, the country’s military and law enforcement agencies are not equipped to deal with the challenges of battling al-Qaida. For years Indonesia’s intelligence services, distracted by separatist rebellions and almost four years of political turmoil in the capital, had their hands too full to collect information on Islamist groups. What little intelligence gathering they attempted was hampered by chronic lack of funds; equipment that is standard in many countries, including devices to monitor cellular phones, are a luxury to Indonesia’s intelligence services. Nor will the Indonesian government be able, even if it is willing, to seek immediate help from the United States.

A U.S. law, passed in the wake of the Indonesian army’s human-rights abuses in East Timor, prohibits American military assistance to Indonesia. This law may soon be rescinded, as the war on terrorism overshadows human-rights issues. Meanwhile, Washington has quietly expanded the scope of intelligence cooperation with Indonesia on terrorist-related issues, in the hope that this could spur law enforcement agencies to take more aggressive steps against extremist groups. But the effort has so far received a mixed reception. Ironically, the Indonesian government’s attempts to avoid offending the country’s moderate Muslims may well have created the need for an unprecedented and harsh crackdown on Islamist groups. There is no question that if Indonesia continues to ignore the presence of international terrorists in its territory, it will face serious risks: not only the likelihood of further attacks, but also escalating conflict with its neighbors, including Malaysia and Singapore, and now Australia as well. These countries have problems of their own, and are unlikely to tolerate the risk of the epidemic of global jihad spreading from Indonesia to their own territories.

May have from several hundred to several thousand members. Also serves as the core of a loose umbrella organization that includes many Sunni Islamic extremist groups, including factions of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Gama'at al-Islamiyya, and the Harakat ul-Mujahidin.
The Embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam underscore al-Qaida's global reach. Bin Ladin and his key lieutenants reside in Afghanistan, and the group maintains terrorist training camps there
Bin Ladin, son of a billionaire Saudi family, is said to have inherited around $300 million that he uses to finance the group. Al-Qaida also maintains money-making businesses, collects donations from like-minded supporters, and illicitly siphons funds from donations to Muslim charitable organizations.


Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
An Islamic extremist group, the GIA aims to overthrow the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an Islamic state. The GIA began its violent  in early 1992 after Algiers voided the victory of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)--the largest Islamic party--in the first round of legislative elections in December 1991. Frequent attacks against civilians, journalists, and foreign residents. In the last several years the GIA has conducted a terrorist campaign of civilian massacres, sometimes wiping out entire villages in its area of operations and frequently killing hundreds of civilians. Since announcing its terrorist campaign against foreigners living in Algeria in September 1993, the GIA has killed more than 100 expatriate men and women--mostly Europeans--in the country. Uses assassinations and bombings, including car bombs, and it is known to favor kidnapping victims and slitting their throats. The GIA hijacked an Air France flight to Algiers in December 1994, and suspicions centered on the group for a series of bombings in France in 1995. Probably several hundred to several thousand members. Area of operation is Algeria. Algerian expatriates and GIA members abroad, many of whom reside in Western Europe, provide some financial and logistic support. In addition, the Algerian Government has accused Iran and Sudan of supporting Algerian extremists and severed diplomatic relations with Iran in March 1993.

Aum Supreme Truth
a.k.a. Aum Shinrikyo. A cult established in 1987 by Shoko Asahara, Aum aims to take over Japan and then the world. Its organizational structure mimicks that of a nation-state, with "finance," "construction," and "science and technology" ministries. Approved as a religious entity in 1989 under Japanese law, the group ran candidates in a Japanese parliamentary election in 1990. Over time, the cult began to emphasize the imminence of the end of the world and stated that the United States would initiate "Armageddon" by starting World War III with Japan. The Japanese Government revoked its recognition of Aum as a religious organization in October 1995, but in 1997 a government panel decided not to invoke the Anti-Subversive Law against the group, which would have outlawed the cult.

On 20 March 1995 Aum members simultaneously released sarin nerve gas on several Tokyo subway trains, killing 12 persons and injuring up to 6,000. The group was responsible for other mysterious chemical incidents in Japan in 1994. Its efforts to conduct attacks using biological agents have been unsuccessful. Japanese police arrested Asahara in May 1995, and he remained on trial facing seventeen counts of murder at the end of 1998. In 1997 and 1998 the cult resumed its recruiting  in Japan and opened several commercial businesses. Maintains an Internet homepage that indicates Armageddon and anti-US sentiment remain a part of the cult's world view. At the time of the Tokyo subway attack, the group claimed to have 9,000 members in Japan and up to 40,000 worldwide. Its current  is unknown. Operates in Japan, but previously had a presence in Australia, Russia, Ukraine, Germany, Taiwan, Sri Lanka, the former Yugoslavia, and the United States.

Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)
a.k.a Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna. Founded in 1959 with the aim of establishing an independent homeland based on Marxist principles in Spain's Basque region and the south western French provinces of Labourd, Basse-Navarra, and Soule. Primarily bombings and assassinations of Spanish Government officials, especially security and military forces, politicians, and judicial figures. In response to French operations against the group, ETA also has targeted French interests. Finances its  through kidnappings, robberies, and extortion. Has killed more than 800 persons since it began lethal attacks in the early 1960s; responsible for murdering 6 persons in 1998. ETA declared a "unilateral and indefinite" cease-fire on 17 September 1998. They broke it in 2001 renewing their bombing campaign. While popular in Basque they are hated by all other Spaniards. May have hundreds of members, plus supporters. Operates primarily in the Basque autonomous regions of northern Spain and south western France, but also has bombed Spanish and French interests elsewhere. Has received training at various times in the past in Libya, Lebanon, and Nicaragua. Some ETA members allegedly have received sanctuary in Cuba. Also appears to have ties to the Irish Republican Army through the two groups' legal political wings.

On 22 March 2006, ETA sent a DVD message to the Basque Network Euskal Irrati-Telebista and the journals Gara and Berria with a communiqué from the organization announcing what it called a "permanent ceasefire" that was broadcast over Spanish TV. Talks with the group were then officially opened by Spanish Presidente del Gobierno José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. These took place all over 2006, not free from incidents such as an ETA cell stealing some 300 handguns, ammunition and spare parts in France on October 2006 or a series of warnings made by ETA such as the one of 23 September, when masked ETA militants declared that the organization would "keep taking up arms" until achieving "independence and socialism in the Basque country", which were regarded by some as a way to increase pressure on the talks, by others as a tactic to reinforce ETA's position in the negotiations.
Finally, on 30 December 2006 ETA detonated a van bomb after three confusing warning calls, in a parking building at the Madrid Barajas international airport. The explosion caused the collapse of the building and killed two Ecuadorian immigrants who were napping inside their cars in the parking building. At 6:00 pm, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero released a statement stating that the "peace process" had been discontinued.

In January 2008, ETA stated that its call for independence is similar to that of the Kosovo status and Scotland. In the week of 8 September 2008, two Basque political parties were banned by a Spanish court for their secretive links to ETA. In another case in the same week, 21 people were convicted whose work on behalf of ETA prisoners actually belied secretive links to the armed separatists themselves. ETA reacted to these actions by placing three major car bombs in less than 24 hours in northern Spain.

In April 2009 Jurdan Martitegi was arrested, making the fourth consecutive ETA military chiefs to be captured within a single year, an unprecedented police record further weakening the group. The group, and therefore the violence resurged in summer 2009, with several ETA attacks leaving three people dead and dozens injured around Spain.
The Basque newspaper Gara published an article that suggested that ETA member Jon Anza could had been killed and buried by Spanish police in April 2009. The central prosecutor in the French town of Bayonne, Anne Kayanakis, announced, as the official version, that the autopsy carried out on the body of Jon Anza – a suspected member of the armed Basque group ETA, missing since April 2009 – revealed no signs of having been beaten, wounded or shot, which should rule out any suspicions that he died from unnatural causes. Nevertheless, that very magistrate denied the demand of the family asking for the presence of a family trustworth doctor during the auptopsy. After this Jon Anza's family members asked for a second autopsy to be carried on. In December 2009, Spain raised its terror alert after warning that ETA could be planning major attacks or high-profile kidnappings during Spain's European Union presidency. The next day, after being asked by the opposition, Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba said that warning was part of a strategy.

On 5 September 2010, ETA declared a new ceasefire, its third, after two previous ceasefires were ended by the group. A spokesperson speaking on a video announcing the ceasefire said the organisation wished to use "peaceful, democratic means" to achieve its aims, though it was not specified whether the ceasefire was considered permanent by the group. ETA claimed that it had made the decision to initiate a ceasefire several months prior to the announcement. In part of the video, the spokesperson said that the group was "prepared today as yesterday to agree to the minimum democratic conditions necessary to put in motion a democratic process, if the Spanish government is willing." The announcement was met with a mixed reaction; Basque nationalist politicians responded positively, and said that the Spanish and international governments should do the same, while the Spanish interior counselor of Basque, Rodolfo Ares, said that the commitment did not go far enough. He said that he considered ETA's statement "absolutely insufficient" because it did not commit to a complete termination of what Ares considered "terrorist activity" by the group.

The final declaration of the Donostia-San Sebastián International Peace Conference (17 October 2011) led to an announcement of cessation of armed activity by ETA. On 10 January 2011, ETA declared that their September 2010 ceasefire would be permanent and verifiable by international observers. Observers urged caution, pointing out that ETA had broken permanent ceasefires in the past, whereas Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (set to be replaced in December 2011 after the election of Mariano Rajoy in November) demanded that ETA declare that it had given up violence for once and for all. After the declaration, Spanish press started speculating of a possible Real IRA-type split within ETA, with hardliners forming a new more violent offshoot led by "Dienteputo". On 20 October 2011, ETA announced a cessation of armed activity via video clip sent to media outlets following the Donostia-San Sebastián International Peace Conference, which was attended by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, former Taoiseach of Ireland Bertie Ahern, former Prime Minister of Norway Gro Harlem Brundtland (an international leader in sustainable development and public health), former Interior Minister of France Pierre Joxe, president of Sinn Féin Gerry Adams (a Teachta Dála in Dáil Éireann), and British diplomat Jonathan Powell, who served as the first Downing Street Chief of Staff.

They all signed a final declaration that was supported also by former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, the former US President and 2002 Nobel Peace Prize winner Jimmy Carter, and the former US senator and former US Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George J. Mitchell. The meeting did not include Spanish or French government representatives. The day after the ceasefire, in a contribution piece to the New York Times, Tony Blair indicated that lessons in dealing with terrorist groups can be learned from the way in which the Spanish administration handled the ETA. Blair wrote, “governments must firmly defend themselves, their principles and their people against terrorists. This requires good police and intelligence work as well as political determination. [However], firm security pressure on terrorists must be coupled with offering them a way out when they realize that they cannot win by violence. Terrorist groups are rarely defeated by military means alone”. Blair also suggested that Spain will need to discuss weapon decommissioning, peace strategies, reparations for victims, and security with the ETA, as Britain has discussed with the Provisional IRA. Less optimistic, the recently elected Spanish Prime Minister, Mariano Rajoy, of the center-right People's Party (Spain), expressed the need to push for the full dissolution of the ETA.

The People's Party has emphasized the obligation of the state to refuse negotiations with separatist movements since former Prime Minister José María Aznar was in office. Aznar was responsible for banning media outlets seen as subversive to the state and Batasuna, the political party of the ETA. Additionally, in preparation for his party’s manifesto, on 30 October 2011, Rajoy declared that the People's Party will not negotiate with terrorists (ETA) under threats of violence nor announcements of the group’s termination, but will instead focus party efforts on remembering and honoring victims of terrorist violence. Significantly, while the ETA pledged to refrain from a violent separatist movement, the separatist movement was not denounced. In fact, the ETA announcement reinforced the struggle for the Basque homeland, but through the use of democratic means. It is crucial to understand that this event may not alter the goals of the Basque separatist movement, but will change the method of the fight for a more autonomous state. Negotiations with the newly elected administration may prove difficult with the return to the center-right People's Party, which is replacing Socialist control, due to pressure from within the party to refuse all ETA negotiations.


 

Devrimci Sol (Revolutionary Left)
a.k.a. Dev Sol, Egypt's largest militant group, active since the late 1970s; appears to be loosely organized. Has an external wing with a worldwide presence. Signed Usama Bin Ladin's fatwa in February 1998 calling for attacks against US civilians but publicly has denied that it supports Bin Ladin. Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman is al-Gama'at's preeminent spiritual leader, and the group publicly has threatened to retaliate against US interests for his incarceration. Primary goal is to overthrow the Egyptian Government and replace it with an Islamic state. Armed attacks against Egyptian security and other government officials, Coptic Christians, and Egyptian opponents of Islamic extremism. Al-Gama'at has launched attacks on tourists in Egypt since 1992, most notably the attack in November 1997 at Luxor that killed 58 foreign tourists. Also claimed responsibility for the attempt in June 1995 to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Probably several thousand hardcore members and another several thousand sympathizers.
Operates mainly in the Al Minya, Asyu't, Qina, and Soha Governorates of southern Egypt. Also appears to have support in Cairo, Alexandria, and other urban locations, particularly among unemployed graduates and students. Has a worldwide presence, including in the United Kingdom, Afghanistan, and Austria. The Egyptian Government believes that Iranian, Sudanese, and Afghan militant groups support the IG.
 

Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
Marxist-Leninist organization founded in 1969 when it split from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Believes Palestinian national goals can be achieved only through revolution of the masses. In early 1980s occupied political stance midway between Arafat and the rejectionists. Split into two factions in 1991; Nayif Hawatmah leads the majority and more hardline faction, which continues to dominate the group. Joined with other rejectionist groups to form the Alliance of Palestinian Forces (APF) to oppose the Declaration of Principals signed in 1993. Broke from the APF--along with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)--over ideological differences. Has made limited moves toward merging with the PFLP since the mid-1990s. In the 1970s conducted numerous small bombings and minor assaults and some more spectacular operations in Israel and the occupied territories, concentrating on Israeli targets. Involved only in border raids since 1988, but continues to oppose the Israel-PLO peace agreement. Membership is estimated at 500 (total for both factions). Operate in Syria, Lebanon, and the Israeli-occupied territories; terrorist attacks have taken place entirely in Israel and the occupied territories. Conducts occasional guerrilla operations in southern Lebanon. Receives limited financial and military aid from Syria.
 

Harakat ul-Mujahidin
Formerly the Harakat ul-Ansar, which was designated a foreign terrorist organization in October 1997. HUM is an Islamic militant group based in Pakistan that operates primarily in Kashmir. Leader Fazlur Rehman Khalil has been linked to Bin Ladin and signed his fatwa in February 1998 calling for attacks on US and Western interests. Operates terrorist training camps in eastern Afghanistan and suffered casualties in the US missile strikes on Bin Ladin-associated training camps in Khowst in August 1998. Fazlur Rehman Khalil subsequently said that HUM would take revenge on the United States. Has conducted a number of operations against Indian troops and civilian targets in Kashmir. Linked to the Kashmiri militant group al-Faran that kidnapped five Western tourists in Kashmir in July 1995; one was killed in August 1995, and the other four reportedly were killed in December of the same year. Has several thousand armed supporters located in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan, and India's southern Kashmir and Doda regions. Supporters are mostly Pakistanis and Kashmiris, and also include Afghans and Arab veterans of the Afghan war. Uses light and heavy machineguns, assault rifles, mortars, explosives, and rockets. Based in Muzaffarabad, Pakistan, but members conduct insurgent and terrorist  primarily in Kashmir. The HUM trains its militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Collects donations from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf and Islamic states and from Pakistanis and Kashmiris. The source and amount of HUA's military funding are unknown.
 

Jamaat ul-Fuqra
Islamic sect that seeks to purify Islam through violence. Led by Pakistani cleric Shaykh Mubarik Ali Gilani, who established the organization in the early 1980s. Gilani now resides in Pakistan, but most cells are located in North America and the Caribbean. Members have purchased isolated rural compounds in North America to live communally, practice their faith, and insulate themselves from Western culture. Fuqra members have attacked a variety of targets that they view as enemies of Islam, including Muslims they regards as heretics and Hindus. Attacks during the 1980s included assassinations and firebombings across the United States. Fuqra members in the United States have been convicted of criminal violations, including murder and fraud. Operate in North America and Pakistan.

Japanese Red Army (JRA)
a.k.a. Anti-Imperialist International Brigade (AIIB). An international terrorist group formed around 1970 after breaking away from Japanese Communist League-Red Army Faction. Led by Fusako Shigenobu, believed to be in Syrian-garrisoned area of Lebanon's Bekaa Valley. Stated goals are to overthrow Japanese Government and monarchy and help foment world revolution. Organization unclear but may control or at least have ties to Anti-Imperialist International Brigade (AIIB). Also may have links to Antiwar Democratic Front, an overt leftist political organization in Japan. Details released following arrest in November 1987 of leader Osamu Maruoka indicate that JRA may be organizing cells in Asian cities, such as Manila and Singapore. Has had close and longstanding relations with Palestinian terrorist groups--based and operating outside Japan--since its inception.

During the 1970s JRA conducted a series of attacks around the world, including the massacre in 1972 at Lod Airport in Israel, two Japanese airliner hijackings, and an attempted takeover of the US Embassy in Kuala Lumpur. In April 1988, JRA operative Yu Kikumura was arrested with explosives on the New Jersey Turnpike, apparently planning an attack to coincide with the bombing of a USO club in Naples and a suspected JRA operation that killed five, including a US servicewoman. Kikumura was convicted of these charges and is serving a lengthy prison sentence in the United States. In March 1995, Ekita Yukiko, a longtime JRA activist, was arrested in Romania and subsequently deported to Japan. Eight others have been arrested since 1996, but leader Shigenobu remains at large. About eight hardcore members; undetermined number of sympathizers. Location unknown, but possibly based in Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon.

Kach and Kahane Chai
Stated goal is to restore the biblical state of Israel. Kach (founded by radical Israeli-American rabbi Meir Kahane) and its offshoot Kahane Chai, which means "Kahane Lives," (founded by Meir Kahane's son Binyamin following his father's assassination in the United States) were declared to be terrorist organizations in March 1994 by the Israeli Cabinet under the 1948 Terrorism Law. This followed the groups' statements in support of Dr. Baruch Goldstein's attack in February 1994 on the al-Ibrahimi Mosque--Goldstein was affiliated with Kach--and their verbal attacks on the Israeli Government. Organize protests against the Israeli Government. Harass and threaten Palestinians in Hebron and the West Bank. Have threatened to attack Arabs, Palestinians, and Israeli Government officials. Claimed responsibility for several shootings of West Bank Palestinians that killed four persons and wounded two in 1993. Operate in Israel and West Bank settlements, particularly Qiryat Arba' in Hebron. Receives support from sympathizers in the United States and Europe.

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

Note: As of 2009 this organisation has been completely wiped out. What follows is information about the group prior to 2008.

Known front organizations: World Tamil Association (WTA), World Tamil Movement (WTM), the Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils (FACT), the Ellalan Force, the Sangillan Force. The most powerful Tamil group in Sri Lanka, founded in 1976. Uses overt and illegal methods to raise funds, acquire weapons, and publicize its cause of establishing an independent Tamil state. Began its armed conflict with the Sri Lankan Government in 1983 and relies on a guerrilla strategy that includes the use of terrorist tactics. Has integrated a battlefield insurgent strategy with a terrorist program that targets not only key government personnel in the countryside but also senior Sri Lankan political and military leaders in Colombo. LTTE political assassinations and bombings have become commonplace, including suicide attacks against Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa in 1993 and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991. Has refrained from targeting Western tourists out of fear that foreign governments would crack down on Tamil expatriates involved in fundraising  abroad. Prefer to attack vulnerable government facilities and withdraw before reinforcements arrive.

The LTTE has detonated two massive truck bombs directed against the Sri Lankan economy, one at the Central Bank in January 1996 and another at the Colombo World Trade Center in October 1997. The LTTE also has attacked several ships in Sri Lankan waters, including foreign commercial vessels and infrastructure targets such as commuter trains, buses, oil tanks, and power stations. The LTTE prefers to attack vulnerable government facilities then withdraw before reinforcements arrive, or to time its attacks to take advantage of security lapses on holidays, at night, or in the early morning. In the past several years, the LTTE has also attacked several commercial ships flying foreign flags in the waters off the north and east of the country. In 1998, threats were directed at domestic air carriers flying between Colombo and Jaffna, and in September of that year, a domestic civilian aircraft flying from Colombo to Jaffna crashed, killing everyone on board.

The cause of the accident is still unknown.
Bomb attacks remain the greatest terrorist hazard. The LTTE has attempted or carried out numerous political assassinations or attempts. In 1999, suicide bombings resulted in the death of 30 persons and injury to 143 others in Colombo, Trincomalee, Batticaloa, Jaffna and Medawachchi. In January 2000, a suicide bomber killed more than a dozen and wounded several passers-by when she detonated her bomb outside the Prime Minister's Office after being detected by security personnel. In March 2000, as many as eight LTTE terrorists attacked a government motorcade traveling on a major Colombo thoroughfare, killing 25 people and wounding many others. In June 2000, a suicide bomber assassinated the Minister for Industrial Development in a Colombo suburb. Twenty-one others were killed and 60 people were injured in the attack. In October 2000, two American and one British women and their Sri Lankan driver were seriously injured in their vehicle in Central Colombo when an LTTE suicide bomber confronted by police exploded his device rather than surrender. Three policemen were killed. In October 2001, an LTTE suicide bomber stopped by police in the vicinity of an election rally in Colombo detonated his device rather than surrender, killing five people and injuring 16 others.

In addition to individual suicide bombers, vehicle-mounted bombs have been used by the LTTE. Major hotels have been directly affected by terrorist  and could be again because of their proximity to likely economic, government and military targets. In January 1998, the Temple of the Tooth, an important religious and tourist site in Kandy, was subjected to a truck bomb; eight people were killed, and the temple, nearby businesses and an historic hotel were damaged. Small bombs have frequently been placed against infrastructure targets such as telephone switchgear or electrical power transformers. Public buses have also been the targets of terrorist attacks. In September 1999, bombs were detonated in buses in separate incidents in Negombo and Badula. In one week in February 2000, seven separate explosions of bombs left on public buses in Colombo and other cities killed three and wounded over 140 people. Bombs have also been found on trains and on train roadbeds, resulting in one death and injuries to over 50 people. In May 2000, the Sri Lankan Government activated provisions of the Public Security Ordinance, giving certain government authorities sweeping powers to deal with threats to national security.

The next month the LTTE gained a significant victory in taking the Elephant pass army garrison, located in a town on the Jaffna Peninsula. In February 2002 the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government signed a ceasefire agreement brokered by Norway. As of June 2003 the agreement appears to be dissolving. The LTTE claims the government has done little to address rebel concerns and deliver on the promises made during the six rounds of peace talks. The LTTE wanted to draft an independent Tamil administration, while the Sri Lankan government was willing to go only as far as granting financial autonomy. The impasse came as involved parties planned to meet in Tokyo for a Sri Lankan financial aid conference. The LTTE planned boycott the event. There were approximately 10,000 armed combatants in Sri Lanka; about 3,000 to 6,000 form a trained cadre of fighters. The LTTE also had a significant overseas support structure for fundraising, weapons procurement, and propaganda. They controlled most of the northern and eastern coastal areas of Sri Lanka and has conducted operations throughout the island. Headquartered in the Jaffna peninsula, LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran has established an extensive network of checkpoints and informants to keep track of any outsiders who enter the group's area of control. The LTTE's overt organizations support Tamil separatism by lobbying foreign governments and the United Nations. Also uses its international contacts to procure weapons, communications, and bomb making equipment. Exploits large Tamil communities in North America, Europe, and Asia to obtain funds and supplies for its fighters in Sri Lanka. Some Tamil communities in Europe also are involved in narcotics smuggling.

In August 2009, the civil war ended with total victory for the government forces. During last phase of the war many Tamil civilians and combatants were killed. The government estimated that over 22,000 LTTE cadres had died. The civilian death toll is estimated to vary from 6,500 to as high as 40,000. This is in addition to the 70,000 Sri Lankans killed up to the beginning of the last phase of the civil war. Over 300,000 internally displaced Tamil civilians were interred in special camps and eventually released. As of 2011, there were still few thousand alleged combatants in state prisons awaiting trials.

Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF)
Extremist terrorist group formed in 1996 as a splinter of the mainstream loyalist Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). Seeks to subvert a political settlement with Irish nationalists in Northern Ireland by attacking Catholic politicians, civilians, and Protestant politicians who endorse the Northern Ireland peace process. Composed of hardliners formerly associated with the UVF. Mark "Swinger" Fulton now leads the LVF following the assassination in December 1997 of LVF founder Billy"King Rat" Wright. Announced a unilateral cease-fire on 15 May and, in a move unprecedented among Ulster terrorist groups, decommissioned a small but significant amount of weapons on 18 December 1998. LVF bombs often have contained Powergel commercial explosives, typical of many loyalist groups. LVF attacks have been particularly vicious: LVF terrorists killed an 18-year old Catholic girl in July 1997 because she had a Protestant boyfriend. Murdered numerous Catholic civilians with no political or terrorist affiliations following Billy Wright's assassination. Also has conducted successful attacks against Irish targets in Irish border towns. British press speculates about 500 activists in Northern Ireland, Ireland.

Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO)
a.k.a. The National Liberation Army of Iran (NLA, the militant wing of the MEK), the People's Mujahidin of Iran (PMOI), National Council of Resistance (NCR), Muslim Iranian Student's Society (front organization used to garner financial support). Formed in the 1960s by the college-educated children of Iranian merchants, the MEK sought to counter what it perceived as excessive Western influence in the Shah's regime. Following a philosophy that mixes Marxism and Islam, has developed into the largest and most active armed Iranian dissident group. Its history is studded with anti-Western activity, and, most recently, attacks on the interests of the clerical regime in Iran and abroad.

Worldwide campaign against the Iranian Government stresses propaganda and occasionally uses terrorist violence. During the 1970s the MEK staged terrorist attacks inside Iran and killed several US military personnel and civilians working on defense projects in Tehran. Supported the takeover in 1979 of the US Embassy in Tehran. In April 1992 conducted attacks on Iranian embassies in 13 different countries, demonstrating the group's ability to mount large-scale operations overseas. Recent attacks in Iran include three explosions in Tehran in June 1998 that killed three persons and the assassination of Asadollah Lajevardi, the former director of the Evin Prison. Several thousand fighters based in Iraq with an extensive overseas support structure. Most of the fighters are organized in the MEK's National Liberation Army (NLA). In the 1980s the MEK's leaders were forced by Iranian security forces to flee to France. Most resettled in Iraq by 1987. In the mid-1980s did not mount terrorist operations in Iran at a level similar to its  in the 1970s. In recent years has claimed credit for a number of operations in Iran. Beyond support from Iraq, the MEK uses front organizations to solicit contributions from expatriate Iranian communities.

The group claims to have renounced violence in 2001 and today it is the main component organization of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), an "umbrella coalition" calling itself the "parliament-in-exile dedicated to a democratic, secular and coalition government in Iran. The group has had thousands of its members for many years in bases in Iraq, but according to the British Broadcasting Corporation "they were disarmed in the wake of the US-led invasion and are said to have adhered to a ceasefire." In a writ on 1 June 2012, the US Federal Court of Appeal in Washington asked the US Secretary of State to review the FTO designation of the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) within four months after this issuance of this writ adding "Should the Secretary fail to take action within the four-month period, the petition for writ of mandamus setting aside the FTO designation will be granted".Court's order to State Department on PMOI (court's order) The United States, Canada, Iraq and Iran have designated the MEK a terrorist organization. On January 26, 2009, following what the group called a “seven-year-long legal and political battle”, the Council of the European Union removed the MEK from the EU list of organisations it designates as terrorist. The MEK and the NCRI claim to have provided the United States with intelligence on Iran's nuclear program in 2002 and 2008. On September 6, 2011, the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MEK) elected Zohreh Akhyani as its new Secretary General for a two-year term.

 

National Liberation Army (ELN)
Pro-Cuban, anti-US guerrilla group formed in January 1965. Primarily rural based, although has several urban fronts, particularly in the Magdalena Medio region. Entered peace talks with Colombian Civil Society in mid-1998 and was preparing to participate in a national convention in early 1999. Conducted weekly assaults on oil infrastructure (typically pipeline bombings) and has inflicted massive oil spills. Extortion and bombings against US and other foreign businesses, especially the petroleum industry. Annually conducts several hundred kidnappings for profit, including foreign employees of large corporations. Forces coca and opium poppy cultivators to pay protection money and attacks government efforts to eradicate these crops. Approximately 3,000-5,000 armed combatants and an unknown number of active supporters. Operate in
Colombia, border regions of Venezuela.

New People's Army (NPA)
The guerrilla arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), NPA is an avowedly Maoist group formed in December 1969 with the aim of overthrowing the government through protracted guerrilla warfare. Although primarily a rural-based guerrilla group, the NPA has an active urban infrastructure to conduct terrorism and uses city-based assassination squads called sparrow units. Derives most of its funding from contributions of supporters and so-called revolutionary taxes extorted from local businesses. Has suffered setbacks since the late 1980s because of splits within the CPP, lack of money, and successful government operations. The NPA primarily targets Philippine security forces, corrupt politicians, and drug traffickers. Opposes any US military presence in the Philippines and attacked US military interests before the US base closures in 1992. Estimated between 6000 to 8000 members and operates in rural Luzon, Visayas, and parts of Mindanao. Has cells in Manila and other metropolitan centres.

Qibla and People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD)
Qibla is a small radical Islamic group led by Achmad Cassiem, who was inspired by Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini. Cassiem founded Qibla in the 1980s, seeking to establish an Islamic state in South Africa. PAGAD began in 1996 as a community anticrime group fighting drug lords in Cape Town's Cape Flats section. PAGAD now shares Qibla's anti-Western stance as well as some members and leadership. Though distinct, the media often treat the two groups as one. Qibla routinely protests US policies toward the Muslim world and uses radio station 786 to promote its message and mobilze Muslims. PAGAD is suspected of conducting 170 bombings and 18 other violent actions in 1998 alone. Qibla and PAGAD may have masterminded the bombing on 15 August of the Cape Town Planet Hollywood. Often use the front names Muslims Against Global Oppression (MAGO) and Muslims Against Illegitimate Leaders (MAIL) when anti-Western campaigns are launched. Qibla is estimated at 250 members. Police estimate there are at least 50 gunmen in PAGAD, and the size of PAGAD-organized demonstrations suggests it has considerably more adherents than Qibla. Operate mainly in the CapeTown area, South Africa's foremost tourist venue.

Real IRA (RIRA)
a.k.a True IRA. Formed in February-March 1998 as clandestine armed wing of the 32-County Sovereignty Movement, a "political pressure group" dedicated to removing British forces from Northern Ireland and unifying Ireland. The 32-County Sovereignty Movement opposed Sinn Fein's adoption in September 1997 of the Mitchell principles of democracy and nonviolence and opposed the amendment in May 1998 of Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution, which lay claim to Northern Ireland. Former IRA "quartermaster general" Mickey McKevitt leads the group; Bernadette Sands-McKevitt, his common-law wife, is the vice-chair of the 32-County Sovereignty Movement. Bombings, assassinations, and robberies. Most Real IRA activists are former IRA members; the group has inherited a wealth of experience in terrorist tactics and bombmaking. Targets include British military and police in Northern Ireland and Northern Irish Protestant communities. Claimed responsibility for the car bomb attack in Omagh, Northern Ireland on 15 August, which killed 29 and injured 220 persons. Announced a cease-fire after that bombing. Has attempted several unsuccessful bomb attacks on the UK mainland. About 70 members, plus limited support from IRA hardliners dissatisfied with the current IRA cease-fire and other republican sympathizers. Operates in Northern Ireland, Ireland, Great Britain. Suspected of receiving funds from sympathizers in the United States. Press reports claim Real IRA leaders also have sought support from Libya.

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
The largest, best-trained, and best-equipped insurgent organization in Colombia. Established in 1964 as a rural-based, pro-Soviet guerrilla army. Organized along military lines and includes several urban fronts. Has been anti-United States since its inception. The FARC agreed in 1998 to enter into preliminary peace talks with the Colombian Government. The Pastrana administration demilitarized five large rural municipalities to meet FARC conditions for peace talks. (President Pastrana traveled to this area on 7 January 1999 to inaugurate peace talks with guerrilla leaders, although the FARC's senior-most leader failed to attend). Armed attacks against Colombian political, economic, military, and police targets. Many members pursue criminal , carrying out hundreds of kidnappings for profit annually. Foreign citizens often are targets of FARC kidnappings. Group has well-documented ties to narcotics traffickers, principally through the provision of armed protection for coca and poppy cultivation and narcotics production facilities, as well as through attacks on government narcotics eradication efforts. Also began in 1998 a bombing campaign against oil pipelines. Approximately 8,000-12,000 armed combatants and an unknown number of supporters, mostly in rural areas. Operate in
Colombia, with occasional operations in border areas of Venezuela, Panama, Peru, Brazil, and Ecuador.

Revolutionary Organization 17 November
Radical leftist group established in 1975 and named for the student uprising in Greece in November 1973 that protested the military regime. Anti-Greek establishment, anti-US, anti-Turkey, anti-NATO, and committed to the ouster of US bases, removal of Turkish military presence from Cyprus, and severing of Greece's ties to NATO and the European Union (EU). Possibly affiliated with other Greek terrorist groups. Initial attacks were assassinations of senior US officials and Greek public figures. Added bombings in 1980s. Since 1990 has expanded targets to include EU facilities and foreign firms investing in Greece and has added improvised rocket attacks to its methods. Operate in Athens, Greece. Believed to have been disbanded in 2002 after the arrest and trial of a number of its members.

Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front
a.k.a. Devrimci Sol (Revolutionary Left), Dev Sol. Originally formed in 1978 as Devrimci Sol, or Dev Sol, a splinter faction of the Turkish People's Liberation Party/Front. Renamed in 1994 after factional infighting, it espouses a Marxist ideology and is virulently anti-US and anti-NATO. Finances its  chiefly through armed robberies and extortion.
Since the late 1980s has concentrated attacks against current and retired Turkish security and military officials. Began a new campaign against foreign interests in 1990. Assassinated two US military contractors and wounded a US Air Force officer to protest the Gulf war. Launched rockets at US Consulate in Istanbul in 1992. Assassinated prominent Turkish businessman in early 1996, its first significant terrorist act as DHKP/C.
Conducts attacks in Turkey--primarily in Istanbul--Ankara, Izmir, and Adana. Raises funds in Western Europe.

Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA)
Extreme leftist group that developed from opposition to the military junta that ruled Greece from 1967 to 1974. Formed in 1971, ELA is a self-described revolutionary, anti-capitalist, and anti-imperialist group that has declared its opposition to "imperialist domination, exploitation, and oppression." Strongly anti-US and seeks the removal of US military forces from Greece. Since 1974 has conducted bombings against Greek Government and economic targets as well as US military and business facilities. In 1986 stepped up attacks on Greek Government and commercial interests. Raid on a safehouse in 1990 revealed a weapons cache and direct contacts with other Greek terrorist groups, including 1 May and Revolutionary Solidarity. In 1991, ELA and 1 May claimed joint responsibility for over 20 bombings. Greek police believe they have established a link between the ELA and the Revolutionary Organization 17 November. Has not claimed responsibility for a terrorist attack since January 1995.
 

Sikh Terrorism
Sikh terrorism is sponsored by expatriate and Indian Sikh groups who want to carve out an independent Sikh state called Khalistan (Land of the Pure) from Indian territory. Active groups include Babbar Khalsa, International Sikh Youth Federation, Dal Khalsa, Bhinderanwala Tiger Force. A previously unknown group, the Saheed Khalsa Force, claimed credit for the marketplace bombings in New Delhi in 1997. Attacks in India are mounted against Indian officials and facilities, other Sikhs, and Hindus; they include assassinations, bombings, and kidnappings. Attacks have dropped markedly since 1992, as Indian security forces have killed or captured numerous senior Sikh militant leaders and have conducted successful army, paramilitary, and police operations. Many low-intensity bombings that might be attributable to Sikh extremists now occur without claims of credit. Operate in Northern India, western Europe, Southeast Asia, and North America. Militant cells are active internationally and extremists gather funds from overseas Sikh communities. Sikh expatriates have formed a variety of international organizations that lobby for the Sikh cause overseas. Most prominent are the World Sikh Organization and the International Sikh Youth Federation.

Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path, SL)
Larger of Peru's two insurgencies, SL is among the world's most ruthless guerrilla organizations. Formed in the late 1960s by then university professor Abimael Guzman. Stated goal is to destroy existing Peruvian institutions and replace them with peasant revolutionary regime. Also wants to rid Peru of foreign influences. Guzman's capture in September 1992 was a major blow, as were arrests of other SL leaders in 1995, defections, and Peruvian President Fujimori's amnesty program for repentant terrorists. Has engaged in particularly brutal forms of terrorism, including the indiscriminate use of bombs. Conducted fewer attacks in 1998, generally limited to rural areas. Almost every institution in Peru has been a target of SL violence. Has bombed diplomatic missions of several countries in Peru, including the US Embassy. Conducts bombing campaigns and selective assassinations. Has attacked US businesses since its inception. Involved in cocaine trade. Approximately 1,500 to 2,500 armed militants; larger number of supporters, mostly in rural areas. Rural based, with few violent attacks in the capital.

Zviadists
Extremist supporters of deceased former Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia. Following Gamsakhurdia's ouster in 1991, his supporters launched a revolt against his successor, Eduard Shevardnadze. Suppressed in late 1993, and Gamsakhurdia committed suicide in January 1994. Some Gamsakhurdia sympathizers have formed a weak legal opposition in Georgia, but others remain violently opposed to Shevardnadze's rule and seek to overthrow him. Some Gamsakhurdia government officials fled to Russia following Gamsakhurdia's ouster and now use Russia as a base of operations to bankroll anti-Shevardnadze.
Bombings and kidnappings. Attempted two assassinations against Shevardnadze in August 1995 and February 1998. Took UN personnel hostage following the February 1998 attempt, but released the hostages unharmed. May have received support and training in Chechen terrorist training camps. Chechen mercenaries participated in the assassination attempt against Shevardnadze in February 1998.
 

The Underworld and Terrorism Sourcebook