National Intelligence Council |
The National Intelligence
Council (NIC) is best known as the organization that produces National
Intelligence Estimates, which are intelligence community-wide forecasts of
issues and challenges facing the security of the United States. The NIC
reports to the Director of Central Intelligence in his capacity as head of
the intelligence community. In an attempt to engage creative thinking from
outside the intelligence community's classified bunker the NIC has
increasingly participated in joint sponsorship of conferences with
non-governmental institutions and has produced a number of unclassified
publications. |
Central Intelligence Agency |
The United States has
carried on foreign intelligence activities since the days of George
Washington, but only since World War II have they been coordinated on a
government wide basis. Even before Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt was concerned about American intelligence deficiencies. He asked
New York lawyer William J. Donovan to draft a plan for an intelligence
service. The Office of Strategic Services was established in June 1942 with
a mandate to collect and analyze strategic information required by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and to conduct special operations not assigned to other
agencies. During the War, the OSS supplied policy makers with essential
facts and intelligence estimates and often played an important role in
directly aiding military campaigns. But the OSS never received complete
jurisdiction over all foreign intelligence activities. Since the early 1930s
the FBI had been responsible for intelligence work in Latin America, and the
military services protected their areas of responsibility.
In October 1945, the OSS was abolished and
its functions transferred to the State and War Departments. But the need for
a postwar centralized intelligence system was clearly recognized. Eleven
months earlier, Donovan, by then a major general, had submitted to President
Roosevelt a proposal calling for the separation of OSS from the Joint Chiefs
of Staff with the new organization having direct Presidential supervision.
Donovan proposed an "organization which will procure intelligence both by
overt and covert methods and will at the same time provide intelligence
guidance, determine national intelligence objectives, and correlate the
intelligence material collected by all government agencies." Under his plan,
a powerful, centralized civilian agency would have coordinated all the
intelligence services. He also proposed that this agency have authority to
conduct "subversive operations abroad," but "no police or law enforcement
functions, either at home or abroad."
Donovan's plan drew heavy fire. The military
services generally opposed a complete merger. The State Department thought
it should supervise all peacetime operations affecting foreign relations.
The FBI supported a system whereby military intelligence worldwide would be
handled by the armed services, and all civilian activities would be under
FBI's own jurisdiction. In response to this policy debate, President Harry
S. Truman established the Central Intelligence Group in January 1946,
directing it to coordinate existing departmental intelligence, supplementing
but not supplanting their services. This was all to be done under the
direction of a National Intelligence Authority composed of a Presidential
representative and the Secretaries of State, War and Navy. Rear Admiral
Sidney W. Souers, USNR, who was the Deputy Chief of Naval Intelligence, was
appointed the first Director of Central Intelligence. Twenty months later,
the National Intelligence Authority and its operating component, the Central
Intelligence Group, were disestablished. Under the provisions of the
National Security Act of 1947 (which became effective on 18 September 1947)
the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency were
established. Most of the National Security Act's specific assignments given
the CIA as well as the prohibitions on police and internal security
functions, closely follow both the original 1944 Donovan plan and the
Presidential directive creating the Central Intelligence Group. The 1947 Act
charged the CIA with coordinating the nation's intelligence activities and
correlating, evaluating and disseminating intelligence which affects
national security. In addition, the Agency was to perform such other duties
and functions related to intelligence as the NSC might direct. The Act also
made the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) responsible for protecting
intelligence sources and methods.
In 1949, the Central Intelligence Agency Act was passed supplementing the
1947 Act by permitting the Agency to use confidential fiscal and
administrative procedures and exempting CIA from many of the usual
limitations on the expenditure of federal funds. It provided that CIA funds
could be included in the budgets of other departments and then transferred
to the Agency without regard to the restrictions placed on the initial
appropriation. This Act is the statutory authority for the secrecy of the
Agency's budget. In order to protect intelligence sources and methods from
disclosure, the 1949 Act further exempted the CIA from having to disclose
its "organization, functions, names? Officials, titles, salaries, or numbers
of personnel employed."
The office of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) evolved
gradually. Until 1953, Deputy Directors were appointed by the Director, and
it was General Walter Bedell Smith, the fourth DCI, who established the
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence in the role he has since played in
CIA. Congress recognized the importance of the position in April 1953 by
amending the National Security Act of 1947 to provide for the appointment of
the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate. This amendment also provided that commissioned
officers of the armed forces, whether active or retired, could not occupy
both DCI and DDCI positions at the same time. The DDCI assists the Director
by performing such functions as the DCI assigns or delegates. He acts for
and exercises the powers of the Director during his absence or disability,
or in the event of a vacancy in the position of the Director.
Under these Statutes, the Director serves as the principal adviser to the
President and the National Security Council on all matters of foreign
intelligence related to national security. CIA's responsibilities are
carried out subject to various directives and controls by the President and
the NSC.
Today the CIA reports regularly to the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, as
required by the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 and various Executive
Orders. The Agency also reports regularly to the Defense Subcommittees of
the Appropriations Committees in both houses of Congress. Moreover, the
Agency provides substantive briefings to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Armed Services
Committees in both bodies as well as other Committees and individual
members.
CIA Organizational Development
The Central Intelligence Group was authorized in spring of 1946 to establish
an Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE). ORE's functions were manifold --
the production of national current intelligence, scientific, technical, and
economic intelligence as well as interagency coordination for national
estimates. With its own research and analysis capability, the CIG could
carry out an independent intelligence function without having to rely on the
other departments for data. The change made the CIG an intelligence
producer, while still assuming the continuation of its role as a coordinator
for estimates. Yet acquisition of a research and analysis role meant that
independent production would outstrip coordinated intelligence as a primary
mission. Fundamentally, it would be far easier to assimilate and analyze
data than it had been or would be to engage the Departments in producing
"coordinated" analysis. The same 1946 directive which provided the CIG with
an independent research and analysis capability also granted the CIG a
clandestine collection capability.
The passage of the National Security Act in July 1947 legislated the changes
in the Executive branch that had been under discussion since 1945. The Act
established an independent Air Force, provided for coordination by a
committee of service chiefs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and a
Secretary of Defense, and created the National Security Council (NSC). The
CIG became an independent department and was renamed the Central
Intelligence Agency.
Under the Act, the CIA's mission was only loosely defined, since efforts to
thrash out the CIA's duties in specific terms would have contributed to the
tension surrounding the unification of the services. The four general tasks
assigned to the Agency were to advise the NSC on matters related to national
security; to make recommendations to the NSC regarding the coordination of
intelligence activities of the Departments; to correlate and evaluate
intelligence and provide for its appropriate dissemination and "to perform
such other functions ... as the NSC will from time to time direct...."
The Act did not alter the functions of the CIG. Clandestine collection,
overt collection, production of national current intelligence and
interagency coordination for national estimates continued, and the personnel
and internal structure remained the same. The Act affirmed the CIA's role in
coordinating the intelligence activities of the State Department and the
military-determining which activities would most appropriately and most
efficiently be conducted by which Departments to avoid duplication.
In 1947 the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) was created to serve as a
coordinating body in establishing intelligence requirements 2 among the
Departments. Chaired by the DCI, the Committee included representatives from
the Departments of State, Army, Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Stag, and the
Atomic Energy Commission. Although the DCI was to establish priorities for
intelligence collection and analysis, he did not have the budgetary or
administrative authority to control the departmental components. Moreover,
no Department was willing to compromise what it perceived as-its own
intelligence needs to meet the collective needs of policy makers as defined
by the DCI.
As the CIA evolved between 1947 and 1950, it never fulfilled its estimates
function but continued to expand its independent intelligence production. In
July 1949 an internal study conducted by a senior ORE staff member stated
that ORE's emphasis in production had shifted "from the broad long-term type
of problem to a narrowly defined short-term type and from the predictive to
the non-predictive type." In 1949 ORE had eleven regular publications. Only
one of these addressed national intelligence questions and was published
with the concurrence or dissent of the other departments. Less than
one-tenth of ORE's products were serving the purpose for which the CIG and
the CIA had been created.
By the time Walter Bedell Smith became DCI in 1950, it was c]car that the
CIA's record on the production of national intelligence estimates had fallen
far short of expectation. ORE had become a directionless service
organization, attempting to answer requirements levied by all agencies
related to all manner of subjects -- politics, economics, science, and
technology. The wholesale growth had only confused ORE's mission and ]ed the
organization into attempting analysis in areas already adequately covered by
other departments.
Smith embarked on a program of reorganization. His most significant change
was the creation of the Office of National Estimates (ONE), whose sole
purpose was to produce National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs). There were
two components in ONE, a staff which drafted the estimates and a senior
body, known as the Board of National Estimates, which reviewed the
estimates, coordinated the judgments with other agencies, and negotiated
over their final form.
Smith also attempted to redefine the DCI's position in relation to the
departmental intelligence components. From 1947 to 1950 the DCIs had
functioned at the mercy of the Departments rather than exercising direction
over them. By formally stating his position as the senior member of the
Intelligence Advisory Committee, Smith tried to assume a degree of
administrative control over departmental activities. Nonetheless, the
obstacles remained, and personal influence, rather than recognized
authority, determined the effectiveness of Smith and his successors in
interdepartmental relationships.
In January 1952, CIA's intelligence functions were grouped under the
Directorate for Intelligence (DDI), ORE was dissolved and its personnel were
reassigned. In addition to ONE, the DDI's intelligence production components
included: the Office of Research and Reports (ORE), which handled economic
and geographic intelligence; the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI),
which engaged in basic scientific research; and the Office of Current
Intelligence (OCI), which provided current political research. Collection of
overt information was the responsibility of the Office of Operations (NO).
The Office of Collection and Dissemination (OCD) engaged in the
dissemination of intelligence as well as storage and retrieval of
unevaluated intelligence.
The immediate pressures for information generated by the Korean War resulted
in continued escalation in size and intelligence production. Government-wide
demands for the Agency to provide information on Communist intentions in the
Far East and around the world justified the increases. By the end of 1953
DDI personnel numbered 3,338. Despite the sweeping changes, the fundamental
problem of duplication among the Agency and the Departments remained. DDI's
major effort was independent intelligence production rather than coordinated
national estimates.
The establishment of the office of National Intelligence Programs Evaluation
(NIPE) in 1963 was the first major effort by a DCI to insure consistent
contact and coordination with the community. Yet, from the outset DCI McCone
accepted the limitations on his authority; although Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara agreed to provide him with access to the Defense Department
budget (which still constitutes 80 percent of the intelligence community's
overall budget), McCone could not direct or control the intelligence
components of the other departments. The NIPE staff directed most of its
attention to sorting out intelligence requirements through USIB and
attempting to develop a national inventory for the community, including
budget, personnel and materials. Remarkably, this had never before been
done.
The most pressing problem for the community was the adjustment to the impact
of technical collection capabilities. The large budgetary resources
involved, and the value of the data generated by overhead reconnaissance
systems precipitated a major bureaucratic battle over their administration
and control. From 1963 to 1965, much of McCone's and the senior NIPE staff
officer's community efforts were directed toward working out an agreement
with the Air Force on development, production, and deployment of overhead
reconnaissance systems.
Internally, the Agency was also adjusting to the impact of technical and
scientific advances. In 1963, the Directorate for Science and Technology
(DDS&T) was created. Previously, scientific and technical intelligence
production had been scattered among the other three directorates. The
process of organizing an independent directorate meant wresting personnel
and resources from the existing components. Predictably, the resistance was
considerable, and a year and a half passed between the first attempts at
creating the Directorate and its actual establishment.
The new component included the Office of Scientific Intelligence and the
office of ELINT (electronic intercepts) from DDI, the Data Processing Staff
from DDA, the Development Projects Division (responsible for overhead
reconnaissance) from the DDP, and a newly created Office of Research and
Development. Later, the Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center was added.
The Directorate's specific functions included, and continue to include,
research, development, operation, data collection, analysis, and
contributions to National Intelligence Estimates. The Directorate was
organized on the premise that close cooperation should exist between
research and application on the one hand, and technical collection and
analysis all the other. This close coordination along with the staffing anti
career patterns in the Directorate have contributed to the continuing
vitality and quality of the DDS&T's work.
The DDP began and remained a closed, self-contained component; the DDI
evolved into a closed, self-contained component. However, the DDS&T was
created with the assumption that it would continue to rely on expertise and
advice from outside the Agency. A number of arrangements insured constant
interchanges between the Directorate and the scientific and industrial
communities. First, since all research and development for technical systems
was done through contracting, the DDS&T could draw on and benefit from the
most advanced technical systems nationwide. Second, to attract high-quality
professionals from the industrial and scientific communities, the
Directorate established a competitive salary scale. The result has been
personnel mobility between the DDS&T and private industry. It has not been
unusual for individuals to leave private industry, assume positions with
DDS&T for several years, then return to private industry. This pattern has
provided the Directorate with a constant infusion and renewal of talent.
Finally, the Directorate established the practice of regularly employing
advisory groups as well as fostering DDS&T staff participation in
conferences and seminars sponsored by professional associations.
Current methods of intelligence collection generally fall into one of two
major categories: they are either manpower- or hardware-intensive. As its
name indicates, human-source intelligence or HUMINT requires a considerable
investment in people to obtain the desired results. In contrast, the
satellites and other sophisticated hardware systems that yield enormous
amounts of data are themselves extremely costly to develop and operate. Two
of the CIA's four directorates engage in collection:
Directorate of Operations (DO)
The Directorate of Operations (DO), headed by the Deputy Director for
Operations (DUO), has primary responsibility for the clandestine collection
of foreign intelligence, including HUMINT. Domestically, the DDO is
responsible for the overt collection of foreign intelligence volunteered by
individuals and organizations in the United States, and in some cases, data
on foreign activities collected by other US Government agencies. Since 1992,
the DDO has been assisted by an Associate Deputy Director for Military
Affairs (ADDO/MA), who facilitates Agency cooperation with the military. The
DO is divided administratively into area divisions, as are the State
Department and CIA's Directorate of Intelligence, with the addition of a
domestic collection division, two topical centers, one tasking center, and
one defector resettlement center. Several staffs deal with issues specific
to the work of the DO.
Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T)
Directorate of Science and Technology headed by the Deputy Director for
Science and Technology provides support to CIA and the Intelligence
Community (IC) in the collection, processing, and exploitation of
intelligence from all sources - imagery, HUMINT, open source, signals
intelligence (SIGINT), and other forms of intelligence data collected by
clandestine technical means. The support includes research, development,
acquisition, and operations of the technical capabilities and systems. For
open source and imagery exploitation, the DS&T serves as a service of common
concern for the IC through, respectively, its Foreign Broadcast Information
Service (FBIS) and National Photographic Interpretation Centre. For HUMINT,
the DS&T components provide a wide range of technical support, including
agent communication. The National Photographic Interpretation Centre is also
managed within the DS&T. NPIC is a joint CIA/Defence Department centre, and
its product is disseminated to its parent agencies, which, in turn,
incorporate it into all-source intelligence reports. NPIC also produces
imagery interpretation reports, briefing boards, videotapes for
national-level consumers, and provides support for the military.
Directorate of Intelligence
The CIA produces a wide variety of finished intelligence. Its substantive
scope is worldwide. It covers functional as well as regional issues, and its
products range from quick-reaction, informal oral briefings to complex,
long-term research studies that may take months or years to complete.
Virtually all of CIA's finished intelligence is designed to support
national-level policy deliberations. The Directorate of Intelligence (DI),
headed by the Deputy Director for Intelligence, produces the bulk of CIA's
finished intelligence products and is the executive agent for meeting CIA's
responsibility to produce national-level current intelligence. Since 1981,
the Directorate's analysis of regional and country-specific topics has been
performed in five regional offices. Each of these offices generates
multi-disciplinary studies encompassing military, economic, political, and
other factors and produces the full range of finished intelligence. These
offices structured largely to mirror the way their policy maker consumers
are organized in the State Department, Defence Department, NSC Staff, and
other departments - are:
Office of African and Latin American Analysis
Office of East Asian Analysis
Office of European Analysis
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis
Office of Slavic and Eurasian Analysis
The Directorate also has four offices that are worldwide in responsibility
but focus on particular issues or kinds of analysis:
The Office of Resources, Trade and Technology (RTT) has the broadest
responsibility, covering such translational issues as sanctions monitoring,
economic negotiations support, foreign efforts to unfairly aid business,
questionable foreign financial practices, international arms market trends,
defence industry strategies, energy and resource analysis, geographic and
demographic issues, and environmental trends and civil technology
challenges-from both a technical and policy perspective.
The Office of Scientific and Weapons Research (OSWR) produces assessments of
foreign developments in science, technology, and weapons. Major issues
currently addressed by OSWR include: the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, nuclear security and safety, technology surprise, and the
proliferation of advanced conventional weaponry.
The Office of Leadership Analysis (LDA) integrates the work of biographic,
psychological, and medical specialists to provide comprehensive assessments
of the major leaders, groups, and institutions of foreign countries that
exercise formal or informal power.
The Office of Imagery Analysis (OIA) which, effective I October 1993, is
managed and staffed on behalf of the Directorate by the National
Photographic Interpretation Centre - provides analyses on the full range of
substantive intelligence topics worldwide and develops and applies
methodologies used to maximize the utility of current and future imaging
systems.
Two offices in the Directorate provide support to Directorate analysis and
to other agencies:
The Office of Information Resources (OIR) provides all-source library and
reference services within CIA and retrieves CIA documents for the IC. It
supports Directorate of Intelligence information systems and is developing
an electronic open-source delivery system with connectivity to the IC. OIR
also develops methodologies to support quantitative research and analysis.
The Office of Current Production and Analytic Support (CPAS) publishes
national-level current intelligence, fulfills the CIA's warning and alert
functions via its Operations Center, coordinates foreign intelligence
liaison activities, and supports CIA's finished intelligence production with
cartographic, design, and editorial expertise.
In May 1992, the DCI's Nonproliferation Center (NPC) was established as the
focal point for all IC activities related to nonproliferation. The NPC,
structurally located in the Directorate of Intelligence, develops and
updates strategic plans, provides assessments, manages operations, and
enhances collection efforts in order to provide the policy maker with a
coordinated view on nonproliferation issues for decision making. |
NSA |
NSA is the nation's crypto
logic organization, tasked with making and breaking codes and ciphers. In
addition, NSA is one of the most important centres of foreign language
analysis and research and development within the government. NSA is a
high-technology organization, working on the very frontiers of
communications and data processing. The expertise and knowledge it develops
provide the government with systems that deny foreign powers knowledge of US
capabilities and intentions. The
National Security Agency (NSA) is charged with two of the most important and
sensitive activities in the US intelligence community. The information
systems security or INFOSEC mission provides leadership, products, and
services to protect classified and unclassified national security systems
against exploitation through interception, unauthorized access, or related
technical intelligence threats. This mission also supports the Director,
NSA, in fulfilling responsibilities as Executive Agent for interagency
operations security training.
The foreign signals intelligence or SIGINT
mission allows for an effective, unified organization and consists of all
the foreign signals collection and processing activities of the United
States. NSA is authorized to produce SIGINT in accordance with objectives,
requirements and priorities established by the Director of Central
Intelligence with the advice of the National Foreign Intelligence Board.
Although code making and breaking are ancient
practices, modern cryptologic communications intelligence activities in the
United States date from the World War I period and radio communications
technology. In 1917 and 1918 the US Army created, within the Military
Intelligence Division, the Cipher Bureau (MI-8) under Herbert O. Yardley.
MID assisted the radio intelligence units in the American Expeditionary
Forces and in 1918 created the Radio Intelligence Service for operations
along the Mexican border. The Navy had established a modest effort, but it
was absorbed, by mutual agreement in 1918, into Yardley's post-war civilian
"Black Chamber."
The Army (and State Department) continued to support Yardley until the
termination of his "Black Chamber" in 1929. Army continuity was assumed,
however, in the small Signal Intelligence Service of the Army Signal Corps
under the direction of William F. Friedman. The Navy's cryptanalytic
function reappeared formally in 1924 in the "Research Desk" under Commander
Laurance F. Safford in the Code and Signal Section, OP-20-G, within the
Office of Naval Communications. While emphasis was on the security of US
military communications (COMSEC), both organizations developed radio
intercept, radio direction finding, and processing capabilities prior to
World War II; they achieved particular successes against Japanese diplomatic
communications. Exploitation successes of their respective counterpart
service communications had to await the shift of resources until after
hostilities commenced. However, wartime successes by the United States and
Britain proved the value of COMINT to military and political leaders, and,
as a result, both service organizations expanded greatly in terms of
manpower resources and equipment.
In the latter stages of the war, the services created a coordinating body to
facilitate COMINT cooperation, the Army-Navy Communications Intelligence
Board (ANCIB) with a subordinate coordinating committee (ANCICC). These
became the instruments for negotiating joint post-war arrangements. In late
1945, with the addition of the Department of State to its membership, ANCIB
became the State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board (STANCIB).
STANCIB evolved in 1946 into the United States Communications Intelligence
Board (USCIB), which added the FBI as a member.
With the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, Congress reinforced
the direction in which the intelligence community was moving toward
increased centralization - and built the framework for a modern national
security structure. Among other things, the Act established the National
Security Council (NSC) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). CIA became
a member of USCIB, which received a new charter as the highest national
COMINT authority in the form of an NSC Intelligence Directive, NSCID No. 9,
dated 1 July 1948.
As the Air Force sought to expand its cryptologic organization, Secretary of
Defence James V. Forrestal contemplated cutting defence expenditures. One
solution was a unified cryptologic agency. He appointed a special board
under Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone , Director of Naval Communications, to
formulate a plan for merging all military COMINT and COMSEC activities and
resources into a single agency. Only the Army favoured the Stone Board's
recommendations for merger at this time, and the plan was shelved.
In 1949, a new Secretary of Defence, Louis A. Johnson, also seeking ways to
economize, reviewed the Stone Board's report and began to take steps for its
implementation. After much discussion among the services regarding the
concept of merger, on 20 May194 9 Secretary Johnson ordered the issuance of
JCS Directive 2010. This directive established the Armed Forces Security
Agency (AFSA), which had as its mission the conduct of communications
intelligence and communications security activities within the National
Military Establishment. AFSA thus had the actual responsibility for running
COMINT and COMSEC operations, excluding only those that were delegated
individually to the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The JCS directive also
established an advisory council within the AFSA structure. Known for a time
as the Armed Forces Communications Intelligence Advisory Council (AFCIAC),
it later was renamed Armed Forces Security Agency Council (AFSAC). The
organization became the mechanism through which AFSA reported to the JCS.
On 15 July 1949 RADM Stone became AFSA's first director, appointed by the
JCS. By January 1950 the Army and Navy cryptologic organizations had
transferred enough civilian and military personnel, as well as equipment, so
that AFSA could operate. AFSA did not however, have its own facilities.
Admiral Stone was succeeded in 1951 by Army Major General Ralph J. Canine.
By this time, various difficulties in defining powers and areas of
jurisdiction were painfully obvious. Further, both directors experienced
grave difficulties in obtaining the Advisory Council's approval of proposed
courses of action because of AFSAC's policy requiring unanimous decisions.
Finally, the potentialities of expanding technical COMINT capabilities of
the late 1940s could not always be realized. During the Korean War the
quality of strategic intelligence derived from COMINT fell below that which
had been provided in World War II. Consumers were disappointed and
increasingly critical. By late 1951, AFSA had clashed with the service
cryptologic agencies, with consumers, wit h CIA, and with the State
Department, although not all at one time nor with all on one issue. Despite
the intentions, AFSA had in fact become a fourth military cryptologic
agency.
On 13 December 1951 President Truman ordered a searching analysis to be
conducted by a special committee to be named by the Secretaries of State and
Defence, aided by the Director of Central Intelligence. Chaired by George
Brownell, an eminent New York lawyer, the Brownell Committee surveyed the
situation and in June recommended that a unified COMINT agency receive
greater powers commensurate with clearly defined responsibilities. It also
advised that the agency be freed of the crippling line of subordination
through AFSAC to the JCS and, instead, be directly subordinate to the
Secretary of Defence, acting with the Secretary of State on behalf of the
NSC. It further proposed that the unified agency be controlled in policy
matters by a reconstituted USCIB, under the chairmanship of the Director of
Central Intelligence, in which the representation of military and
nonmilitary intelligence interests would be evenly balanced.
In October 1952 the President and National Security Council adopted most of
the Brownell Committee's recommendations and issued a revised version of
NSCID No.9 on 24 October 1952.
A mingling of military and nonmilitary interests was expressed in the word
"national." The production of COMINT was declared to be a national
responsibility. In place of an Armed Forces Security Agency, the US
government was to have a National Security Agency, an organization with the
same resources plus a new charter. The AFSA Council, while not specifically
abolished, thus had the agency pulled out from under it. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff were no longer in the chain-of-command. The Director, NSA, report ed
to the Secretary of Defence through a unit in the latter's office that dealt
with sensitive operations. The Secretary himself was declared to be
executive agent of the government for COMINT and subordinate to a special
committee for the NSC, of which h e and the Secretary of State were the two
members and the Director of Central Intelligence was an advisor.
The Secretary of Defence was instructed to delegate his COMINT
responsibilities to the Director, NSA, and to entrust to him operational and
technical control of all US military COMINT collection and production
resources. The Director, NSA, was ordered to bring about the most effective,
unified application of all U. S. resources for producing national COMINT to
meet requirements approved by USCIB. In addition, the DIRNSA was ordered to
assume the COMSEC responsibilities previously assigned to AFSA. Promulgation
of NSCID No.9 brought about a greater participation by civilian members (CIA
and State) of the community in the COMINT process. At the same time it was
recognition of the necessity for more centralized technical operations. On 4
November 1952, Major General Ralph J. Canine, USA, became the first
Director, NSA.
Unlike the DIA, the National Security Agency (NSA) is a presidential
creation, established in response to a Top Secret directive issued by
President Truman in October 1952. In this directive. the President
designated the Secretary of Defence as Executive Agent for the signals
intelligence and communications security activities of the Government. A
specific National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) defines
NSA's functions. It is augmented by Director of Central Intelligence
Directives (DCIDs ) and internal Department of Defence and NSA regulations
NSA assumed the responsibilities of its predecessor, the Armed Forces
Security Agency (AFSA), which had been created after World War II to
integrate the national cryptologic effort. NSA was established as a separate
agency responsible directly to the Secretary of Defence. In addition, it was
granted SIGINT operational control over the three Service Cryptologic
(collection) Agencies (SCAs): the Army Security Agency, Naval Security Group
Command, and Air Force Security Service. Under this arrangement, NSA
encountered initially the same jurisdictional difficulties that were to
plague DIA.
In an effort to strengthen the influence of the Director of the National
Security Agency (DIRNSA) over their activities, the SCAs were confederated
in 1971 under a Central Security Service (CSS) with the DIRNSA as its chief.
The National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/ CSS) provides
centralized coordination, direction, and control of the Government's Signals
Intelligence (SIGINT) and Communications Security (COMSEC) activities. The
Central Security Service (CSS) was established by a Presidential memorandum
in order to provide a more unified cryptologic effort within the Department
of Defence. With the establishment of the CSS, NSA underwent a major
internal reorganization to become the institution it is today. As Chief,
CSS, the Director of NSA exercises control over the signals intelligence
activities of the military services. NSA, while not a military organization,
is one of several elements of the intelligence community administered by the
Department of Defence.
The Agency was charged with an additional mission, computer security, in a
1984 Presidential directive, and with an operations security training
mission in a 1988 Presidential directive. Like the Department of State and
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Security Agency has its own
civilian career service, established by Congress in 1959. To maintain this
career service, the agency conducts its own recruiting and employment
programs. From its beginning, NSA has been hiring promising college
graduates from all sections of the country - including the
Baltimore/Washington area - to augment its growing staff of professionals.
The Secretary of Defence approved the Plan for Restructuring Defence
Intelligence on 15 March 1991, and subsequently forwarded it to Congress.
The plan emphasized the centralization of management within the DOD for more
effectively dealing with the changing world situation. However the National
Security Agency was only peripherally affected by the plan, under which the
Office of the Secretary of Defence for Command, Control, Communications and
Intelligence does not exercise the same degree of control, direction and
authority over the National Security Agency as was instituted for the
Defence Intelligence Agency.
The SIGINT or foreign intelligence mission of NSA/CSS involves the
interception, processing, analysis, and dissemination of information derived
from foreign electrical communications and other signals. SIGINT itself is
composed of three elements: Communications Intelligence (COMINT),
Electronics Intelligence (ELINT), and Telemetry Intelligence (TELINT).
COMINT is intelligence information derived from the interception and
analysis of foreign communications. ELINT is technical and intelligence
information derived from electromagnetic radiations, such as radars. TELINT
is technical and intelligence information derived from the interception,
processing, and analysis of foreign telemetry.
The COMSEC mission protects United States telecommunications and certain
other communications from exploitation by foreign intelligence services and
from unauthorized disclosure. COMSEC systems are provided by NSA to 18
Government departments and agencies , including Defence, State, CIA, and
FBI. The predominant user, however, is the Department of Defence. COMSEC is
a mission separate from SIGINT, yet the dual SIGINT and COMSEC missions of
NSA/CSS do have a symbiotic relationship, and enhance the performance of the
other.
Initially, most SIGINT was collected by personnel of the Service Cryptologic
Agencies located around the world. The Director, NSA/Chief, CSS has
authority for SIGINT missions. NSA responds to requests by other members of
the intelligence community, such as CIA, DIA, and FBI, to provide "signals"
intelligence on topics of interest. An annual list of SIGINT requirements is
given to NSA and is intended to provide the NSA Director and the Secretary
of Defence with guidance for the coming year's activities. These
requirements are usually stated in terms of general areas of intelligence
interest, but are supplemented by "amplifying requirements," which are
time-sensitive and are expressed directly to NSA by the requesting agency.
NSA exercises discretion in responding to these requirements; it also
accepts requests from the executive branch agencies. NSA does not generate
its own requirements.
All requirements levied on NSA must be for foreign intelligence. Yet, the
precise definition of foreign intelligence is unclear. NSA limits its
collection of intelligence to foreign communications and confines its
activities to communications links having at least one foreign terminal.
Nevertheless, this is based upon an internal regulation and is not supported
by law or executive branch directive. Although NSA limits itself to
collecting communications with at least one foreign terminal, it may still
pick up communications between two Americans when international
communications are involved. Whenever NSA chooses particular circuits or
"links" known to carry foreign communications necessary for the production
of foreign intelligence, it collects all transmissions that go over those
circuits. Given current technology, the only grey for NSA to prevent the
processing of communications of US citizens would be to control the
selection, analysis, or dissemination phases of the process.
Communications intelligence has been an integral element of United States
intelligence activities. Foreign communications have been intercepted,
analysed, and decoded by the United States since the Revolutionary War.
During the 1930s elements of the Army and Navy collected and processed
foreign intelligence from radio transmissions. Much of their work involved
decryption, as well as enciphering United States transmissions. Throughout
World War II, their work contributed greatly to the national war effort
Since President Truman authorized NSA's establishment in 1952 to coordinate
United States cryptologic and communications activities, tremendous advances
have been made in the technology of communications intelligence. These
advances have contributed to add expansion in demands for a wider variety of
foreign intelligence and of requirements placed upon NSA/CSS SIGINT
personnel and resources. As new priorities arise in the requirements
process, greater demands will be placed upon NSA.
SIGINT is not finished intelligence, but NSA provides its specially
controlled SIGINT product directly to military commands worldwide and to
governmental consumers, as well as to producers of all-source intelligence.
NSA supports each NIO with a senior topical or regional specialist called a
Signals Intelligence NIO (SINIO). SINIOs and other representatives of the
Director, NSA, and the NSA Deputy Director for Operations are assigned to
facilitate the exchange of information and conduct liaison on operational
matters throughout the IC and with the consumers of SIGINT. The SIGINT
product is extremely sensitive and is normally handled in special channels
available to only specifically designated personnel.
The SIGINT Digest
This compilation is published Monday through Friday. Although not considered
finished intelligence, the Digest apprises readers of the most significant
developments of the day that were derived from SIGINT. The Digest is
distributed in hardcopy to Washington-area customers and electronically to
customers in the field .
Subject to the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence
Directive No. 6 (NSCID No. 6), and the National Security Act of 1947, as
amended, and pursuant to the authorities vested in the Secretary of Defence,
the National Security Agency is a separately organized agency within the
Department of Defence under the direction, supervision funding, maintenance
and operation of the Secretary of Defence.
The National Security Agency is a unified organization structured to provide
for the Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) mission of the United States and to
insure secure communications systems for all departments and agencies of the
US Government. The Central Security Service will conduct collection,
processing and other SIGINT operations as assigned.
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) is a category of intelligence information
comprising all Communications Intelligence (COMINT), Electronics
Intelligence (ELINT), and Telemetry Intelligence (TELINT).
COMINT is technical and intelligence information derived from foreign
communication by other than the intended recipients. COMINT is produced by
the collection and processing of foreign communications passed by
electromagnetic means, with specific exceptions stated below, and by the
processing of foreign encrypted communications, however transmitted.
Collection comprises search, intercept, and direction finding. Processing
comprises range estimation, transmitter/operator identification, signal
analysis, traffic analysis, cryptanalysts, decryption, study of plain text,
the fusion of these processes, and the reporting of results. COMINT does not
include: intercept and processing of unencrypted written communications,
except the processing of written plain t ext versions of communications
which have been encrypted or are intended for subsequent encryption.
Intercept and processing of press, propaganda and other public broadcasts,
except for processing encrypted or "hidden meaning" passages in such
broadcasts ; oral and wire interceptions conducted under DoD Directive
5200.24; or censorship.
ELINT is technical and intelligence information derived from foreign,
non-communications, electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than
atomic detonation or radioactive sources. ELINT is produced by the
collection (observation and recording), and t he processing for subsequent
intelligence purposes of that information.
TELINT is technical and intelligence information derived from the intercept,
processing, and analysis of foreign telemetry.
SIGINT operational control is the authoritative direction of SIGINT
activities, including tasking and allocation of effort, and the
authoritative prescription of those uniform techniques and standards by
which SIGINT information is collected, processed an d reported. SIGINT
resources comprise unit, activities and organizational elements engaged in
the conduct of SIGINT (COMINT, ELINT or TELINT) activities.
The National Security Agency consists of a Director, a Headquarters, and
such subordinate units, elements, facilities, and activities as are assigned
to the National Security Agency by the Secretary of Defence as the executive
agent of the Government for the conduct of SIGINT.
The NSA provides technical guidance to all SIGINT or SIGINT-related
operations of the Government. It formulates programs, plans, policies,
procedures and principles, and manages assigned SIGINT resources, personnel
and programs.
NSA produces and disseminates SIGINT in accordance with the objectives,
requirements and priorities established by the Director of Central
Intelligence. This function does not include the production and
dissemination of finished intelligence which are the e responsibilities of
departments and agencies other than the National Security Agency / Central
Security Service.)
In relation to the Department of Defence SIGINT activities, NSA prepares and
submits to the Secretary of Defence a consolidated program and budget, and
requirements for military and civilian manpower, logistic and communications
support, and research, development, test and evaluation, together with his
recommendations pertaining thereto. NSA conducts research, development and
systems design to meet the needs of the National Security Agency / Central
Security Service and coordinate with the departments an d agencies their
related research, development, test and evaluation in the SIGINT field. The
Agency determines and submits to the Secretary of Defence logistic support
requirements for the National Security Agency, and the Central Security
Service, together with specific recommendations as to what each of the
responsible departments and agencies of the Government should supply.
It also develops requisite security rules, regulations and standards
governing operating practices in accordance with the policies of the US
Intelligence Board and the US Communications Security Board. The Director
prescribes within the field of authorize d operations requisite security
regulations covering operating practices, including the transmission,
handling, and distribution of SIGINT material within and among the elements
under his control; and exercise the necessary monitoring and supervisory
control to ensure compliance with the regulations.
The Director makes reports and furnish information to the US Intelligence
Board or the US Communications Security Board, as required. The Director
also responds to the SIGINT requirements of all DoD components and other
departments and agencies, eliminate s unwarranted duplication of SIGINT
efforts, standardizes SIGINT equipment and facilities wherever practicable,
and provides for production and procurement of SIGINT equipments.
NSA provides the Director of Central Intelligence through the Secretary of
Defence with such information as required on the past, current and propose
plans, programs, and costs of the SIGINT activities under the Agency's
control. It also provides guidance to the military departments to effect and
insure sound and adequate military and civilian SIGINT career development
and training programs, and conduct, or otherwise provide for, necessary
specialized and advanced SIGINT training. The Agency provides technical
advice and support to enhance SIGINT arrangements with foreign governments,
and conduct, as authorized, SIGINT exchanges with foreign governments.
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
The Central Security Service is comprised of a Chief, Central Security
Service, a Deputy Chief, jointly staffed headquarters, Army, Navy/Marine
Corps and Air Force operating elements, and such other subordinate elements
and facilities as may be assigned t o the Central Security Service by the
Secretary of Defence.
The Director, National Security Agency, is also the Chief, Central Security
Service. The Director of the National Security Agency/Chief, Central
Security Service has a Deputy Director for the National Security Agency and
a Deputy Chief, Central Security Service. To provide continuity in SIGINT
matters, the Deputy Director, National Security Agency, is a technically
experienced civilian. The Deputy Chief, Central Security Service, is a
commissioned officer of the military Services, of not less than two star
rank, designated by the Secretary of Defence. The Deputy Chief is normally
not be selected from the same military Service as the Chief. The Director
and Deputy Director of the National Security Agency are designated by the
Secretary of Defence, subject to the approval of the President. The Director
is a commissioned officer of the military Services, on active or reactivated
status, and enjoys not less than three star rank during the period of his
incumbency.
The Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service
reports to the Secretary of Defence.
The Commanders of the Service cryptologic organizations and their
subordinate activities which conduct SIGINT operations are subordinate to
the Chief, Central Security Service, for all matters involving SIGINT
activities. In this role they are designated as Service element Commanders
and subordinate activities of the Central Security Service. The Service
cryptologic organizations will remain in their parent Services, for the
purpose of administrative and logistic support. The Secretary of Defence
with the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may specifically designate
other SIGINT related resources of the Department of Defence which will be
subordinate to the Chief, Central Security Service for SIGINT operations.
Subject to the direction, authority and control of the Secretary of Defence,
the Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service
accomplish the SIGINT mission of the National Security Agency/Central
Security Service. The Director acts a s principal SIGINT advisor to the
Secretary of Defence, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. As principal SIGINT advisor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the Director, National Security Agency keeps the Joint Chiefs of Staff fully
informed on SIGINT matters.
The Director exercises SIGINT operational control over SIGINT activities of
the US Government to respond most effectively to military and other SIGINT
requirements. In the case of mobile military SIGINT platforms, the Director
shall state movement requirements through appropriate channels to the
military commanders, which retain responsibility for operational command of
the vehicle.
Subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defence,
the Director, National Security Agency / Chief, Central Security Service, is
specifically delegated authority to exercise SIGINT operational control over
SIGINT activities of the United States, issue directives to any operating
elements such instructions and orders necessary to carry out his
responsibilities and functions, and have direct access to, and direct
communications with, any element of the US Government performing SIGINT
functions.
The NSA Director may adjust as required, through the Service cryptologic
organizations, personnel resources under SIGINT operational control, and
centralize or consolidate SIGINT operations for which he is responsible to
the extent desirable, consistent with efficiency, economy, effectiveness,
and support to field commanders. The Director submits, as appropriate,
concurrent letter of evaluation efficiency / fitness reports on the
commanders of subordinate elements of the Central Security Service in
accordance with parent Service procedures, and delegates SIGINT operational
tasking of specified SIGINT resources and facilities for such periods and
for such operational tasks as required or as directed by the Secretary of
Defence.
NSA prescribes SIGINT procedures for activities to whom he provides
technical guidance, and prescribe, reviews and approves security rules,
regulations and instructions. It conducts the SIGINT operations undertaken
in support of certain missions within the purview of NSCID No. 5, and
obtains such information and intelligence material from the departments and
agencies (military departments, other Department of Defence agencies, or
other departments or agencies of the Government) as may be necessary for the
performance of the National Security Agency / Central Security Service
functions.
In the performance of its responsibilities and functions, the National
Security Agency / Central Security Service coordinates actions, as
appropriate, with other DoD components, and other Departments and agencies
of the Government. The Agency maintains direct liaison, as appropriate, for
the exchange of information and advice in the field of its assigned
responsibility with other DoD components and other departments and agencies
of the Government. It provides for direct liaison by representatives of the
intelligence components of individual departments and agencies regarding
interpretation and amplification of requirements and priorities within the
framework of objectives, requirements, and priorities established by the
Director of Central Intelligence.
Other DoD components provide support, within their respective fields of
responsibility, to the Director, National Security Agency / Chief, Central
Security Service as may be necessary to carry out assigned responsibilities
and functions. The National Security Agency / Central Security Service will
be authorized such personnel, facilities, funds and other administrative
support as the Secretary of Defence deems necessary for the performance of
its functions. Other DoD components shall provide support for the Agency /
Service as prescribed in specific directives or support agreements.
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE COMPONENTS
The Naval Security Group Command is the Navy component of the Central
Security Service. The Army CSS component is the Intelligence and Security
Command (INSCOM).
"INSCOM organizations which perform national SIGINT functions are being
restructured from conventional OCONUS lines of sight and HF collection
mission units into jointly manned organizations, at CONUS locations, with
the access to enemy signals provided via remote collection technology and
communications linkages.... The Army Technical Control and Analysis Element
(A-TCAE) in the 704th Ml Brigade at Fort Meade will direct the Army's SIGINT
exploitation efforts in support of operational commanders and national
collection needs, and will assist in technical training and support for all
Army Intelligence forces as part of preparations for deployment. "
The 694th Intelligence Group (formerly the 694th Intelligence Wing),
headquartered at Fort Meade, MD, steers Air Force Intelligence Agency's
mission operations on the east coast. It is a vital part of AIA's continuing
support to national missions in support of US intelligence activities. The
Air Force's 694th Intelligence Group (formerly 694th Wing) is the largest
military unit on Fort Meade. It is subordinate to the Air Intelligence
Agency, Kelly Air Force Base, Texas. With a widely varied mission the 69 4th
Intelligence Wing has more than 2,000 officers and airmen within its
subordinate units at Fort Meade. In addition, the 694th provides
operational, technical, administrative and resource management to include
representation al support to the commander of the Air Intelligence Agency
and other government elements in the Washington, DC area. Responsible for an
integral part of the US worldwide communications network, the unit provides
rapid radio relay, secure communications an d command, control and
communications countermeasures support to US and allied forces. Unit members
develop and apply techniques and materials designed to ensure that friendly
command and control communications are secure and protected from enemy
countermeasures. The 694th Intelligence Group also advises US and allied
commanders on procedures and techniques which could be used to counter enemy
command and control communications. Additional functions include research
into electronic phenomena.
DIRECTORATES AND GROUPS
Unlike other intelligence organizations such as CIA or DIA, NSA is
particularly reticent concerning its internal organizational structure. The
following description is based on the best available current information.
The National Security Agency is organized into five Directorates, each of
which consists of several groups or elements. The Operations Directorate is
responsible for SIGINT collection and processing. The Technology and Systems
Directorate develops new technologies for SIGINT collection and processing.
The Information Systems Security Directorate is responsible for NSA's
communications and information security missions. The Plans, Policy and
Programs Directorate provides staff support and general direction for the
Agency, while the Support Services Directorate provides logistical and
administrative support activities.
A Group - Former Soviet Bloc
This Group performs worldwide SIGINT operations at fixed sites and with
assigned and attached mobile assets to collect against targets in the Former
Soviet Bloc. It maintains liaison with service CSS components on SIGINT
operations of direct interest to t his area of responsibility, under the
SIGINT OPCON of the DIRNSA or the Chief, Central Security Service (CHCSS).
(The current designation of this Group is uncertain)
B Group - Asia
This Group performs worldwide SIGINT operations at fixed sites and with
assigned and attached mobile assets to collect against targets, including
China, North Korea, and Vietnam. It maintains liaison with service CSS
components on SIGINT operations of direct interest to this area of
responsibility, under the SIGINT OPCON of the DIRNSA or the Chief, Central
Security Service (CHCSS). (The current designation of this Group is
uncertain)
C Group - Policy & Resources
This Group establishes immediate, short and long range policy and resource
requirements for Information Security activities to satisfy current and
future requirements. It identifies needs, criteria development, and program
development of projects for operation and maintenance of current assets and
acquisition or construction of new facilities.
D Group - Director
The Director of the NSA directs and controls the National Security Agency
(NSA) in the accomplishment of assigned missions, programs, plans, and
projects. This Group serves as the NSA focus for DIRNSA Central Security
Service (CSS) activities, and for the US Signals Intelligence Directive
System. The Group also represents NSA on other SIGINT community coordinating
committees, such as the DCI Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Committee, SIGINT
Requirements Validation and Evaluation Subcommittee (SIRVES) and SO RS.
E Group - Contract Support
This Group provides acquisition and management services and support to other
NSA program offices in the development of technical and nontechnical support
facility requirements and concepts. It develops facility acquisition
strategies, plans, master schedules, cost estimates, and management plans.
It provides engineering management services, plans for maintenance and
operation of facilities, and coordinates with host nations or commands. The
Group acts as principal staff advisor and assistant to the Direct or, NSA,
in the development and application of NSA contracting policy, plans,
programs, and systems as related to contracting of supplies and services;
production management; industrial preparedness planning; DAR; FAR; and
contracting reporting; DoD Coordinated Acquisition Program; market research
and analysis; DoD Procurement Management Review (PMR) Program; NSA field
contracting activities; ADP/T contracting; Pricing and Competition, and
management improvement initiatives; and exercises staff program direction
over assigned programs. (The identity of this Group is tentative)
F Group (No Group with this designation has been identified)
G Group - Operations (?) / All Others (?)
This Group performs worldwide SIGINT operations at fixed sites and with
assigned and attached mobile assets to collect against targets areas not
covered by A and B Groups. It maintains liaison with service CSS components
on SIGINT operations of direct interest to this area of responsibility,
under the SIGINT OPCON of the DIRNSA or the Chief, Central Security Service
(CHCSS). (The current designation of this Group is uncertain)
H Group (No Group with this designation has been identified)
I Group - Information Security Programs
This Group develops, establishes, and administers comprehensive programs for
information security, classification management, security education and
motivation, and industrial and personnel security. It represents NSA on the
Security Career Program Policy Council.
J Group - Legislative Affairs
Acts as the principal staff advisor and assistant to the Director, NSA, and
other staff elements on all NSA matters with respect to Legislative Affairs.
K Group - Operations Research (?)
This Group directs NSA Cryptologic research activities to provide
theoretical and other support for all US Communications Security (COMSEC)
and SIGINT activities. (The identity of this Group is tentative)
L Group - Logistics
Serves as the principal focus for on matters relating to the implementation
of the NSA logistics support activities, including support by the Defence
Courier Service.
M Group - Administration
Acts as the principal staff advisor and assistant to the Director, NSA, and
other staff elements on all NSA matters, exclusive of equipment (ADP and
non-ADP) and software, with respect to printing and publications; library;
postal and mail; travel; audiovisual facilities, productions and exhibits;
records, forms, and correspondence; committee management; authentication of
publications, directives, and communications.
N Group - Programs
This Group determines, in conjunction with the entire NSA staff, immediate,
short and long range planning requirements for facility development to
satisfy current and future mission requirements. It identifies facility
need, facility criteria development, and program development of projects for
operation and maintenance of current assets and acquisition or construction
of new facilities.
O Group (No Group with this designation has been identified)
P Group - Production
This Group is NSA's principal element for the production of finished SIGINT
(ELINT and COMINT) products in support of other consumers in the
intelligence community. The Group provides signals intelligence research,
retrieval and dissemination services for NSA programs, associated
contractors and other government agencies and contractors. It maintains
manual and automated classified data bases to facilitate the acquisition,
storage and dissemination of signals intelligence information. The Group
identifies and establishes NSA requirements for SIGINT production based on
consumers' present and future needs. It serves as the focal point for
intelligence documentation support and processing and dissemination requests
through national automated intelligence data bases.
Q Group - Plans & Policy
This Group acts as the principal staff advisor and assistant to the
Director, NSA, and other staff elements on the initiation, development,
integration, coordination, and monitoring of NSA policy, plans, programs,
and projects and is responsible for oversight of designated NSA/CSS
programs; mission and organization control; command control and contingency
planning; NSA studies and projects, operations research and. economic
analysis; NSA strategic planning and personnel authorizations and position
management.
R Group - Research & Engineering
This Group transforms SIGINT collection requirements into system performance
parameters, requirements, and system configurations. It establishes and
maintains system performance specifications and supports the configuration
controls. The Group develops an d monitors internal and external interface
requirements, defines test and target requirements and provides cost,
schedule, produce ability, manufacturing, basing, logistics, and other
support necessary for SIGINT collection system development and deployment.
The Group serves as a centre for research and development on signals
intelligence technologies, and provides for evaluation of algorithms, data
bases, and display concepts in signal processing. The Group maintains
facilities for research and development on audio and speech signal
processing, the supports test and evaluation of speech processing technology
to intelligence related problems.
S Group - Standards & Evaluation
This Group develops, establishes, and evaluates implementation of
comprehensive standards for information security, classification management,
security education and motivation, and industrial and personnel security.
The Group provides staff supervision and guidance for industrial security
program, performs industrial security functions of review and approval,
serves on contract requirements and technical review boards, and performs
industrial security inspections of classified contractor activities. It is
the primary COMSEC community focus for development and certification of
COMSEC equipment and procedures.
T Group - Telecommunications
This Groups manages all government and contractor activities associated with
the design, development, production and operation of Special Intelligence
Communications (SPINTCOM) networks and systems for the transmission of
SIGINT data and products.
U Group - General Counsel
Provides legal advice and services to the Director and the Heads of NSA
staff elements on matters involving or affecting NSA, exercises supervisory
and professional control over personnel providing legal services in NSA,
provides liaison with other agencies on legal issues relating to NSA, and
manages assigned programs.
V Group - Network Security
This Group develops, establishes, and administers comprehensive programs for
communications network security and related industrial security. (The
identity of this Group is tentative)
W Group - Space
This Group implements operational control of space-based sensors. It
documents, maintains, and implements operational requirements, monitors
capabilities, and coordinates activities for sensors. Provides resource
management for collection, transmission an d processing of SIGINT derived
from space-based sensors. The Group monitors and performs analysis on sensor
operations, system capabilities, and performance. It manages technical
service support (TSS) contracts to ensure operational support for ground
stations. Interfaces with NRO on system acquisition. The Group coordinates
and monitors system testing for space-based sensors, and interfaces with the
Air Force Satellite Control Facility (SCF) for operational tasking. It also
coordinates and provides input on future sensor requirements.
X Group - Special Access Systems (The function and designation of this Group
is undetermined)
Y Group - (The function and designation of this Group is undetermined)
Z Group - (No Group with this designation has been identified) |
NRO |
The National Reconnaissance Office
was created on 25 August 1960 following months of intense controversy
between the White House, CIA, the Air Force and the Department of Defence
over the allocation of responsibilities for satellite reconnaissance. In the
aftermath of the 1 May 1960 downing of Gary Powers' U-2 over the Soviet
Union, President Eisenhower on 10 June directed Defence Secretary Thomas
Gates develop recommendations on the future of space intelligence
collection. Gates appointed a panel headed by Under Secretary of the Air
Force Joseph Charyk, who was joined by Deputy Director of Defence Research
and Engineering John Rubel and Presidential Science Adviser George
Kistiakowsky. Their report to the National Security Council (NSC) on 25
August marked the formation of the NRO. The decision to form a "national"
agency was intended to ensure that the interests of all parties, including
the military and civilian intelligence communities, would be represented in
the utilization of space systems.
By 1961 the Agency and the Air Force had established a working relationship
for overhead reconnaissance systems through a central administrative office,
whose director reported to the Secretary of Defence but accepted
intelligence requirements through USIB. By informal agreement, the Air Force
provided launchers, bases, and recovery capability for reconnaissance
systems, while the Agency was responsible for research, development,
contracting, and security. Essentially, the agreement allowed the Agency to
decide which systems would be deployed, and the Air Force challenged the
CIA's jurisdiction.
A primary mission was at stake in these negotiations, and the struggle was
fierce on both sides. Control by one agency or another did not involve only
budgets and manpower. Since the Air Force and CIA missions were very
different, a decision would affect the nature of the reconnaissance program
itself -- tactical or national intelligence priorities, the frequency and
location of overflights, and the use of data.
The agreement that emerged in 1965 attempted to balance the interests of
both the Air Force and the CIA. A three-person Executive Committee, (EXCOM)
for the administration of overhead reconnaissance was established. Its
members included the DCI, an Assistant Secretary of Defence, and the
President's Scientific Advisor. The EXCOM reported to the Secretary of
Defence, who was assigned primary administrative authority for overhead
reconnaissance systems. The arrangement recognized the DCI's authority as
head of the community to establish collection requirements in consultation
with USIB; it also gave him responsibility for processing and utilizing data
generated by overhead reconnaissance. In the event that he did not agree
with a decision made by the Secretary of Defence, the DCI was given the
right to appeal to the President.
The agreement represented a compromise between Air Force and CIA claims and
provided substantive recognition of the DCT's national intelligence
responsibility. As a structure for decision-making, it has worked well.
However, it has not rectified the inherent competition over technical
collection systems that has come to motivate the intelligence process. The
development of these systems has created intense rivalry principally between
the Air Force and the Agency over program deployments. With so much money
and personnel at stake with each new system, each organization is eager to
gain the benefits of successful contracting. As a result the accepted
solution to problems with the intelligence product has come to be more
collection rather than better analysis.
In late 1992, the NRO released the text of the Defence Department Directive
establishing the Organization:
The National Reconnaissance Office will be organized separately within the
Department of Defence under the Director, National Reconnaissance Office,
appointed by the Secretary of Defence. The Director will be responsible for
consolidation of all Department of Defence satellite and air vehicle
overflight projects for intelligence into a single program, defined as the
National Reconnaissance Program, and for the complete management and conduct
of this Program in accordance with policy guidance and decisions of the
Secretary of Defence.
In carrying out his responsibilities for the National Reconnaissance Program
the Director National Reconnaissance Office shall:
Work directly with the Defence Space Operations Committee (DSOC) on policy
budgets, requirements and programs. The Defence Space Operations Committee
is the principal advisory body to the Secretary of Defence for the National
Reconnaissance Program. (Its members include the Under Secretary of Defence
for Policy Review; the Assistant Secretary of Defence for Communications,
Command, Control and Intelligence; and the Secretary of the Air Force, who
will be the Chairman of the Committee.) The Director shall respond to tasks
approved by the Defence Space Operations Committee and will keep the DSOC
informed, on a regular basis, on the status of projects of the National
Reconnaissance Program.
Similarly inform other Department of Defence personnel as he may determine
necessary in the course of carrying out specific project matters.
Establish appropriate interfaces between the National Reconnaissance Office
and the United States Intelligence Board, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Defence Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency.
Where appropriate, make use of qualified personnel of services and agencies
of the Department of Defence as full time members of the National
Reconnaissance Office.
Officials of the Office of the Secretary of Defence, military departments,
and other DoD agencies shall provide support within their respective fields
of to the Director, National Reconnaissance Office as may be necessary for
the Director to carry out his assigned responsibilities and functions,
Director, National Reconnaissance Office. The Director, National
Reconnaissance Office will be given support as required from normal staff
elements of the military departments and agencies concerned, although these
staff elements will not participate in these project matters except as he
specifically requests.
The Director, National Reconnaissance Office, in connection with his
assigned responsibilities for the National Reconnaissance Office and the
National Reconnaissance Program, is hereby specifically delegated authority
to:
Organize, staff and supervise the National Reconnaissance Office.
Establish, manage and conduct the National Reconnaissance Program.
Assist the Secretary of Defence in the supervision of aircraft, and
satellite reconnaissance, photographic projects, and be his direct
representative both within and outside the Department of Defence.
Review all Department of Defence budget requests and expenditures for any
item falling within the definition of the National Reconnaissance Program,
including studies and preliminary research and development of components and
techniques to support such existing or future projects.
All projects falling within the definition of the National Reconnaissance
Program are assigned to that program and will be managed as outlined herein
unless specific exception is made by the Director, National Reconnaissance
Office. Announcements of any such exceptions will be made by numbered
enclosures to this directive.
The Director, National Reconnaissance Office will establish the security
procedures to be followed for all matters in the National Reconnaissance
Program to protect all elements of the National Reconnaissance Office.
All communications pertaining to matters under the National Reconnaissance
Program will be subject to special systems of security control under the
cognisance of the Director, Defence Intelligence Agency, except as
specifically exempted by either Director, National Reconnaissance Office or
the Secretary of Defence.
With the single exception of this directive, no mention will be made of the
following titles or their abbreviations in any document which is not
controlled under the special security control system(s) referred to:
National Reconnaissance Program; National Reconnaissance Office. Where
absolutely necessary to refer to the National Reconnaissance Program in
communications not controlled under the prescribed special security systems,
such reference will be made by use of the terminology: "Matters under the
purview of DoD TS-5105.23."
1960-1989 - Initial Organization
Since its formation on 25 August 1960, the Navy, Air Force and CIA had each
managed their own stable of satellites, with both Air Force and CIA managing
both SIGINT and IMINT assets, although CIA usually handled IMINT and Air
Force had primary responsibility for SIGINT. Program D included aerial
assets. Initially the NRO was organized into four programs, each of which
was responsible for system design and development, coordination with
contractors, and operations.
Program A included all Air Force satellite intelligence programs, which were
managed by the Special Projects Office located at the Air Force Space and
Missiles System Centre at Los Angeles AFB, El Segundo, CA.
Program B encompassed Central Intelligence Agency satellite programs, which
were the responsibility of the Agency's Deputy Director for Science and
Technology, discharged the Assistant Deputy Director for Research and
Engineering.
Program C embraced the Naval component of NRO, responsible for ocean
surveillance satellites. Development activities were conducted by the Naval
Space and Warfare Systems Command (NAVSPAWAR) in Crystal City, VA, and the
Navy Space Project Office at Los Angeles AFB, El Segundo, CA. Operational
control of Naval systems is the responsibility of the Naval Security Group
Command, headquartered in Washington, DC.
Program D covered aerial surveillance programs, such as the U-2 and A-11,
prior to 1969. These aircraft were subsequently operated by the Air Force
Strategic Air Command, until the establishment of Air Combat Command,
whereupon control of the remaining U-2s reverted briefly with NRO.
Responsibility for these activities was subsequently removed from the NRO
and ultimately lodged in the Defence Airborne Reconnaissance Office in late
1993.
This use of service executive agents mirrored the pattern initially
established by the Advanced Research Projects Agency, and later by the
Strategic Defence Initiative Organization, and its successor, the Ballistic
Missile Defence Organization. A small central agency staff directed and
supervised work conducted by much larger service organizations, which in
turn managed relations with the even larger contractor base.
Although the NRO is a national organization, since its formation the NRO has
operated under the cover of the Under Secretary of the Air Force, and the
Office of Space Systems [SAF/SS], which serves as the organization's staff
director. However, during the Carter and Bush Administrations, the NRO was
headed by an Assistant Secretary of the Air Force -- on both occasions the
Under Secretary was a woman, who was presumably not qualified to discharge
this responsibility. Exceptionally, Reagan Administration Air Force Under
Secretary Edward Aldridge retained responsibility for the NRO when he became
Secretary of the Air Force. For over a decade the NRO Deputy Director has
been an Air Force civilian, Jimmie Hill, and the current identity of the NRO
Director can be readily tracked by observing who Jimmie Hill works for.
The Under Secretary of the Navy is also specifically tasked to operate the
Department of the Navy's programs which are part of the NRO.
The Director of Central Intelligence chairs the National Reconnaissance
Executive Committee, which directly supervises the NRO.
1989-1990 Consolidation
In mid-1989, David Boren, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence requested a jointly approved plan for the reorganization of the
National Reconnaissance Office. In 1989 the Senate Intelligence Committee
stated that:
"the best approach to ensuring a robust national reconnaissance program is
to reorganize the NRO in a way which facilitates greater communication,
cross-system and cross program fertilization, and common security, support,
and administrative practices. Thus, the Committee directs that, unless an
Alternative plan approved by the Secretary of Defence and the DCI is
submitted prior to November 1, 1989, the NRO begin, no later than November
1, 1989, a reorganization according to the plan outlined in a letter to the
Intelligence Committee dated November 21, 1988 by then Secretary of the Air
Force Edward C. Aldridge, Jr....
" ... (2) collocation of remaining activities in a central facility in the
Washington, D.C. area; ... [under] ... the Aldridge Plan...Ultimately, circa
1991-1992, the plan called for the collocation of the CIA Air Force, and
Navy Program offices in a new facility in Northern Virginia. The Committee
believes these goals and the timetable are realistic. Moreover, additional
realignment of program office functions are made feasible by the collocation
and should be pursued....
"Accordingly, the Committee directs that all activities of the various
program offices be collocated according to the 1991-1992 timetable unless
the Director, NRO decides, based on compelling reasons, that certain
sub-elements of the three program offices should not collocate. In such a
case, the Director should notify the Intelligence Committees of his decision
and describe his rationale for it.
In a 3 July 1989 letter to Boren regarding the NRO restructure, Defence
Secretary Richard Cheney and Director of Central Intelligence William
Webster stated their intent to:
Form a Joint Senior Advisory Board (now referred to as the National
Reconnaissance Review Board) of senior Intelligence Community managers to
advise us and the DSRO regarding NRO issues; Establish a strong Planning,
Analysis, and Evaluation capability within the NRO to support the
architectural development and programmatic decision processes; Designate the
CIA's Director of Development and Engineering as the Director of Program B
to provide a full-time manager for Program B; and Establish, within the NRO,
a Deputy Director for Command Support position (now referred to as the
Deputy Director for Military Support) to improve NRO support to the
military.
In addition to these initial steps, the DNRO Restructure Study recommended:
Realignment of the NRO and Defence Support Project Office (DSPO) staffs to
improve management effectiveness and facilitate a more integrated and
effective organizational response to military requirements. The DSPO
continued as a distinct organizational entity providing the principal focus
for the DSPO/NRO interface with the military. However, common support
functions, such as budget administration and planning and analysis support,
were combined into single organizational entities that provided support to
both the NRO and DSPO. Establish, within the NRO, National Security Agency
responsible for ensuring that consistent and adequate implementation
standards are applied across government and contractor organizations in
order to minimize wasteful resource expenditures and maximize the
effectiveness of security protection. Continued use of a small, centralized,
Inspection and Audit (IG) function, supported by the IG activities of the
NRO Program Offices' parent organizations, to accomplish the necessary NRO
IG functions. With the recent agreement between the NRO and CIA, the final
issue preventing successful implementation of this concept has been removed
and all NRO Program Offices and their parent organizations support the
charter of the NRO Inspector General.
Defence Secretary Richard Cheney and Director of Central Intelligence
William Webster endorsed the DNRO's decision not to pursue further
collocation. They shared his belief that the combination of restructure
initiatives being implemented had the potential to achieve the same benefit
as a total collocation without the downside risk of disrupting the NRO's
program execution ability and support infrastructure. However, they did
express the belief, as did DNRO, that it was important to continue to
protect the option to implement additional collocation initiatives if
required. The DNRO's facility acquisition strategy supported this objective.
The Defence Secretary and the Director of Central Intelligence reaffirmed
their previous conviction, supported by the DNRO's 1989-90 reassessment,
that a business-line structure, that would attempt to give each Program
Office the responsibility for a unique mission area, was neither a viable or
effective restructure alternative. They wanted to preserve a beneficial
degree of competition between the Program Offices and the ability to apply
the resources of all three Program Offices, as appropriate, to a problem.
Competition was also viewed as vital to sustaining the motivation of the
Program Offices and the ability to develop creative solutions to
intelligence requirements.
The Defence Secretary and the Director of Central Intelligence shared the
DNRO's concern regarding the House Appropriations Committee guidance to
shift program management responsibility for the Defence Reconnaissance
Support Program (DRSP) and Airborne Reconnaissance Support Program (ARSP)
from the DNRO to the Assistant Secretary of Defence for Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence (AND (C3I)). In their view, no matter what
external lines of authority existed, or are established, to the NRO, the
fundamental principle must remain that NRO Program Offices must work for one
program manager, the DNRO, regardless of the source of the funding for the
programs they are executing. Subsequent to the preparation of the
Restructuring Report on 8 January 1990, the ASD(C3I) and the DNRO developed
a recommendation which maintained this principle while providing for
appropriate direction from the ASD(C3I). Under this plan, the NRO's Deputy
Director for Military Support would also serve as the Director of the DSPO
under the day-to-day operational control of the DNRO. In this capacity, he
will receive programmatic oversight, requirements, guidance, and funding
through the ASD(C3I). The DSPO would be a DoD staff element (not a NRO
Program Office) with budgeting, coordination, and architectural
responsibilities. Specific relationships among the ASD(C3I), DSPO, DNRO, and
the DCI were to be formulated and provided at a later date.
The DNRO recommended implementation of an NRO headquarters collocation that
included the DNRO, his deputies, their staff support, management elements
from the three Program Offices, and appropriate centralized support
functions in order to facilitate a more integrated organizational approach
to the accomplishment of the NRO mission, built upon the unique capabilities
of the individual Program Offices.
Throughout most of its history, the small NRO staff consisted of personnel
seconded from other agencies. The January 1990 NRO Restructure Report noted
the problems this created, and considered the possibility of creating:
" ... a more integrated organizational structure. Multiple civilian
personnel systems may result in individuals doing similar jobs for different
levels of pay and benefits. Additionally, our ability to make the personnel
changes necessary to accommodate programmatic changes in our programs might
be improved if the NRP budgeted, and perhaps directly controlled, its
personnel resources. "This area is very important to the long term success
of our restructure efforts. However, I am not prepared to recommend a
definitive solution for our personnel requirements beyond the approach for
the additional requirements described above. I intend to work with the
Administration and the Congress to develop a solution as quickly as
possible."
The restructure activities required additional personnel to support the
centralized security function.
To support the additional personnel requirements associated with the new
facilities and the centralized security function, 111 additional personnel
were authorized to be paid with funds available to the National
Reconnaissance Program, which would require funding increasing gradually
from $5.6 million in 1991 to $7.9 million in 1995.
1992 Functional Reorganization
As early as mid-1989 it was reported that the Defence Department (Air Force)
was in charge of the photographic intelligence bureau of the NRO. And by
late 1989 it was reported that the NRO had initiated a major restructuring,
with each CIA assigned responsibility for all satellites under the Imagery
Branch, and Air Force assigned responsibility for all satellites under the
SIGINT Branch. Least affected was the Navy, which retained responsibility
for the satellites of the Ocean Surveillance Branch. Although these reports
were in error at the time, they reflected the options under consideration in
1989, and ultimately implemented in 1992.
The Woolsey panel recommended reorganization of NRO into several
directorates and collocation of major NRO elements as expeditiously as
possible. These recommendations were approved by the DCI, the Secretary of
Defence, and the President. The Restructure Plan approved by the SECDEF and
DCI collocated most of the NRO to a single location as soon as possible.
Full collocation would be supported with the occupancy of the NRO Westfields
facility in 1996. According to the NRO, the Westfields consolidation would:
strengthen the technical capability of the organization; improve decision
making; promote closer, more active, interfaces with customers; improve
ability to develop more integrated architecture; allow merging of similar
functions to minimize redundancy; and facilitate functional organization
structure.
The process of reorganization along product rather than service lines began
in late 1992. In mid- November, DCI Robert Gates announced:
"... we have implemented a far-reaching internal restructuring of the
National Reconnaissance Office (including declassification of its
existence). These changes, from an organizational to a functional structure,
are the most comprehensive in the NRO's history."
Under the new structure, the designation of CIA as IMINT Branch manager and
Air Force as SIGINT Branch-manager was replaced by IMINT and SIGINT Branches
staffed by workers from CIA and the military services. According to NRO
Director Martin Faga, under the new structure:
"We will have the CIA and the [Defence Department] people intertwined to
carry out the particular functions we need."
Faga suggested that the NRO organization prior to 1989, with each service
working competitively and independently, had contributed to excessive
proliferation of competing satellite designs and a lack of technical
coordination.
The leading public authority on NRO, Jeff Richelson, suggested that:
"The advances have been so great that maybe they don't need the degree of
competition they have had in the past. You're not going to have the Air
Force and the CIA competing for the design of the next signals intelligence
spacecraft in the way you have in the past."
As of early 1994, NRO reported that "significant progress has been made in
our efforts to reorganize into an integrated functional organization."
As part of the continuing baseline review of NRO support functions, it was
determined that the support function needed to be consolidated and expanded
in the NRO. Consequently a Management Services and Operations (MSO)
organization was established in FY 1992. MSO provides consolidated support
in the areas of communications, human resources management, administrative
services, facility acquisition, logistics support,, and facility security.
Additionally, the Centralized Security Function has expanded its original
support function in the areas of communications security training and
personnel security.
The Miscellaneous Support and Operations element of the Mission Support
expenditure centre includes the facilities required in the NRO
reorganization, airlift support, personnel costs, security operations, NRO
communications and non-program specific logistics and support. The FY 1992
increase in Miscellaneous Support and Operations includes a functional
transfer from the Air Force for the operational costs of the NRO
communications.
As a result of the restructure actions the NRO became responsible for new or
increased infrastructure and administrative support which it had previously
received from other organizations. These functions necessitated an increase
in NRO personnel. In addition to the personnel requirements to support the
NRO restructure initiated in 1990, the recent organizational changes and the
declassification of the existence of the NRO increased the requirement for
additional personnel to support FOIA facility activities and an expanded NRO
Inspector General function. |
NIMA |
The National Imagery and
Mapping Agency (NIMA) is a combat support agency of the Department of
Defence (DoD), supporting the Secretary of Defence, the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI), and other national-level policymakers in the areas of
imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information. NIMA is a member
of the national Intelligence Community and the single entity upon which the
U.S. Government relies to coherently manage the disciplines of imagery and
mapping. NNIMA was established on 1 October 1996 to address these expanding
requirements. It was created from the former Defence Mapping Agency (DMA),
Central Imagery Office (CIO), and the Defence Dissemination Program Office
(DDPO) in their entirety; the missions and functions of the National
Photographic Interpretation Centre (NPIC); and the imagery exploitation,
dissemination and processing capabilities of the National Reconnaissance
Office (NRO), Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Defence Airborne
Reconnaissance Office (DARO). The National Imagery and Mapping Agency's
(NIMA's) role is to support the war fighter through priorities established
by the commanders in chief (CINCs). This support comes in the form of
imagery, imagery intelligence, and GI (including standard maps and data
sets) in support of national security objectives. The agency's vision is to
guarantee ready access to the world's imagery, imagery intelligence, and GI.
NIMA has technical and liaison representatives at the CINC level who work
with the staff and the GI&S officer to establish requirements and priorities
and to identify the best products and services that NIMA can provide. These
representatives prioritise, validate, and consolidate requirements
identified by major subordinate commands (MSCs).
NIMA has a global mission, as established by
the NIMA Act of 1996. It has the unique responsibilities of managing and
providing imagery and GI to national policy makers and military forces. NIMA
is also an established part of the US intelligence community in recognition
of its unique responsibilities and global mission. NIMA brings together in a
single organization the imagery tasking, production, exploitation, and
dissemination (TPED) responsibilities and the mapping, charting, and
geodetic functions of eight separate organizations of the defence and
intelligence communities. NIMA continues to improve support to national and
military customers through comprehensive management of US imaging and
geospatial capabilities. The NIMA mission is to provide timely, relevant,
and accurate imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information in
support of national security objectives. NIMA is responsible for providing
support to military operations, defence agencies, the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), and other Federal
Government Agencies on matters concerning imagery and geospatial information
relating to national security. NIMA was created by consolidating several
agencies into a single entity which requires consolidating several distinct
missions into the NIMA mission. Under this mission NIMA is assigned the
responsibility to prescribe and mandate standards and end-to-end technical
architectures related to imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial
information for the DoD Components and for non-DoD elements of the
Intelligence Community. NIMA is chartered to provide management and
operation (collection tasking, imagery analysis and geospatial information
production) of the imagery and geospatial services for National customers
and for support to military operations, planning, training, and weapons
systems. It is to ensure access and dissemination of primary and secondary
imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information. NIMA is
responsible for the acquisition, design, development, implementation,
installation, transition, and sustainment of systems, standards, and
technology pertaining to the United States Imagery and Geospatial
Information Systems (USIGS) for the imagery, imagery analysis, and
geospatial information community. NIMA ensures that imagery intelligence,
geospatial information, and other needs for imagery are managed effectively
and efficiently in a manner conducive to national security and consistent
with the authorities and duties of the Secretary of Defence and the DCI.
United States Imagery and Geospatial
Information Systems (USIGS)
The United States Imagery and Geospatial
Information System (USIGS) is an umbrella term for the suites of systems
formerly called the United States Imagery System (USIS) and the Global
Geospatial Information and Services (GGIS). USIGS will be defined by the
migration of the former USIS and GGIS architectures, with the goal of common
graphical interfaces, and seamless information exchanges. In addition to the
former USIS and GGIS framework, USIGS will include new capabilities, and
leverage the pre-existing architecture work. USIGS will use the DII/COE
C4ISR Architecture Framework, and the Joint Technical Architecture as its
baseline. |
Federal Bureau of Investigation |
Since the 1930's, the FBI has
had the primary responsibility for investigating most federal crimes.
Espionage and treason are such crimes, and so the FBI has been responsible
for most of America's counterintelligence work. Although the Bureau has
close to 100,000 agents, only about a thousand are involved in
counterintelligence work. These agents are occasionally assisted by other
FBI agents or officers of local or state police agencies. The FBI also has
Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Teams. |
Delta Force |
The 1st SFOD-Delta (Delta
force) is one the Federal Government's CT (Counter Terrorist) groups. Also
known as CAG (Combat Applications Group) the Pentagon manages to tightly
control what is known about this Unit. Their soldiers are recruited from the
U.S. Army, mainly from the Special Forces Green Berets and Rangers. Their
main compound is in a remote area of Fort Bragg and it is rumoured that up
to 2,500 personnel are present at this facility.
The TO (Table of Order) for Delta consists
of three operational squadrons, a support squadron, a signal squadron, an
aviation platoon, and what is termed the "Funny Platoon". This funny platoon
is reported to be the only JSOC unit including female operators. Selection
for all of these units is rigorous with more focus on mental abilities and
toughness than physical
Training involves runs through CQB (Close
Quarters Battle) killing houses designed to teach teams and individuals how
to assault buildings that have been captured by terrorists. Selective firing
(whether or not to shoot a target) as well as the double tap (shooting the
target twice to make sure that the target does not get up again) are
instilled in the Counter-terrorism specialists.
Their facility at Bragg is reported to be
considered the best special operation training facility in the world. The
CQB indoor training range has earned the ominous nick-name, "The House of
Horrors". The Facility comes equipped with mock-up of trains and buses for
practice in tubular assaults, and there is reported to be a section of a
wide-body jet in the units "aircraft room".
As a counter-terrorist group, Delta's main
function is in hostage rescue. During Operation Just Cause Delta got
their chance to do just that. Kurt Muse, an American businessman operating
an underground radio station, had been jailed in the city of Modelo. A 160th
SOAR MH-6 transported a team of troopers to the rooftop of the jail. The
team fought its way down to the second floor and blew the door to Muse'
cell, freeing him without injury. As the team and Muse made their way to the
roof and the waiting MH-6, Kurt Muse counted at least five bodies. Not all
had been killed; one terrified guard had been handcuffed to a staircase
railing. Lifting off, the small helicopter was hit by small arms fire and
fell to the street below. The pilot slid the aircraft along the ground to a
parking lot and attempted to take off again. The aircraft was hit by ground
fire again and hit the ground, this time permanently. A passing UH-60
spotted the infrared spotlight held up by a Delta trooper, and soldiers from
the 6th Infantry Regiment came to their rescue. Four Delta operators were
wounded, but Delta had "officially" validated their existence and saved Kurt
Muse' life.
Delta also saw action in Desert Storm,
although the full extent of what they did there has not been revealed. Delta
Troopers provided security for General Norman Schwartzkopf and also took
part in some missions into Iraq to locate Scud missile launchers for
destruction. Delta received some unwanted publicity in the disastrous UN
Campaign to stabilize the country of Somolia. During their mission in
Mogadishu, Somolia, they assaulted different safe houses containing
high-ranking members of warring clans and took them prisoner. Unfortunately,
during their last mission two of the support helicopters from the 160th SOAR
were shot down. Two Delta operators were killed defending the survivours of
the second crash, and at least one was killed in an on-foot extraction
through a city populated with locals riled up against the Americans.
Delta works closely with the 160th SOAR
for air support, but they also have their own fleet of helicopters (the
aviation platoon). Painted in civilian colours and with fake registration
numbers, the helicopters can deploy with Delta operators and mount gun pods
to provide air support as well as transportation. Delta/CAG also works with
the CIA's Special Activities Staff. |
DEVGRU |
Much of what DEVGRU, or the
Naval Special Warfare Development Group, is and does remains classified and
unknown. What is know is that they were formed in the mid 1990's after SEAL
Team Six, the Navy's Counter-terrorism was disbanded. DEVGRU was created
after Richard Marcinko, the original commander of ST6 published a series of
books that outlined the history and purpose of the original Team. According
to the US Navy, DEVGRU was formed to create, test, and evaluate new tactics,
weapons, and equipment. However with the disbanding of ST 6 the Navy was
left without a maritime CT unit, although SEAL Team 8 was tasked with
maritime deployments and takedowns. Recent rumours have appear to confirm
that DEVGRU is actually a CT unit created (although current officers will
deny its existence) to replace the lime-light stricken ST6. This is born
out, in no small significance, buy the structure surrounding DEVGRU. While
under the command of NAVSPECWARGRU (Navy Special Warfare Group, DEVGRU is
also a component of JSOC, with other such units as the US Army's 1at SFOD-D
and 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, both units that list
counter-terrorism in their primary activities.
What weapons and equipment DEVGRU uses has
not been revealed. However, given their SEAL parentage it is a safe bet that
the MP55
is used mainly in COB
and the Colt M4 is the primary
assault weapon. The SOCOM pistol has been issued but it is reported that the
Sig-Sauer P-228 is preferred for personal defence. DEVGRU is thought to
consist of around 400 operators and support personnel, divided into four
combat teams and one training team. The combat assault teams are Red, Gold,
and Blue, with Gold being the premier assault team. Grey team is the
transportation unit containing the SDVs and boats used to transport the
assault teams. Green Team consists of the new operators who have just joined
DEVGRU and are in training. Each operator inside the Teams has a specialty,
but all are experts in underwater and HALO insertion. They are also rumoured
to have their own helicopter assets within the unit. 18 HH-60 helicopters
optimised for CSAR are said to exist within the unit, but I doubt this.
Maybe one or two, but the navy has only 18 HH-60s in two reserve squadrons
so it makes little sense to me to have 18 in one top-secret unit.
|
Military Police Special Reaction Teams |
Throughout the last few
decades of the Twentieth Century a wave of violent protest and viscous
terrorist attacks swept across the Western world. Many of the these
incidents were specifically directed at US Army personnel and installations.
These attacks, coupled with the increased amount of violent crimes being
encountered by Army Military Police (MP) personnel, caused great concern
amongst senior Army law enforcement officials. At the time that the Army was
studying how to deal with this new threat, the Air Force had been conducting
tactical team training for its Security Police (SP) units Emergency Services
Teams (EST) at Lackland AFB. The Army sent a small team of MP's to Lackland,
to attend the course. The results were deemed so successful that the Dept.
of the Army (DA) mandated that all Army MP units, assigned to a major
installation, form specially trained teams to respond to potential crisis
situations. As a result, of this directive, all major Army posts now
maintain the ability to deploy a MP Special Reaction Team, or SRT. SRTs are
the Army's version of a civilian SWAT team. SRT's are deployed in the event
that a situation develops that is beyond the scope of the regular MP units,
assigned to that installation. Possible scenarios that may call for the
deployment of an SRT include:
Hostage situations
Counter terrorist operations
Barricaded criminals
Sniper incidents
VIP protection duties
High risk searches
Threatened suicide
Barricaded mentally disturbed persons
In the event that a SRT is deployed, the
teams primary focus would be to insure the safety of all parties involved.
Teams would also try to apprehend any offenders, and secure the area for
investigators. Potential SRT members are selected from the ranks of
experienced MPs. After passing an initial selection which includes a
physical fitness test, a psychological screening, and a records review;
candidates then attend a two week long SRT 1 course at the US Army Military
Police School. During the 160 hr. course of instruction students receive
instruction in selective firing, physical training, rappelling, breaching
techniques, and tactics. Students must successfully complete eight
scenarios, including some conducted at night, to graduate. SRT
marksman-observers (snipers) attend a separate one week long SRT 2 course.
Team members receive additional training at US Army, civilian, and military
training courses. A standard SRT consists of a least 9 men led by a team
leader, who holds the rank of E-6, or above. 5-6 men compromise the entry
team, with the remaining four men making up two-2 man marksman-observer
teams. The entry team is broken down into:
1 Team leader- E-6 or above
1 Pointman- E-4 or above
2 Defensemen - E-4 or above
1 Rear Security E-4 or above
The teams are outfitted with standard Army
BDUs, black kevlar helmets, tactical thigh holsters, and various tactical
vests with built in radios. Weapons available for employment by team members
include: M-9 Barretta pistols, M-16 and M-4 rifles, HK MP-5 SMGs, Remington
870 shotguns, and M-24 sniper rifles (modified Remington 700s). |
Joint Special Operations Command |
After the failed attempt to
rescue US hostages being held prisoner in Iran, the US military immediately
began planning for a second rescue attempt. As part of this panning a number
of new special operations units were formed within the armed forces. To help
prevent some of the confusion that developed during the planning, and
execution phases of the first rescue attempt, a new command structure was
activated to control these new units. This new command would eventually
evolve into the Joint Special Operations Command or JSOC. Activated on
December 15, 1980 and based at Pope AFB, NC JSOC's publicly-released posture
statement states that JSOC performs the following missions:
provides a standing joint special operations task force provides joint
special operations planning studies joint special operations requirements
and techniques ensures interoperability and equipment standardization
conducts joint special operations exercises. Although JSOC's stated purpose
is to provide a unified command structure for conducting joint special
operations and exercises, numerous reports have stated that JSOC is actually
the command responsible for conducting US counter-terrorism (CT) operations.
According to published reports, JSOC commands the US military's Special
Missions Units (SMUs). These SMUs are tasked with conducting CT operations,
strike operations, reconnaissance in denied areas, and special intelligence
missions.
JSOC units have reportedly been involved
in a number of covert military operations over the last two decades. Some of
the operations that have come to light include providing assistance to
Italian authorities during their search for kidnapped US Army Gen. James
Dozier, participating in Operation Urgent Fury; the US invasion of Grenada,
planning a rescue attempt of US hostages being held in Lebanon, rescuing
hostages being held aboard the cruise liner Achille Lauro, participating in
Operation Just Cause; the US intervention in Panama, directing US Scud
hunting efforts during Operation Desert Storm, conducting operations in
support of UN mandates in Somalia, and searching for suspected war criminals
in the former Republic of Yugoslavia. Recently the veil of secrecy
surrounding JSOC has been lifted a little more. Press reports have indicates
that US SMUs have been tasked with conducting counter-proliferation
operations against countries producing weapons of mass destruction.
Currently JSOC is believed to command the following units:
1st Special Forces Operational
Detachment-Delta " Delta" ( also known as the Combat Development Group, or
Combat Applications Group)
Intelligence Support Activity (ISA) -
operates under various cover names
Naval Special Warfare Development Group-
DEVGRU
USAF 24 Special Tactics Squadron - (24
STS)
Joint Communications Unit- (JCU)
A joint aviation unit (operating under
various cover names)
A technical intelligence unit
Other US special operations forces may
operate in support of JSOC depending on their operational needs. The primary
units that operate in this manner include the following:
75th Ranger Regiment
160th SOAR, primarily the 1st Bn. with its
"Little Bird" helicopters
USAF Special Operations Squadrons,
especially the 55th SOS and their MC-130 squadrons.
JSOC units regularly conduct training with
similar units from around the world, and provide training to nations that
request US support. JSOC has also provide support to domestic law
enforcement agencies during high profile, or high risk events such as the
Olympic;, the World Cup; political party conventions; and Presidential
inaugurations. |
Joint Communication Unit |
In the investigation that
followed the failed attempt to rescue US hostages from Iran a number of
deficiencies were identified. One of the main factors contributing to the
confusion at Desert One was the lack of compatibility between communications
systems, and the fact that each service involved had different standard
operating procedures. To alleviate some of the confusion and standardize
communication procedures when conducting joint special operations, the Joint
Chiefs of staff ordered the formation of a new joint-service communication
unit. The new unit was designated the Joint Communication Unit (JCU), and
was activated in 1980 at Ft. Bragg, NC, and assigned to the Joint Special
Operations Command (JSOC). The unit's initial cadre of personnel was drawn
from special operations communications personnel assigned to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff's (JCS) Joint Communication Support Element (JCSE). The JCU
is tasked with ensuring standardization of communications procedures and
equipment used by JSOC, and its subordinate units. It is also tasked with
providing a link between deployed JSOC units, other special operations and
military units, other government agencies, and the National Command
Authority (NCA). JCU is required to maintain doctrinal expertise in the use
all the services communications equipment. JCU is also proficient in the use
US governmental agency's and allied military communications systems. In June
of 1981 JCU assumed the responsibility of providing communications support
for US special operations conducting counter terrorist (CT) operations, from
the JCSE. Prior to this specially selected, airborne trained Army and Air
Force personnel assigned to JCSE Quick Reaction Element teams supported CT
exercises, and missions. Since its initial activation JCU personnel have
supported every JSOC deployment.
In october of 1983 the JCU deployed as
part of JSOC task force conducting operations on the Caribbean island of
Grenada. For its actions during the operation, the unit was awarded a Joint
Meritorious Unit Award. JCU personnel also deployed to provide support to
JSOC forces during the planned attempt to rescue hostages being held on the
hijacked Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro. In 1990 JCU communicators were
deployed to the desert Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The US deployment was code
named Operation Desert Storm, and was the largest deployment of US forces
since Vietnam. As part of the build up of US troops, JSOC had covertly
deployed a a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), composed of
several military Special Mission Units (SMUs), to the area. With the JSPTF
initial mission no longer necessary, the task force was used to hunt form
Iraqi mobile SCUD launchers, in an operation code named Elusive Concept. JCU
personnel provided critical support between JSOC units operating in the
field, and and higher headquarters elements. For its support of JSOC units
during the Gulf Conflict, the JCU and its personnel, were awarded a third
Joint Meritorious Unit award. In the fall of 1993 JCU personnel once again
deployed in support of JSOC units operating in a hostile environment. The US
had deployed a military force in support of UN peace keeping operations in
the nation of Somalia. As part of that support the US had ordered the secret
deployments of a JSOC JSOTF. The JSOTF was tasked with capturing rouge
Somali warlord Gen. Mohammad Farh Adid. The JCU provided a communications
link between the JSOTF, the US CINC, NCA, and other UN forces operating in
the country. Most recently JSOC units have been operating in the Balkans
supporting NATO peace keeping operations in the Former Yugoslavia. JCU
personnel have provided support to these operations.
|
US Air Force Special Operations |
The US Air Force Special
Operations Wings provide US forces with the ability to insert or extract or
perform search and rescue missions behind enemy lines at night or in bad
weather. The USAF Special Operations Wings have a history that dates back to
W.W.II. Officially, the 1st Air Commando Group came into being on March 29,
1944. However, the group had existed before under different names. Army
General Arnold had tasked Lt. Colonel Phil Cochran (a war hero and basis for
the comic strip "Terry and the Pirates") and John Alison (former deputy
commander of the 75th Fighter Squadron; the USAAF group that the AVG Flying
Tigers became when they were absorbed back into the American force
structure) with the creation of an Air Corps unit to support a guerrilla
force being created to harass the Japanese in Burma in early 1943. Cochran
and Alison succeeded in training 523 men to operate as a cohesive, highly
effect special operations force. It should be noted that the normal
compliment of an Air Corps Wing was around 2,000 soldiers, nearly four times
what they had on hand. Moreover, their training was cut short and they were
deployed to the Pacific theatre after only a month of flying. After training
with the Chindits (the force they were supporting) for three months they
performed their first mission. The unit eventually operated 346 aircraft;
including L-1 and L-5 scout aircraft for scouting and light medivac, P-51
Mustang's for fighter/attack cover, B-25H's for heavy attack, C-47's and
CG-4A Waco Gliders for assaults and resupply, and four YR-4 helicopters.
They were the first to use the helicopter in combat, and perfected the
"glider snatch" technique, in which an loaded glider on the ground would be
grabbed and towed aloft by a low-flying C-47 cargo plane. The unit was so
under staffed that it was not a rare occurrence for the pilots of one type
of aircraft to hop into another and go up for a second flight after
finishing the first mission.
The early USAAC (United States Army Air
Corps; the forerunner of the US Air Force) built a tradition of excellence
and determination, coining the still-used motto of "Anytime, Anyplace." The
motto came into being after one of the gliders crashed in a night-time
training accident. The Chindit's commander, British General Wingate, was
very impressed with the ability of the newly-formed air commandos and sent
them a message that despite the crash, "we will go with your boys ant place,
any time, any where." The 1st Air Commando Group went on to take place in
Operation Thursday, a disruptive action that successfully stopped the
Japanese invasion of India. On the first night, March 5 1944, they
successfully delivered over 500 men and 15 tons of supplies behind Japanese
lines to landing zone Broadway using gliders and C-47 cargo aircraft. Two
nights later Operations reached a high tempo and no less than 92 planes
loads ( roughly one every 4 minutes) arrived in the small jungle clearing in
a night. Because of the Chindits (made possible by the air commando's
insertion and resupply abilities) raids and sabotage, the Japanese invasion
failed. The Army Air Corps also had a unit that operated in the European
Theatre. Choosing the name "Carpetbaggers," the 801st/492nd Bombardment
Group began to train for their mission of agent insertion and resupply
behind enemy lines. Using modified ex-Navy PB they began practicing
low-level flights in single ship formations, a far different way of
operating than the high-level massed-formation daytime operations the pilots
were used to. One of the modifications was the removal of the ball turret on
the bottom of the aircraft. This allowed an easy exit from the aircraft for
any agents being inserted. Another was the installation of a radio
navigation device that lead a good navigator to within three miles of his
target--at night in pitch black conditions. The cockpit instruments were
also redesigned, putting the critical instruments front and centre so the
pilot could keep his eyes on the ground as much as possible.
They began operations in January of 1944
and flew until September of that year, taking place in many important
actions, including the build up to the D-day invasion of the French coast.
Two days before the invasion, on June 3, 1944, they flew 17 missions in a
single night. Before the invasion a need arose to pick up agents and ferry
them back to England. The venerable C-47 Dakota was added to their
inventory, and after two months of training the were ready for their first
nighttime covert short field landing and take off. All in all, the
Carpetbaggers C-47 inserted 78 agents with 104,000 pounds of supplies and
extracted 213 agents from occupied territory. In part because of the
Carpetbaggers actions, guerrillas were able to cut 885 rail lines and
destroy 322 locomotives, 295 alone in the month following the D-Day landing,
when their services were needed most. By September of 1944 the Allied army
had captured the area the carpetbaggers operated, and the need for their
night-time flights almost disappeared. There was still a need for their
expertise, so they were simply moved forward and began operating from
liberated bases in France. In one operation, a stripped-down C-47 smuggled a
captured German V2 rocket out of Sweden for examination. They also inserted
agents into Norway, although the weather caused many of their flights to
abort due to bad conditions and inability to see the drop zone through the
clouds and storms. When General Patton's drive into Germany stalled (His
tank drive was so effective it ran ahead of the supply chain and they ran
out of gas and had to stop) the Carpetbaggers modified their
bombers-turned-cargo planes into flying fuel trucks, with the capacity to
carry 2,500 gallons of non-aviation fuel each flight. All told, they
airlifted almost a million gallons of fuel to Patton's gas-starved tanks and
allowed them to resume their drive to Germany.
With the success of the Carpetbaggers came
the need for more special operations capabilities in other areas. Fledgling
units within conventional Air Forces (such as the Twelfth Air Force's 885th
Bombardment Squadron (Heavy) (Special) ) were created to aid in the supply
of OSS agents and Eastern European Guerrillas in their fight to oust German
occupation forces. The forerunner to today's Special Tactics Teams, BATS
(Balkan Air Terminal Service) Teams, were created to coordinate the creation
and use of covert airstrips, including guiding the aircraft in and
unloading/loading cargo. The smaller units and the Carpetbaggers continued
to operate until the end of the war, inserting agents behind enemy lines and
resupplying covert and conventional units. New aircraft, such as the A-26
Invader (Later used in the Vietnam War) and British Mosquito were adopted to
enable them to operate deeper and with greater safety to the aircrews. One
innovation (which must have been quite the wild ride) was the use of the
A-26's bomb bay doors as a platform for the agents to lay on. When the drop
zone was reached, the pilot simply opened the bomb bay doors (with the
proper warning, of course) and away the two agents went. With the close of
the Second World War, all Army Air Corps Special Operations Air assets went
away. Pilots were either discharged or transferred to conventional units.
The planes were almost always scrapped. The United States had no unit
dedicated to the resupply of forces behind enemy lines. Although the newly
created United States Air Force began to look into covert operations in the
late 1940's, there was nothing in place when the Korean War broke out in
1950. As ad-hoc units took on the airborne special operations role, an
"official" squadron was rushed into readiness.
It was named the "Air Resupply and
Communications Service," and although there was another unit that operated
unofficially (det 2 of the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron) earlier, the ARCS
was the USAF's primary Special operations unit in the Korean War and was the
only one to survive the draw down after the war (although it was also
eventually dissolved). There were a total of six ARCS squadron's planned;
only three became operational and served in any capacity. The ARCS were a
combination of many functions, much like the different groups that make up
the USAF's special operations forces today. B-29 Stratofortress bombers were
used to bombard North Korean troops with Psychological leaflets designed to
make them surrender or to lower moral. Helicopters were used to rescue
American pilots shot down behind enemy lines, in many cases evading deadly
enemy fire to do so. In addition, the Pararescue squadrons were first
officially started in the ARCS. With the close of the Korean War, the
immediate need for aviation special operations forces decreased. In an
attempt to survive the budget cuts, the ARCS squadrons came up with new
missions for themselves; such as rescuing U2 spy plane pilots. For various
reasons, some missions could not make it successfully back to their bases.
Two pilots were rescued by the ARCS SA-16 amphibious planes after coming
down in the Caspian and Black Sea. Even with some of the new missions, there
was not enough of a perceived need for special operations forces and the
ARCS were shut down in the late 1950's.
There was another less known special unit
that performed deep penetrations of Chinese Airspace in the late 1950's. Det
2 of the 1045th Observation, Evaluation, and Training Group was responsible
for resupplying Tibetan guerrilla's resisting the Chinese Acquisition of
Tibet. Flying into mountainous terrain, the group would insert Guerrilla's
that had been trained in the US. One of the later missions that was
performed was the a real resupply of the Dali Lama as he and his entourage
escaped from Chinese forces. Det 2 was the first group in the US Air Force
to use C-130 transports for special missions, the beginning of a long
tradition that remains today. In 1961 the special operations capabilities of
the Air Force were again established with the creation of the 4400th Combat
Crew Training Squadron (aka "Jungle Jim"). The 4400th was headquartered at
Hurlburt Field located at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida and began training
aircrews for counter-insurgency operations. The squadron was then changed to
a group, and then changed again to become part of the new Special Air
Warfare Centre. Initially, the unit operated with C-47 Dakota cargo planes,
T-28 attack trainers, and B-26K's (heavily modified A-26 invaders from
W.W.II). Despite the antiquated aircraft, the aircrews fought well and
developed many tactics to use their slow-flying machines to good effect. For
example, fares would be dropped off to the side of a fort being defended so
that the airplane would not be silhouetted as it flew over the enemy's
heads. Attacks would be made from different directions on different passes
so that the enemy would not find a pattern and set up traps. These tactics
made their missions more effective and safer, but there was still a high
toll of airframes and crew.
Structural problems caused by the age of
the aircraft and compounded by their heavy usage, and rough operating
conditions lead to a series of accidents caused by structural failure. As a
result these original aircraft were retired and A-1E Skyraiders were brought
in. The Air Force would continue to use these aircraft for Search And Rescue
(SAR) for the rest of the Vietnam War. The Vietnam war saw the not only the
rebirth of the Air Forces Special Operations forces, but also the addition
of new abilities and the aircraft to carry these missions out. U-10 Helio
Courier aircraft were used to transport personnel and material into
virtually any airfield or dirt road in Vietnam and Laos. The U-10's were
also used in Psychological Operations, dropping propaganda leaflets or
broadcasting voice messages over loudspeakers as the aircraft flew low and
slow over the jungle. Also used in the Psychological Operations theatre was
the MC-130 Combat Talon. Using their larger capacity, higher ceiling, and
longer range, the MC-130's would haul large bundles of counterfeit money up
to altitude near Hanoi and dump them so that they would land where the
citizens would pick them up and hopefully read the propaganda message
attached. They were so successful and the counterfeit money so effective
that the North Vietnamese Government refused to negotiate in 1969 until that
bombing campaign stopped. It was also about this time that the Air Force
began seriously use helicopters for recovery of airmen shot down behind
enemy lines (which was pretty much everywhere in Vietnam). HH-53 Jolly
Greens that the Air Force acquired from the Navy were outfitted with
refuelling probes, radios and extra weapons to enable them to fly into enemy
controlled country to conduct SAR Operations. In addition, the Pararescue
forces began developing the ability for extended operations of the ground,
performing searches for friendly pilots hiding from enemy forces.
One of the more popular weapons to come
out the war (at least for ground forces) was the gunship. seeking to
overcome the problems caused by forward speed on accuracy, the Air Force
came up with a design where the guns were mounted on the side of an aircraft
and fired while the aircraft was circling around the target, able to keep
the guns on target as long as there was ammunition and fuel. It should be
noted that initially the USAF was HIGHLY resistant to this new concept and
it was the motivated efforts of some crucial people (such as Ronald Terry,
who paid for parts and fuel out of his own pocket when the Air Force cut
funding) that kept the program alive. To this day the Gunship is an integral
part of any USAF special opsforce and most conventional assaults. The
Vietnam War saw more than the creation of new aircraft and squadrons; new
units without aircraft were also created such as the Combat Controllers. The
soldiers in these units were trained to jump out of aircraft and perform
vital tasks on the ground, such as guiding rescue aircraft in or acting as a
Forward Air Controller on the ground. Although they were trained to insert
via jumping from fixed-wing aircraft, usually they were based at forward
locations or were inserted via helicopter. Both the Combat Controllers and
Pararescue teams, participated in many missions and saved countless lives.
In particular, note should be made of the citations received. In a war
dominated by medal-happy officers, enlisted ranks rarely received the
commendations they deserved. Only 19 enlisted airmen received the Air Cross
Medal, given for extreme bravery and heroism on the battlefield. Of those
19, ten were members of the Pararescue teams.
Ultimately, the Vietnam War saw the USAF
field three Aircraft that remain in service today (AC-130, MC-130, and
H-53), foster the Combat Controllers and PJ's, and raise at least three
Squadrons (15th, 20th SOS). Following the Vietnam War, the Air Force once
again diminished the size of their special operations capabilities, but this
time they did not get rid of them. Special operations crews were present in
two actions following the war. In May of 1975 (shortly after the close of
the Vietnam War) an American freighter, the USS Mayaguez, was boarded and
seized by the crew of a Cambodian gunboat while sailing in international
waters. The order came down from Washington to immediately recapture the
boat and free the crew. After a brief search the ship was located on Tang
Island. Members and helicopters of the 21st SOS and US Marines were
dispatched to the USS Coral Sea. The plan seemed simple, the helicopters
would drop a USMC raiding force that would overpower the guards and free the
captives, which would then be loaded onto the helicopters for the ride back
to the carrier. Unfortunately for the aircrew and US Marines present, there
was no proper intel and the planners of the mission forgot some lessons that
had been learned in Vietnam. The members of the force were briefed that they
could expect eleven guards, and lightly armed ones at that. A later inquiry
revealed that a passing gunship had counted up to 50 campfires, but that no
one had shown any interest in passing the information on. Operating on the
assumption of light defence no attack aircraft were attached to provide
defence for the helicopters and ground troops.
In the end it was very nearly a total
disaster. The eleven "lightly armed" Khmer Rouge soldiers turned out to be
in excess of 300, and some were armed with rocket-powered Grenades and heavy
machine guns. Two aircraft were immediately shot down and several more
limped away, one losing its last engine on the way to the carrier and
another so full of holes that it had to stay connected to an MC-130 tanker
the entire flight back to the carrier to keep from running out of fuel. In
the end fifteen soldiers had been killed and three were missing, with
another 50 wounded. The crew of the Mayaguez was found to be on the mainland
and were rescued by an American destroyer after being set adrift on a
fishing boat. The second action was the attempted rescue of American
hostages from Tehran, Iran. This operation also ended in disaster, with at
least eight American servicemen losing their lives. Although the operation
ended badly, there were many positive effects. Because of the confusion and
lack of force cohesion it was decided to create a joint special operations
command that would oversee training and integration of special forces units,
including the US Air Force's. This effort would take time to complete, and
only very basic contacts had been set up by the time the US decided to
invade Grenada in 1983.
Tensions between the US and the Grenadan
government had increased and reached a peak when the current Prime Minister
was killed in a coup. There were over 1,000 Americans on the island, many of
them medical students studying on the island and the decision was made to go
in and provide protection for their extraction. Part of the plan involved
the securing of the airport at Point Salines. Before that happened the US
commanders needed to know the state of the airport, whether it was defended
and what obstructions might be in place. A USAF Combat Controller was tasked
for this mission, but instead of sneaking him in on a civilian airliner it
was decided that he would insert with two boatloads of SEALS from ST6 as
escorts. The insertion scheduled as a daytime drop into calm seas was
delayed and turned into a night-time drop into stormy weather, something the
newly-formed ST6 had never practiced. Consequently four members of SEAL Team
6 drowned in the insertion and the surviving force was further delayed. The
small force never reached land, but they were close enough for the Combat
Controller to see obstructions and hear local radio stations broadcasting
citizens to rise up and defend the airport from invaders. He radioed that
the airport would have to be cleared before anything could land, but by this
time the USAF MC-130 cargo aircraft carrying members of the Army's 75th
Rangers were already in transit. Instead of stepping off the planes on the
ground as had been planned, the Rangers would have to jump. Although the
drop was ultimately successful, several events happened that almost turned
it into a disaster and brought to light the weak points in the new joint
commands. While the Rangers had been told to expect heavy resistance, the
Combat Talon pilots had been told that the airfield would be lightly
defended if at all. The heavier than expected defences wound up hitting the
second MC-130 and driving it off until a circling AC-130H could suppress the
fire.
Based on their intelligence the Rangers
had requested a drop from 500 feet; a very low altitude that leaves no room
for error. The first aircraft had suffered an INS (Internal Navigation
System) failure and dropped out of position to let a fully functional
aircraft lead the way in. Consequently the Rangers arrived out of order, and
badly fragmented by the large time gap created by the heavy air defences.
Eventually all players were on the ground (remarkably no Rangers were
killed, the only casualty was one that had broken his leg) and the airport
secured for the arrival of more C-130s. The AC-130 tasked with supporting
the airport assault was responsible for taking out 6 gun pits, one BMP
armoured personnel carrier, and numerous structures that Cuban and Grenadan
troops were using for cover. It expended all of its ammunition and was in
the air for an astonishing 31 hours straight. Another AC-130 was responsible
for protecting half of a SEAL Team 6 force that had been tasked with
rescuing the governor of Grenada so that he could authorize US forces to
officially come to the island. An initial landing at the mansion had been
cut short when one of the Blackhawk helicopters was hit by antiaircraft fire
and driven off before all of the SEALS were on the ground. Outnumbered and
outgunned by the Armoured personnel carriers that appeared, the SEALs were
protected all night long by the circling AC-130. The Grenadan assault was
successful in many aspects, but a disaster in others. While the US had sent
a force to assault the island quickly, interservice fighting and extremely
poor communication caused deaths and delays of the US forces. As a result of
the problems with Grenada the US Military created the US Special Operations
Command (SOCOM) an 1987. Air Force Special Operations units were given
higher status and were consolidated into the new 23rd Air Force. However,
this was still a tenuous organization: the Air Force had signed an agreement
earlier in 1985 to turn all rotary-win aircraft over to the Army and
anti-special ops feelings still ran high in the Air Force brass (Special
Note, I hear rumblings that the Air Force brass is trying this again. The
MH-60 Pavehawk is being transferred to Search and Rescue Units with no
replacement for the SOW's).
AFSOC was created from the 23rd Air Force
in May of 1990. AFSOC has control over three wings, three groups, as well as
the USAF Special Operations School and Special Missions Operational Test &
Evaluation Centre. Some of the changes that occurred after the creation of
the new command was the creation of the Special Tactics Groups, an
organization that blended the USAF Combat Controllers and Pararescue Jumpers
into an integrated force capable of supporting all the different US Special
Forces units in their unique capabilities. This new integration and force
structure was put to the test during the Panama invasion in 1989 and for the
most part worked with flying colours. All of the Air Force's special
operations aircraft types took place in the invasion and members of the
Special Tactics Groups were assigned to help out the other service's
soldiers. MC-130 Combat Talons dropped Army Rangers on an airfields while
HC-130 Combat Shadows (now MC-130 Combat Shadows) stayed in the air the
entire first night refuelling American aircraft. Nine AC-130's provided
cover during the many actions (including the Navy SEALs disastrous assault
on Patilla Airfield). MH-60 Pavehawks shuttled conventional and special
operations forces around the cities and countryside while MH-53J's provided
transport as well as fire support for American troops. Combat Controllers
were along with the SEALs during the Patilla assault, providing their
capabilities to the force, and combined Special Tactics Teams helped the
Army Rangers assault two separate airfields simultaneously. In the end
several aircraft had been damaged but none shot down and no USAF Special
Operations airmen were killed. While there was one friendly fire incident
(no US Soldiers were killed) another gunship crew was recognized and given
medals for refusing a direct order to fire on what turned out to be American
soldiers who were in the process of capturing a Panamanian APC. There were
problems and errors made, but they were readily noticeable and ones that the
Air Commandos could learn from and improve on in time for their next
conflict--The Gulf War.
In 1990 The Forces of Iraq invaded and
conquered the country of Kuwait. Fearful of a continued drive through Saudi
Arabia, American forces were immediately dispatched and plans made for the
defence of the US's oil-rich ally. From the beginning USAF special
operations personnel were present. USAF Combat controllers handled all of
the air traffic at King Fahd airport during the build-up of Allied forces.
During that time, they handled the busiest airport in the history of the
world, some days handling as many as 1,800 operations per day (that equates
out to 75 operations an hour, or an aircraft taking off or landing at
intervals of less than a second between each operation). After the build-up
they moved to Al Jouf Airfield, just south of the Iraqi/Saudi border
preparing to handle battle-damaged aircraft returning from the first night
of the air war. Although the supreme allied commander General Schwartzkopf
had a dislike of special forces, he allowed them some missions early in the
war. The Iraqi border was ringed by an array of high-tech long-range radars
that could warn the Iraqi command of incoming bombers and attack aircraft.
In order to minimize the Iraqi response the element of surprise was needed
and that meant destroying the radars before the Iraqis knew aircraft were on
the way. In an excellent example of inter-service coordination, 4 USAF
MH-53J's lead eight US Army AH-64 Apaches through the Iraqi front lines and
near to two long range radar complexes in an operation named "Eager Anvil".
The Pave lows marked a precise spot with bundles of chem-sticks and then
moved off to a close orbit. Using the chemsticks to precisely update their
internal navigation systems, the Apaches were able to destroy both radar
stations completely within ten seconds of each other. The combined team of
Pave Low and Apache were the first American and Allied aircraft across the
border during the air war.
Pave Low's provided also CSAR for downed
pilots, rescuing the first a Navy F-14 pilot four days after the war
started. During that mission the abilities of the Pilots were shown as they
hid their aircraft in the desert from an Iraqi fighter searching for them
and crossed the border twice while searching for the Navy Pilot. More
recently USAF Special Operations Squadrons have aided US counter-narcotic
efforts in Latin America. MC-130, MH-53J, and MH-60G Aircraft operated in
theatre supporting US and other indigenous troops in the fight against drugs
and Narco-terrorists. The MH-60G Was retired from AFSOC and transferred to
the Air Combat Command for use in the CSAR role, although they continue to
work very closely with AFSOC assets such as Pararescue groups and often
deploy in support of special operations missions.
|
Department of Defence Intelligence and
Related Organizations |
Office of the Secretary of
Defence Assistant Secretary for
Communications, Command, Control and Intelligence
Deputy Assistant Secretary (Intelligence
and Security) (DASD)
Intelligence Systems Support Office (ISSO)
Assistant to the Secretary for
Intelligence Oversight
Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
J-2 Directorate of Intelligence
US Joint Forces Command
Atlantic Intelligence Centre
Blue Light /Delta Force
Cruise Missile Support Activity (CMSA)
First Special Operations Wing
Information Analysis Centre (IAC)
Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) East
(JTF-4)
Joint Task Force 6 /Nightstalkers
SEAL Team 6 (Special counterterrorist)
US Army Ranger Battalions /Black Berets
US Army Special Forces /Green Berets
US Marine Force Reconnaissance Company
US Navy, Sea, Air and Land Platoons /SEAL
USMC Battalion Landing Team
USMC Marine Amphibious Unit
US European Command
Intelligence Directorate (ECJ2)
Joint Analysis Centre - JAC
US Southern Command
Joint Intelligence Centre - JICSOUTH
Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) -
South
US Central Command
Joint Intelligence Centre - JICCENT
US Pacific Command
Joint Intelligence Centre Pacific [JICPAC]
Joint Intelligence Training Activity
Pacific
Special Intelligence Communications
Centre
Cruise Missile Support Activity - CMSA
Camp Smith, HI
Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) West
[JTF-5]
US Special Operations Command
Joint Intelligence Centre - JICSOC
US Strategic Command
Joint Intelligence Centre - JICSTRAT
US Space Command
Joint Intelligence Centre - JICSPACE
US Transportation Command
CJ-2 Intelligence Directorate
Joint Intelligence Centre - JICTRANS
Defence Support Program Office
Defence Dissemination Program Office
(DDPO) |